Narrative:

This was a long day for me - having my alarm set for XB15 for my drive from home to the airport I actually woke up XA30 not being able to get back to sleep; with my report time of XE57 for 6 legs of flying. All of my flying was with new fos; but my first 4 legs were uneventful and my last 2 legs was with a first officer who had only 50 hours in the plane and who had informed me that he had only flown once in the past 60 days. He said that he just felt comfortable with the aircraft once he finished oe at 25hrs; but the sporadic flying since then had not help further his comfort and in fact the lack of flying was now probably helping to maybe go 'backwards' in comfort.as we were only flying 2 legs together I offered him which leg to fly and he responded that I should fly [the first leg] and he'd do the return the leg. On the ground [the first officer] asked which runway he thought we'd use in dtw and I suggested 3R due to the arrival and the runway use throughout the day; so that was added to the flight plan. There was a brief delay waiting for flow into dtw; but we eventually got airborne. Autopilot was requested around 1500ft AGL when some things started to get very busy and maybe a little away from him (speed; needing to raise flaps; busy with departure trying to get on course; etc). This was his idea and a good idea as I was able to coach and offer suggestions to bring everything under control and things improved rapidly.I got the weather (showing landing 3R; 4L and 4R); did the in-range and got numbers for the runways and continued with the belief that we'd be landing on 3R. There was a lot of heading changes and speed alterations issued (more than usual) by ATC as they tried to sequence us for arrival into dtw. I noticed that other aircraft in front of us on the arrival were issued a non-normal arrival frequency (124.35 instead of the usual 126.22 for the spica arrival) which I put down to maybe a stuck mike. Around spica; cleveland center told us to go to approach on 126.22 (not the 124.35 I expected from listening); so I switched to 126.22 and after a delay I was told I need to be on the 124.35 that I heard others issued.I checked in with the ATIS code on 124.35. I believed I was issued and read back 3R; but at the time of writing this I am not confident of this. We were kept high on the downwind staying at 9000ft and I sequenced the approach for 3R; turning base and descending about 7 miles north of the ohio border. Approach asked us if we could see the dtw airport - [first officer] said he could see it and so I called the airport to approach. Approach then issued a new heading; altitude and cleared us to a runway. Approach mode was armed and we intercepted the 3R localizer.ATC soon realized what we had done; informed us we were cleared for 4R; gave us a heading to intercept the 4R course and also gave us the frequency. I apologized and told ATC that I believed that I was assigned 3R; which ATC apologized if that did happen. At this point my head was down; firstly putting in and activating the 4R localizer frequency and then I was setting up the FMS to give [the first officer] fixes and visual help on the mfd. During the set up I saw in the corner of my eye that the green needles were deflected the wrong way. Confused I looked up and saw that we were now past the 4L inbound course and still on the heading issued by ATC (to join 4R localizer). This was when I said 'my aircraft'; disconnected the autopilot and banked hard to the right to get back onto the 4R course as I was worried about a possible collision with other aircraft who were lined up for runway 4L (I got a 'bank angle' aural warning during this maneuver). At the same time ATC gave us another heading to join the 4R localizer. I got the aircraft lined up on 4R; stabilized and configured for landing and approach handed us over to tower where he apologized for any confusion caused (although may have been an awful lot of confusion; he was only a small link in this chain of events and notthe culprit if at all).once stabilized and switched to tower at flaps 45; I figured [the first officer] may have been shook up from these events so I offered him the controls back to take the landing and to get more experience with night landings - which he accepted. We landed and continued to the gate without incident.after parking and completion of the shutdown check I kept the flight deck door closed and debriefed with [the first officer] all that happened on during the approach asking where he and I both think things went wrong; the assumptions made by both of us and with what would we could/should have done differently. Looking back a go around should have been executed; especially as [the first officer] was probably not that familiar with dtw in order to give time for a new briefing; make sure he was happy with everything etc. The flight deck door was then opened with most passengers having already deplaned. Although I never felt that I was fatigued; it was a long day on my last leg of 6 before I went to go get some food and to the hotel - so I now question whether this (and possibly get there-itis) contributed to my expectant 3R landing. If 4R was issued and I missed it then I am disappointed that [the first officer] did not catch this mistake either.the biggest problem from this event was after lining up for the incorrect runway (3R instead of 4R) we continued on a heading assigned by approach; not lining up with 4R and going through the 4L approach course while my head was down in the cockpit. This quite frankly scared the daylights out of me and was a failure of basic airmanship which could have caused a major problem. I am not sure how often he has flown into dtw; but maybe his lack of experience with dtw and its airport environment may not have helped this situation - a dtw based new hire may not have done the same?[the first officer] freely admitted how rough he felt his current flying skills in the crj are at the time; only just feeling his most comfortable right after oe and how his recent lack of flying has not helped this in anyway. I have no problem being a mentor for new pilots to the company; but I certainly felt like a single pilot during this incident. I am not a check airman and did not expect an issue to occur and snowball the way it did. I have flown with many new/green pilots with the many years that I have been a reserve captain.so my main suggestion is that new hire fos; especially those not from another 121 carrier should get their 100 hours of consolidation as soon as possible after finishing oe to get comfortable while their knowledge and check airman oe teachings are still fresh in their mind. I think this would stick better than the current system where you do 25 hours of oe; don't fly for a few weeks losing what you learned from him/her - then coming back for the odd flight here over the next 120 days and there trying to remember all that needs to happen/be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported a track deviation on arrival into DTW that resulted from high workload and an inexperienced First Officer.

Narrative: This was a long day for me - having my alarm set for XB15 for my drive from home to the airport I actually woke up XA30 not being able to get back to sleep; with my report time of XE57 for 6 legs of flying. All of my flying was with new FOs; but my first 4 legs were uneventful and my last 2 legs was with a FO who had only 50 hours in the plane and who had informed me that he had only flown once in the past 60 days. He said that he just felt comfortable with the aircraft once he finished OE at 25hrs; but the sporadic flying since then had not help further his comfort and in fact the lack of flying was now probably helping to maybe go 'backwards' in comfort.As we were only flying 2 legs together I offered him which leg to fly and he responded that I should fly [the first leg] and he'd do the return the leg. On the ground [the FO] asked which runway he thought we'd use in DTW and I suggested 3R due to the arrival and the runway use throughout the day; so that was added to the flight plan. There was a brief delay waiting for flow into DTW; but we eventually got airborne. Autopilot was requested around 1500ft AGL when some things started to get very busy and maybe a little away from him (speed; needing to raise flaps; busy with departure trying to get on course; etc). This was his idea and a good idea as I was able to coach and offer suggestions to bring everything under control and things improved rapidly.I got the weather (showing landing 3R; 4L and 4R); did the in-range and got numbers for the runways and continued with the belief that we'd be landing on 3R. There was a lot of heading changes and speed alterations issued (more than usual) by ATC as they tried to sequence us for arrival into DTW. I noticed that other aircraft in front of us on the arrival were issued a non-normal arrival frequency (124.35 instead of the usual 126.22 for the Spica arrival) which I put down to maybe a stuck mike. Around Spica; Cleveland center told us to go to approach on 126.22 (not the 124.35 I expected from listening); so I switched to 126.22 and after a delay I was told I need to be on the 124.35 that I heard others issued.I checked in with the ATIS code on 124.35. I believed I was issued and read back 3R; but at the time of writing this I am not confident of this. We were kept high on the downwind staying at 9000ft and I sequenced the approach for 3R; turning base and descending about 7 miles north of the Ohio border. Approach asked us if we could see the DTW airport - [FO] said he could see it and so I called the airport to approach. Approach then issued a new heading; altitude and cleared us to a runway. Approach mode was armed and we intercepted the 3R localizer.ATC soon realized what we had done; informed us we were cleared for 4R; gave us a heading to intercept the 4R course and also gave us the frequency. I apologized and told ATC that I believed that I was assigned 3R; which ATC apologized if that did happen. At this point my head was down; firstly putting in and activating the 4R localizer frequency and then I was setting up the FMS to give [the FO] fixes and visual help on the MFD. During the set up I saw in the corner of my eye that the green needles were deflected the wrong way. Confused I looked up and saw that we were now past the 4L inbound course and still on the heading issued by ATC (to join 4R localizer). This was when I said 'my aircraft'; disconnected the autopilot and banked hard to the right to get back onto the 4R course as I was worried about a possible collision with other aircraft who were lined up for runway 4L (I got a 'bank angle' aural warning during this maneuver). At the same time ATC gave us another heading to join the 4R localizer. I got the aircraft lined up on 4R; stabilized and configured for landing and approach handed us over to tower where he apologized for any confusion caused (although may have been an awful lot of confusion; he was only a small link in this chain of events and notthe culprit if at all).Once stabilized and switched to tower at flaps 45; I figured [the FO] may have been shook up from these events so I offered him the controls back to take the landing and to get more experience with night landings - which he accepted. We landed and continued to the gate without incident.After parking and completion of the shutdown check I kept the flight deck door closed and debriefed with [the FO] all that happened on during the approach asking where he and I both think things went wrong; the assumptions made by both of us and with what would we could/should have done differently. Looking back a go around should have been executed; especially as [the FO] was probably not that familiar with DTW in order to give time for a new briefing; make sure he was happy with everything etc. The flight deck door was then opened with most passengers having already deplaned. Although I never felt that I was fatigued; it was a long day on my last leg of 6 before I went to go get some food and to the hotel - so I now question whether this (and possibly get there-itis) contributed to my expectant 3R landing. If 4R was issued and I missed it then I am disappointed that [the FO] did not catch this mistake either.The biggest problem from this event was after lining up for the incorrect runway (3R instead of 4R) we continued on a heading assigned by approach; not lining up with 4R and going through the 4L approach course while my head was down in the cockpit. This quite frankly scared the daylights out of me and was a failure of basic airmanship which could have caused a major problem. I am not sure how often he has flown into DTW; but maybe his lack of experience with DTW and its airport environment may not have helped this situation - a DTW based new hire may not have done the same?[The FO] freely admitted how rough he felt his current flying skills in the CRJ are at the time; only just feeling his most comfortable right after OE and how his recent lack of flying has not helped this in anyway. I have no problem being a mentor for new pilots to the company; but I certainly felt like a single pilot during this incident. I am not a check airman and did not expect an issue to occur and snowball the way it did. I have flown with many new/green pilots with the many years that I have been a reserve captain.So my main suggestion is that new hire FOs; especially those not from another 121 carrier should get their 100 hours of consolidation as soon as possible after finishing OE to get comfortable while their knowledge and check airman OE teachings are still fresh in their mind. I think this would stick better than the current system where you do 25 hours of OE; don't fly for a few weeks losing what you learned from him/her - then coming back for the odd flight here over the next 120 days and there trying to remember all that needs to happen/be done.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.