Narrative:

Flight was flight planned into clt via IVANE5 arrival. During cruise phase I was discussing with first officer (first officer) about problems I and other pilots were having with this arrival caused in part by ATC consistently modifying crossing restrictions and speeds making it difficult to plan; predict; and brief; as well as the complexity of the procedure causing the box to have difficulty even when left alone by ATC. During cruise we had been told to maintain '.80 or greater;' that coupled with the initial crossing speeds of 280 caused me to modifiy both the cost index and the descent speeds to give the box the best chance as we would not be able to modify either once the descent began without 're-cruising' since it was a honeywell box. Because I expected to be 'cleared inhot;' I set mostly hard crossing altitudes into the box in lieu of the windows; again trying to be proactive. Later I modified one or two with a plus from the bottom hard alt trying to make it a little smoother descent. Before lyh we were cleared direct mayos. Well after we passed the top of descent point for mayos; we were given a clearance to cross mayos at FL220; 2;000 feet below the window; and maintain .79 or greater. I had to work a little but we made it. At this point I am a little foggy as things were now happening pretty quickly. At some point we were cleared direct to I think majic; told to disregard the speeds until we needed to slow for the restriction. We were handed off to atl center at some point after we slowed for the restriction and were told to 'descend via the IVANE5 landing north' and maintain maximum forward airspeed (which I think we questioned). I then set 6;000 feet (the bottom alt) and managed descent. Because I was late slowing; I crossed majic considerably higher than the bottom of the window I had planned but below the top of the window. After majic 'too steep descent' was displayed and I looked up and noticed on the nd that hikrr showed -11;000 feet. Knowing I was high; I pulled V/south and dived for 11;000 feet. I barely made hikrr at 11;000 feet within ATC standards. Seeing the next window bottom was 10;000 feet I relaxed and thought I pushed 'manage' [for] the rest of the descent. Unfortunately; the pilot monitoring (pm) was distracted at the same time answering a late call for another wheel chair and should not be penalized for my mistake. Apparently; it would seem that I did not push the manage button; as shortly after we were questioned about what arrival we were on and told to climb back to 10;000 feet. When I looked; I was still in V/south and below 10;000 feet. I never did notice how low we got as I was busy trying to get back to 10;000 feet. We were given a right turn to 270 and told to stop at 9;000 feet. Later we were given a heading back to intercept and resume the arrival. Even though nothing else was said; it was ugly; so I would be surprised if we did not see a pd.later upon reflection; I was extremely upset because I knew all about; planned for; and briefed mitigating stratigies for the IVANE5 problems and still got burned! Interestingly; we flew the same acft the next day and I noticed something strange on the capt's mcdu. The + and - buttons were reversed so that when you push + you get - and when you push - you get +. I think in retrospect; when I tried to put hikrr at /+110 the day before; as indicated on the arrival; the box saw /-110 which I somehow did not notice when I reviewed my changes. Regardless of the mcdu issue; I failed to properly monitor and manage the aircraft. The pm was unfortunately out of the loop when this happened answering a late call from the flight attendant.based on previous as soon as possible reports and anecdotal evidence; I think we as a company should engage washington center; atlanta center and charlotte approach to get this ivane arrival fixed and educate controllers about the problems caused by deviating from the published procedure. For the same reason we have sops; pilots should have areasonable expectation of what to expect when assigned the IVANE5 arrival.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew reported overshooting a crossing restriction on a 'descend via' clearance into CLT; citing multiple ATC changes and FMS problems as contributing.

Narrative: Flight was flight planned into CLT via IVANE5 Arrival. During cruise phase I was discussing with First Officer (FO) about problems I and other pilots were having with this arrival caused in part by ATC consistently modifying crossing restrictions and speeds making it difficult to plan; predict; and brief; as well as the complexity of the procedure causing the box to have difficulty even when left alone by ATC. During cruise we had been told to maintain '.80 or greater;' that coupled with the initial crossing speeds of 280 caused me to modifiy both the cost index and the descent speeds to give the box the best chance as we would not be able to modify either once the descent began without 're-cruising' since it was a Honeywell box. Because I expected to be 'cleared inhot;' I set mostly hard crossing altitudes into the box in lieu of the windows; again trying to be proactive. Later I modified one or two with a plus from the bottom hard alt trying to make it a little smoother descent. Before LYH we were cleared direct MAYOS. Well after we passed the Top of Descent point for MAYOS; we were given a clearance to cross MAYOS at FL220; 2;000 feet below the window; and maintain .79 or greater. I had to work a little but we made it. At this point I am a little foggy as things were now happening pretty quickly. At some point we were cleared direct to I think MAJIC; told to disregard the speeds until we needed to slow for the restriction. We were handed off to ATL Center at some point after we slowed for the restriction and were told to 'descend via the IVANE5 landing North' and maintain maximum forward airspeed (which I think we questioned). I then set 6;000 feet (the bottom alt) and managed descent. Because I was late slowing; I crossed MAJIC considerably higher than the bottom of the window I had planned but below the top of the window. After MAJIC 'Too Steep Descent' was displayed and I looked up and noticed on the ND that HIKRR showed -11;000 feet. Knowing I was high; I pulled V/S and dived for 11;000 feet. I barely made HIKRR at 11;000 feet within ATC standards. Seeing the next window bottom was 10;000 feet I relaxed and thought I pushed 'manage' [for] the rest of the descent. Unfortunately; the Pilot monitoring (PM) was distracted at the same time answering a late call for another wheel chair and should not be penalized for my mistake. Apparently; it would seem that I did not push the manage button; as shortly after we were questioned about what arrival we were on and told to climb back to 10;000 feet. When I looked; I was still in V/S and below 10;000 feet. I never did notice how low we got as I was busy trying to get back to 10;000 feet. We were given a right turn to 270 and told to stop at 9;000 feet. Later we were given a heading back to intercept and resume the arrival. Even though nothing else was said; it was ugly; so I would be surprised if we did not see a PD.Later upon reflection; I was extremely upset because I knew all about; planned for; and briefed mitigating stratigies for the IVANE5 problems and still got burned! Interestingly; we flew the same acft the next day and I noticed something strange on the Capt's MCDU. The + and - buttons were reversed so that when you push + you get - and when you push - you get +. I think in retrospect; when I tried to put HIKRR at /+110 the day before; as indicated on the arrival; the box saw /-110 which I somehow did not notice when I reviewed my changes. Regardless of the MCDU issue; I failed to properly monitor and manage the aircraft. The PM was unfortunately out of the loop when this happened answering a late call from the Flight Attendant.Based on previous ASAP reports and anecdotal evidence; I think we as a company should engage Washington Center; Atlanta Center and Charlotte Approach to get this IVANE arrival fixed and educate controllers about the problems caused by deviating from the published procedure. For the same reason we have SOPs; pilots should have areasonable expectation of what to expect when assigned the IVANE5 arrival.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.