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A80 controller describes a deviation from standard procedures during ILS prm approaches to runways 26R; 27R side step 27L;and 28 when a B777 crew requests an RNAV prm 27L approach and is approved. There is no one to monitor this approach and separation is lost when the B777 descends below 4;000 feet. When the final monitors questioned the operation to the supervisor they were told not to worry about it.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1301135 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201510 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | A80.TRACON |
| State Reference | GA |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B777-200 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Final Approach |
| Route In Use | Other RNAV PRM 27L |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Make Model Name | B737-800 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Final Approach |
| Route In Use | Other RNAV PRM 28 |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Approach |
| Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
| Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Operating on a west operation running triple ILS approaches. The localizer for 27L is OTS. So; we were running ILS's to runways 26R; 27R side step 27L; and 28. A B777 requested the RNAV prm 27L approach and it was approved by the supervisor on the wall. Since we are only able to monitor a total of three finals at any given time it would be required to get another person to monitor the B777 aircraft on a separate scope. Therefore the B777 was not monitored by an appropriate monitor controller for a prm approach while a B737 was turned onto the runway 28 final for an ILS prm approach as well. Separation was lost when the B777 descended below 4;000 feet on the approach. When the final monitors questioned the operation to the supervisor they were told not to worry about it. In turn allowing the separation loss to occur. There was then another aircraft that was going to do the same procedure as the B777; but this time the finals were instructed to stagger so the monitors would not be 'gigged with the error'. It is common practice to staff another monitor controller for such an operation. But in this case it was not followed. Staffing levels may have contributed to this situation and the inability to get personnel in position to run the proper operation required for this procedure.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A80 Controller describes a deviation from standard procedures during ILS PRM approaches to Runways 26R; 27R side step 27L;and 28 when a B777 crew requests an RNAV PRM 27L approach and is approved. There is no one to monitor this approach and separation is lost when the B777 descends below 4;000 feet. When the final monitors questioned the operation to the Supervisor they were told not to worry about it.
Narrative: Operating on a west operation running triple ILS approaches. The localizer for 27L is OTS. So; we were running ILS's to runways 26R; 27R side step 27L; and 28. A B777 requested the RNAV PRM 27L approach and it was approved by the supervisor on the wall. Since we are only able to monitor a total of three finals at any given time it would be required to get another person to monitor the B777 aircraft on a separate scope. Therefore the B777 was not monitored by an appropriate monitor controller for a PRM approach while a B737 was turned onto the Runway 28 final for an ILS PRM approach as well. Separation was lost when the B777 descended below 4;000 feet on the approach. When the final monitors questioned the operation to the supervisor they were told not to worry about it. In turn allowing the separation loss to occur. There was then another aircraft that was going to do the same procedure as the B777; but this time the finals were instructed to stagger so the monitors would not be 'gigged with the error'. It is common practice to staff another monitor controller for such an operation. But in this case it was not followed. Staffing levels may have contributed to this situation and the inability to get personnel in position to run the proper operation required for this procedure.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.