Narrative:

I have flown this SID; in 8 different aircraft in the past year. This incident is the only time I have flown the SID in a honeywell aircraft. We were cleared via the following string; YOKES4.dehli..onl.J114.fsd.. Per company policy at a minimum; the departure runway and SID must be included in the pre-departure brief. As practiced for my 10+ years as a captain; I have always briefed the entire route to include the anticipated landing runway at the destination. There is no doubt in my mind that the entire route was entered; verified and briefed correctly. I would even offer that the cvr be pulled to verify. Typically; where there is a runway change; the flight plan in the FMC may default to a discontinuity after the SID transition or even prior to if the transition is runway specific. As I stated above; I have flown this SID 8 times in the past year; 7 times in a thales FMC; with no incident with and without a runway change. Whenever there is a runway change in the FMC; I would confidently state that most airbus pilots would immediately look for; verify and clear a discontinuity. On this particular day; we planned for; briefed and took off from the same runway. There was no reason to suspect nor did we notice a discontinuity in the flight plan.during the climb; I noticed a discontinuity after dehli. I recall stating dehli (the transition); verifying and clearing the discontinuity. This was prior to yokes with the screen range set to either 40 or 80 nm. After passing yokes; we received a call from ATC asking us to verify our clearance. We looked at and read back our pre departure clearance clearance. He stated there was a fix we were supposed to be going to; chici. We looked at the chart again and indeed verified that chici was no longer in the flight plan. The controller asked which model of FMC we had and we stated it was a honeywell. He stated that ATC was aware of a continuing problem with honeywell FMC's and this particular SID. We were cleared to a downstream fix.based on ATC's comments; I am appalled that a crew was dispatched with a known problem that ATC and I am assuming; that company was aware of. The first officer (first officer) and I were neither trained; briefed nor was there a memo issued about the deficiency. In today's day and age with reporting programs geared to preventing safety concerns; punitive actions for known deficiencies by ATC; aircraft manufacturer; FMC manufacturer and company should not be born by the crew. I have over 10 years' experience as an airbus captain; have written a guide for airbus FMC operation and am frequently asked for guidance from my peers. I have even identified and reported several deficiencies in the past and I am very aware of most of its nuances. This is the first time I was made aware of this particular deficiency and it was via a notice of deviation from the FAA. I don't know what either the first officer or I could have done to prevent this incident without the proper support of before mentioned entities. Not only did we brief and operate per SOP but we went over and above. We have way too many versions of FMC's and software versions. Clearly; if one of the more prolific operators of the airbus is given notice of a deviation then the problem has a far greater potential and maybe detrimental consequences. If problems are known and only communicated post incident; then the system itself has failed.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 equipped with a Honeywell FMS had a track deviation flying the DEN YOKES FOUR RNAV after the waypoint CHICI dropped from the flight plan. ATC indicated the missing CHICI waypoint was a common anomaly on Honeywell FMS aircraft.

Narrative: I have flown this SID; in 8 different aircraft in the past year. This incident is the only time I have flown the SID in a Honeywell aircraft. We were cleared via the following string; YOKES4.DEHLI..ONL.J114.FSD.. Per Company Policy at a minimum; the departure runway and SID must be included in the pre-departure brief. As practiced for my 10+ years as a captain; I have always briefed the entire route to include the anticipated landing runway at the destination. There is no doubt in my mind that the entire route was entered; verified and briefed correctly. I would even offer that the CVR be pulled to verify. Typically; where there is a runway change; the flight plan in the FMC may default to a discontinuity after the SID transition or even prior to if the transition is runway specific. As I stated above; I have flown this SID 8 times in the past year; 7 times in a Thales FMC; with no incident with and without a runway change. Whenever there is a runway change in the FMC; I would confidently state that most Airbus pilots would immediately look for; verify and clear a discontinuity. On this particular day; we planned for; briefed and took off from the same runway. There was no reason to suspect nor did we notice a discontinuity in the flight plan.During the climb; I noticed a discontinuity after DEHLI. I recall stating DEHLI (the transition); verifying and clearing the discontinuity. This was prior to YOKES with the screen range set to either 40 or 80 nm. After passing YOKES; we received a call from ATC asking us to verify our clearance. We looked at and read back our PDC clearance. He stated there was a fix we were supposed to be going to; CHICI. We looked at the chart again and indeed verified that CHICI was no longer in the flight plan. The controller asked which model of FMC we had and we stated it was a Honeywell. He stated that ATC was aware of a continuing problem with Honeywell FMC's and this particular SID. We were cleared to a downstream fix.Based on ATC's comments; I am appalled that a crew was dispatched with a known problem that ATC and I am assuming; that company was aware of. The first officer (FO) and I were neither trained; briefed nor was there a memo issued about the deficiency. In today's day and age with reporting programs geared to PREVENTING safety concerns; punitive actions for known deficiencies by ATC; aircraft manufacturer; FMC manufacturer and company should not be born by the crew. I have over 10 years' experience as an Airbus captain; have written a guide for airbus FMC operation and am frequently asked for guidance from my peers. I have even identified and reported several deficiencies in the past and I am very aware of most of its nuances. This is the first time I was made aware of this particular deficiency and it was via a notice of deviation from the FAA. I don't know what either the FO or I could have done to prevent this incident without the proper support of before mentioned entities. Not only did we brief and operate per SOP but we went over and above. We have way too many versions of FMC's and software versions. Clearly; if one of the more prolific operators of the Airbus is given notice of a deviation then the problem has a far greater potential and maybe detrimental consequences. If problems are known and only communicated post incident; then the system itself has failed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.