Narrative:

We had just departed on runway 26R. We had cleaned up the airplane and were climbing when when we received an ECAM caution for 'vent skin valve fault'. I was pilot flying while the captain was pilot monitoring. [He] reacted quickly and began the SOP for non normal ops. Including immediate action/ECAM exception determinations and designating flying duties. I then called for ECAM actions. [The captain] performed the correct ECAM actions for the skin valve fault which included verifying which valve was affected. In our case it was the extract valve. Both valves were showing closed but the extract valve was in amber. [He] proceeded to place both the blower and extract to ovrd per the ECAM procedure. While [the captain] was running the ECAM I was given a higher altitude from [approach] (in the low flt levels I believe...) and after conferring with [the captain]; requested to stop our climb at a lower altitude. I explained that we were working out an issue and needed to evaluate the situation before continuing higher. I believe we were given an altitude of 12;000 ft but do not remember exactly. [The captain] continued with the ECAM placing both blower and extract to ovrd did not get rid of the caution message or the extract valve in amber. The ECAM then directs manual depressurization of the cabin. I remember thinking that it was odd to depressurize a cabin that seemed to be pressurizing normally. I wanted to suggest holding off on that part of the ECAM until we could fully ascertain what was happening. In the end; I decided against putting in my two cents. [The captain] was running the ECAM and seemed to have things under control and running things by the books which was a good thing. I had my own duties as flying pilot in busy airspace to try and help troubleshoot the problem. [The captain] began to manually depressurize the cabin per the ECAM. While he was starting the procedure; I was just beginning to climb through 10;000ft. I voiced to [the captain] that we can't be going above ten if he is depressurizing the cabin and he agreed and suggested getting clearance to an altitude below 10;000ft. I quickly leveled off somewhere between 10;000 and 11;000 and requested a lower altitude. I believe [ATC] had cleared us to descend to 9;000 but can't remember the exact altitude. By the time the descent was initiated; the cabin had caught up with the aircraft altitude and we received a warning for cabin attendant pr excess cabin attendant altitude. [The captain] was about to start the SOP for this abnormal but the message went away very quickly as we descended through 10;000ft. We than decided as a crew that it was best to ask [approach] for holding in the area while we conferred with the company and decided the best course of action. We were given the published hold over zzzzz intersection. In the hold; [the captain] sent ACARS messages to dispatch about our condition and the possibility of a return to field or divert. [The captain] also called ops at ZZZ and spoke to the ops manager as well as line maintenance about possibly diverting there due to better maintenance handling vs. ZZZ1. We notified ATC that we might be diverting to ZZZ due to a pressurization issue. At no time did we declare an emergency. Before making the decision to divert to ZZZ we decided to troubleshoot our problem one last time. Captain recycled the blower and extract valves back to on from ovrd. Going back to the on position cleared away the vent skin valve fault ECAM and all valves were than showing closed and green. We than decided to put the cabin back in auto mode. The cabin began to pressurize normally. After another turn in the hold and all systems functioning normal we checked our fuel status and decided that continuing to ZZZ2 was possible and; in fact; the best course of action as we would land with over 8;000 lbs. Fuel. [The captain] sent an ACARS message to dispatch telling them that the problem was cleared and we were proceeding to ZZZ2. We ascertained a new clearance from [approach]; exited the hold when cleared and continued the rest of the flight normally. Curiously; we received an ACARS messages from dispatch that they didn't know we were continuing to ZZZ2 and thought we were going to divert to ZZZ. I then sent another ACARS message to dispatch explaining once again that everything was working normally and we were continuing to ZZZ2. Later on in the flight we received one more ACARS from dispatch apologizing for the confusion as apparently our last few messages were going to the wrong desk. We landed at ZZZ2 without further incident. I believe the cabin attendant pr excess cabin attendant altitude warning message was self-inflicted. Better crew communications could have taken place regarding the ECAM actions being executed. Specifically; getting clearance to an altitude below 10;000ft. Before starting to manually depressurize the cabin. This particular ECAM procedure could possibly be written better. Possibly with a better warning about not exceeding 10;000ft. Cabin alt when starting manual depressurization procedure. Adding the possibility of cycling the blower and extract valves back to on from ovrd should be included as well. Either way better communication between crew members should take place when doing something as extreme as manually depressurizing the cabin to prevent exceeding 10;000ft. Cabin alt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Shortly after takeoff; crew received a 'VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT' alert message. While performing the QRH procedure and without coordination with the Pilot Flying; the Pilot Monitoring began to depressurize the aircraft while in a climb to 12;000 feet. Crew then received a 'CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT' alert and re-pressurized the aircraft. During that procedure the original alert was cleared. Crew continued to destination.

Narrative: We had just departed on runway 26R. We had cleaned up the airplane and were climbing when when we received an ECAM caution for 'VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT'. I was pilot flying while the Captain was pilot monitoring. [He] reacted quickly and began the SOP for non normal ops. including immediate action/ECAM exception determinations and designating flying duties. I then called for ECAM actions. [The Captain] performed the correct ECAM actions for the skin valve fault which included verifying which valve was affected. In our case it was the extract valve. Both valves were showing closed but the extract valve was in amber. [He] proceeded to place both the blower and extract to OVRD per the ECAM procedure. While [the Captain] was running the ECAM I was given a higher altitude from [approach] (in the low flt levels I believe...) and after conferring with [the Captain]; requested to stop our climb at a lower altitude. I explained that we were working out an issue and needed to evaluate the situation before continuing higher. I believe we were given an altitude of 12;000 ft but do not remember exactly. [The Captain] continued with the ECAM placing both blower and extract to OVRD did not get rid of the caution message or the extract valve in amber. The ECAM then directs manual depressurization of the cabin. I remember thinking that it was odd to depressurize a cabin that seemed to be pressurizing normally. I wanted to suggest holding off on that part of the ECAM until we could fully ascertain what was happening. In the end; I decided against putting in my two cents. [The Captain] was running the ECAM and seemed to have things under control and running things by the books which was a good thing. I had my own duties as flying pilot in busy airspace to try and help troubleshoot the problem. [The Captain] began to manually depressurize the cabin per the ECAM. While he was starting the procedure; I was just beginning to climb through 10;000ft. I voiced to [the Captain] that we can't be going above ten if he is depressurizing the cabin and he agreed and suggested getting clearance to an altitude below 10;000ft. I quickly leveled off somewhere between 10;000 and 11;000 and requested a lower altitude. I believe [ATC] had cleared us to descend to 9;000 but can't remember the exact altitude. By the time the descent was initiated; the cabin had caught up with the aircraft altitude and we received a warning for CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT. [The Captain] was about to start the SOP for this abnormal but the message went away very quickly as we descended through 10;000ft. We than decided as a crew that it was best to ask [Approach] for holding in the area while we conferred with the company and decided the best course of action. We were given the published hold over ZZZZZ intersection. In the hold; [the Captain] sent ACARS messages to dispatch about our condition and the possibility of a return to field or divert. [The Captain] also called ops at ZZZ and spoke to the ops manager as well as line maintenance about possibly diverting there due to better maintenance handling vs. ZZZ1. We notified ATC that we might be diverting to ZZZ due to a pressurization issue. At no time did we declare an emergency. Before making the decision to divert to ZZZ we decided to troubleshoot our problem one last time. Captain recycled the blower and extract valves back to on from OVRD. Going back to the on position cleared away the VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT ECAM and all valves were than showing closed and green. We than decided to put the cabin back in auto mode. The cabin began to pressurize normally. After another turn in the hold and all systems functioning normal we checked our fuel status and decided that continuing to ZZZ2 was possible and; in fact; the best course of action as we would land with over 8;000 lbs. fuel. [The Captain] sent an ACARS message to dispatch telling them that the problem was cleared and we were proceeding to ZZZ2. We ascertained a new clearance from [approach]; exited the hold when cleared and continued the rest of the flight normally. Curiously; we received an ACARS messages from dispatch that they didn't know we were continuing to ZZZ2 and thought we were going to divert to ZZZ. I then sent another ACARS message to dispatch explaining once again that everything was working normally and we were continuing to ZZZ2. Later on in the flight we received one more ACARS from dispatch apologizing for the confusion as apparently our last few messages were going to the wrong desk. We landed at ZZZ2 without further incident. I believe the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT warning message was self-inflicted. Better crew communications could have taken place regarding the ECAM actions being executed. Specifically; getting clearance to an altitude below 10;000ft. Before starting to manually depressurize the cabin. This particular ECAM procedure could possibly be written better. Possibly with a better warning about not exceeding 10;000ft. cabin alt when starting manual depressurization procedure. Adding the possibility of cycling the blower and extract valves back to ON from OVRD should be included as well. Either way better communication between crew members should take place when doing something as extreme as manually depressurizing the cabin to prevent exceeding 10;000ft. cabin alt.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.