Narrative:

At approximately 20;000 feet on the arrival the captain was checking the fuel on board and happened to notice the pitch trim indications in amber. He pointed it out to me and transferred the flight controls and radios to [me] while he referenced the QRH to see what the most applicable scenario would be. During this time I suggested we disconnect the autopilot to see if the aircraft can still be trimmed and perhaps we have had a bad indication of the position. As soon as I disconnected the autopilot we received a master caution for ap fail and pitch trim fail. The captain ran the ap fail QRH and while it states after 10 seconds you may attempt to reengage the ap we felt this wouldn't be the safest course of action combined with a pitch trim fail. Upon running the pitch trim fail QRH procedure; the fault remained and trim switches did not work. The captain sent an ACARS message to dispatch to advise them of the [situation] and notified ATC [of the situation]. He also notified the flight attendants and passengers of the situation and requested direct to [the airport]. The captain then took over controls and elected to slow down early at a high altitude to see how the aircraft would respond slowing from 270 to 250. During this time; the aircraft became very nose heavy. I called the flight attendants and had every passenger relocate to as far aft as possible (we had a total of 59 passengers). Passengers were located in a passenger seat with their seatbelt fastened. Once everyone relocated in the aft most seats available; the aircraft became more controllable and easier to manage. Around 9;000 feet or so; I called for flaps 1 and reduced to 200kts. The aircraft seemed to behave normally. I kept the descent going to 5;000 feet on a downwind leg and slowly brought in flaps to see how the aircraft would respond with each setting. Eventually we were fully configured and on vapp at 5;000 feet on a left downwind. The aircraft was nose heavy on final but controllable. The touchdown was smooth and uneventful and we exited the runway. Upon exiting the runway we received a flight control no dispatch and a stall prot fault. The captain set the parking brake and we ran the appropriate QRH procedures. The captain elected to call maintenance control to verify there would be no reason that would prohibit me from continuing taxiing in under my own power. Maintenance controller and the captain both agreed as long as the hydraulic pumps were all in the on position; there would be no issues and we continued to the gate. Upon arriving at the gate; the event was briefly discussed with maintenance control and the mechanical discrepancies were recorded in the aircraft logbook. The captain expressed concern to the crew scheduling supervisor along with chief pilot that we did not feel mentally fit to continue the rest of the night to [destination]. During the phone call; the chief pilot and scheduling discussed they had no reserves to cover the flight and he would have to make a few phone calls to see if we could get pulled off the rest of our flying for the night. About 20 minutes later; scheduling called back and advised us [company] had decided to pull us off the [flight].

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-175 First Officer reported AP FAIL and PITCH TRIM FAIL master caution warnings on descent to their destination.

Narrative: At approximately 20;000 feet on the arrival the Captain was checking the fuel on board and happened to notice the pitch trim indications in amber. He pointed it out to me and transferred the flight controls and radios to [me] while he referenced the QRH to see what the most applicable scenario would be. During this time I suggested we disconnect the autopilot to see if the aircraft can still be trimmed and perhaps we have had a bad indication of the position. As soon as I disconnected the autopilot we received a master caution for AP FAIL and PITCH TRIM FAIL. The Captain ran the AP FAIL QRH and while it states after 10 seconds you may attempt to reengage the AP we felt this wouldn't be the safest course of action combined with a PITCH TRIM FAIL. Upon running the PITCH TRIM FAIL QRH procedure; the fault remained and trim switches did not work. The Captain sent an ACARS message to dispatch to advise them of the [situation] and notified ATC [of the situation]. He also notified the flight attendants and passengers of the situation and requested direct to [the airport]. The Captain then took over controls and elected to slow down early at a high altitude to see how the aircraft would respond slowing from 270 to 250. During this time; the aircraft became very nose heavy. I called the flight attendants and had every passenger relocate to as far aft as possible (we had a total of 59 passengers). Passengers were located in a passenger seat with their seatbelt fastened. Once everyone relocated in the aft most seats available; the aircraft became more controllable and easier to manage. Around 9;000 feet or so; I called for flaps 1 and reduced to 200kts. The aircraft seemed to behave normally. I kept the descent going to 5;000 feet on a downwind leg and slowly brought in flaps to see how the aircraft would respond with each setting. Eventually we were fully configured and on VAPP at 5;000 feet on a left downwind. The aircraft was nose heavy on final but controllable. The touchdown was smooth and uneventful and we exited the runway. Upon exiting the runway we received a FLT CONTROL NO DISPATCH and a STALL PROT FAULT. The Captain set the parking brake and we ran the appropriate QRH procedures. The Captain elected to call maintenance control to verify there would be no reason that would prohibit me from continuing taxiing in under my own power. Maintenance Controller and the Captain both agreed as long as the HYD pumps were all in the on position; there would be no issues and we continued to the gate. Upon arriving at the gate; the event was briefly discussed with maintenance control and the mechanical discrepancies were recorded in the aircraft logbook. The Captain expressed concern to the crew scheduling supervisor along with chief pilot that we did not feel mentally fit to continue the rest of the night to [destination]. During the phone call; the chief pilot and scheduling discussed they had no reserves to cover the flight and he would have to make a few phone calls to see if we could get pulled off the rest of our flying for the night. About 20 minutes later; scheduling called back and advised us [Company] had decided to pull us off the [flight].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.