Narrative:

The entire flight was uneventful until turning base for the runway. The weather was not a factor. The first officer had slowed down and had flaps 5 before turning base. Approach asked if we had the airport in sight. I asked the first officer and he said yes. We were then cleared for the visual approach.in descent the first officer briefed the RNAV approach to the runway with the appropriate minimums set. After being cleared for the visual approach I extended a line from zzzzz intersection to intercept the final approach course. I asked the first officer if it looked good. He agreed so I executed it.when being cleared for the visual approach the first officer disconnected the autopilot and did not engage VNAV or LNAV. I put the decision altitude (da) in the altitude window.at this point things changed rapidly. The first officer was not configuring; so I encouraged him to do so. He called for gear and flaps 20. I told him we needed to be configured by 1;500 AGL. I believe I asked him if I could select flaps 30 and he agreed. We did get a momentary horn as the gear was not fully down at this time. The final flaps were probably selected at about 1;200 AGL; 300 feet lower then procedure calls for.at this point I believe the relief officer (ro) and I notice the speed low. I only noticed 10 knots slow while the ro said he noticed 20 knots slow. We both stated this fact and called for an increase in power. We then got fast and slow again. At one point I noticed 4 red on the PAPI and informed the first officer.unbelievably; we were stable at 500 and continued to a normal landing. This approach was at the end of a 9 hour flight; so there is no doubt in my mind that fatigue had something to do with the way this event happened.in the area above; I checked several communication boxes. When I brief the flight attendants and crew I stress the importance of communication. Although what the first officer did was legal under these conditions; it would have been helpful for the ro and me to know his intentions.as stated about everything came undone about the time the autopilot was disconnected. It is good to hand fly; yet under conditions as this; being at the end of a 9 hours flight; I would recommend using all available resources.at the gate we discussed this for some time. One major problem is the first officer was arguing with me about when we needed to be fully configured. 777 operating manual (OM) volume 1; page 20.2 states that landing flaps must be selected no lower than 1;500 feet AGL. The ro was forced to get the OM out to show this to the first officer.not using automation and every available resource and not knowing very basic procedures are what caused this event to happen. While I was distracted by lack of configuration; the ro noticed the airspeed. There were many things happening and it's impossible to monitor everything at once. Due to the coordination of the ro and myself; I believe we prevented this situation from getting much worse; as the first officer was not making corrections without us bringing them to his attention.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Boeing 777 flight crew reported that an approach became unstable after transitioning from auto to manual flight. A delay in final configuration and several speed excursions contributed to this event; however; at 500 feet the aircraft was in a stable condition and an uneventful landing was accomplished.

Narrative: The entire flight was uneventful until turning base for the runway. The weather was not a factor. The FO had slowed down and had flaps 5 before turning base. Approach asked if we had the airport in sight. I asked the FO and he said yes. We were then cleared for the visual approach.In descent the FO briefed the RNAV approach to the runway with the appropriate minimums set. After being cleared for the visual approach I extended a line from ZZZZZ intersection to intercept the final approach course. I asked the FO if it looked good. He agreed so I executed it.When being cleared for the visual approach the FO disconnected the autopilot and did not engage VNAV or LNAV. I put the Decision Altitude (DA) in the altitude window.At this point things changed rapidly. The FO was not configuring; so I encouraged him to do so. He called for gear and flaps 20. I told him we needed to be configured by 1;500 AGL. I believe I asked him if I could select flaps 30 and he agreed. We did get a momentary horn as the gear was not fully down at this time. The final flaps were probably selected at about 1;200 AGL; 300 feet lower then procedure calls for.At this point I believe the Relief Officer (RO) and I notice the speed low. I only noticed 10 knots slow while the RO said he noticed 20 knots slow. We both stated this fact and called for an increase in power. We then got fast and slow again. At one point I noticed 4 red on the PAPI and informed the FO.Unbelievably; we were stable at 500 and continued to a normal landing. This approach was at the end of a 9 hour flight; so there is no doubt in my mind that fatigue had something to do with the way this event happened.In the area above; I checked several communication boxes. When I brief the flight attendants and crew I stress the importance of communication. Although what the FO did was legal under these conditions; it would have been helpful for the RO and me to know his intentions.As stated about everything came undone about the time the autopilot was disconnected. It is good to hand fly; yet under conditions as this; being at the end of a 9 hours flight; I would recommend using all available resources.At the gate we discussed this for some time. One major problem is the FO was arguing with me about when we needed to be fully configured. 777 Operating Manual (OM) Volume 1; page 20.2 states that landing flaps must be selected no lower than 1;500 feet AGL. The RO was forced to get the OM out to show this to the FO.Not using automation and every available resource and not knowing very basic procedures are what caused this event to happen. While I was distracted by lack of configuration; the RO noticed the airspeed. There were many things happening and it's impossible to monitor everything at once. Due to the coordination of the RO and myself; I believe we prevented this situation from getting much worse; as the FO was not making corrections without us bringing them to his attention.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.