Narrative:

Our flight was dispatched through the tehran fir (flight information region) boundary operating over iranian airspace. This routing brought our flight near; but not through; the simferopol (ukfv) fir in which the FAA created special federal aviation regulation (sfar) no 113; 91.1607 in response to the shoot down of [an air carrier aircraft] by missile. The only notams and warnings provided in our paperwork by dispatch concerned the simferpol (ukfv) fir. The bbc news broadcast approximately 2hrs prior to departure was reporting the russian caspian sea navy was launching cruise missiles through the tehran (oiix) fir to targets in syria at unknown flight levels and that the eu aviation governing body had issued a warning to eu nation aircraft of missile activity in the tehran (oiix) fir. It was reported [other airlines] were already suspending flights through the tehran fir. However; no such FAA warning had been issued by the FAA prior to the departure of [our flight]. Airborne we received an ACARS message from [company] notifying us of missile activity (without the normal promulgation of appropriate aeronautical information); may exist within portions of the tehran (oiix) fir. At that time we were airborne and approximately 1hr from entering the tehran (oiix) fir. As the international relief officer (international relief officer) I was currently just beginning break in the galley; however rejoined the flight deck to assist the captain and first officer. The captain asked [company] flight control for a threat assessment and after 45mins more of waiting on [company] control and only 15mins from the tehran fir [we were] rerouted to omdb dubai due to the unknown risks of russian cruise missiles potentially occupying the same airspace as [our flight] in the tehran fir. Operations within the middle east are currently tenuous at best and very fluid with unpredictable military movements. [We] just barely received timely information to avoid a very unpredictable situation of operating thru a russian missile firing range over iranian airspace. It is unknown and a concern why prior to 2hrs of departure missile activity in the tehran fir was reported by the bbc; but no notams or warnings concerning missile activity to us registered civil aircraft was provided in the departure paperwork to the operating crew concerning the 'tehran fir' situation. Having experienced it first-hand this crewmember recommends a more dynamic and timely warning system if we are to continue operations in this region. A more timely day by day or even hourly threat assessment is recommended be put in place to warn civil aircraft with immediate pre-determined actions to be carried out to avoid military threats to civil aircraft operating near syria; iraq; iran; ukraine airspaces.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 First Officer reported his company was late advising them of possible missile activity along their route near Tehran.

Narrative: Our flight was dispatched through the Tehran FIR (Flight Information Region) boundary operating over Iranian airspace. This routing brought our flight near; but not through; the Simferopol (UKFV) FIR in which the FAA created Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No 113; 91.1607 in response to the shoot down of [an air carrier aircraft] by missile. The only NOTAMs and warnings provided in our paperwork by Dispatch concerned the Simferpol (UKFV) FIR. The BBC news broadcast approximately 2hrs prior to departure was reporting The Russian Caspian Sea navy was launching cruise missiles through the Tehran (OIIX) FIR to targets in Syria at unknown flight levels and that the EU aviation governing body had issued a warning to EU nation aircraft of Missile activity in the Tehran (OIIX) FIR. It was reported [other airlines] were already suspending flights through the Tehran FIR. However; no such FAA warning had been issued by the FAA prior to the departure of [our flight]. Airborne we received an ACARS message from [company] notifying us of Missile activity (without the normal promulgation of appropriate aeronautical information); may exist within portions of the Tehran (OIIX) FIR. At that time we were airborne and approximately 1hr from entering the Tehran (OIIX) FIR. As the IRO (International Relief Officer) I was currently just beginning break in the galley; however rejoined the flight deck to assist the Captain and F/O. The Captain asked [company] flight control for a threat assessment and after 45mins more of waiting on [company] control and only 15mins from the Tehran FIR [we were] rerouted to OMDB Dubai due to the unknown risks of Russian cruise missiles potentially occupying the same airspace as [our flight] in the Tehran FIR. Operations within the Middle East are currently tenuous at best and very fluid with unpredictable military movements. [We] just barely received timely information to avoid a very unpredictable situation of operating thru a Russian Missile firing range over Iranian airspace. It is unknown and a concern why prior to 2hrs of departure missile activity in the Tehran FIR was reported by the BBC; but no NOTAMs or warnings concerning missile activity to US registered civil aircraft was provided in the departure paperwork to the operating crew concerning the 'TEHRAN FIR' situation. Having experienced it first-hand this Crewmember recommends a more dynamic and timely warning system if we are to continue operations in this region. A more timely day by day or even hourly threat assessment is recommended be put in place to warn civil aircraft with immediate pre-determined actions to be carried out to avoid military threats to civil aircraft operating near Syria; Iraq; Iran; Ukraine airspaces.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.