Narrative:

We reported to the gate on time; but had to wait approximately 25 minutes for the aircraft to arrive. During the crew swap out briefing; the captain giving us the airplane mentioned the fuel gage MEL and the need to drip stick; but did not mention any other aircraft maintenance issues.during my preflight; I discovered that the engine number 1 anti-ice indicator lights and both of the wing anti-ice indicator lights were not indicating correctly. I checked circuit breakers and discovered the engine number 1 engine and wing control circuit breaker was popped. I then contacted dispatch and maintenance control. Maintenance control informed me that the circuit breaker had been reported popped in the recent past and a flight crew reset would not be allowed. Maintenance control then requested we contact contract maintenance.when contract maintenance arrived; the issue was explained and the mechanic began working on a fix to the problem. Shortly after this; I was contacted by dispatch who informed me that the system could be deferred due to the absence of icing conditions on the west coast. I informed the mechanic and he then contacted maintenance control to apply the special procedures for the deferral. After completing the special procedures and making the appropriate documentation in the logbook; we pushed from the gate.we started engine number 2 first and it started normally through egt roll back. Number 1 engine start was then initiated and during that start the number 2 engine failed. We then stopped the number 1 engine start and accomplished the aborted engine start procedures for the number 2 engine. At this point we decided to return to the gate and in an effort to clear the taxiway expeditiously; we elected to start engine number 1 and taxi back to the gate using that engine. Engine number 1 started normally to egt rollback; but then it too failed. We then called ops and were towed back to the gate.dispatch and maintenance control were then contacted again and contract maintenance was called to return to the gate. After explaining to the mechanic what had happened; he contacted maintenance control and discovered; 'while deactivating wing anti-ice valve; inadvertently disconnected spare valve.' the mechanic then; 'reconnected spare valve in accordance with sp.' per maintenance control's request; both engines were started two separate times and operated normally. Appropriate logbook entries were made and the flight pushed the gate four hours late and made an uneventful flight.I would recommend when contract maintenance is being used; that a verbal readback to maintenance control of what was accomplished while the mechanic is looking directly at the system being worked on be done to confirm the proper procedures were followed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 Captain reported that maintenance had been performed on the aircraft during preflight. During engine start; both engines flamed out after the start procedure. The flight returned to the gate for further maintenance.

Narrative: We reported to the gate on time; but had to wait approximately 25 minutes for the aircraft to arrive. During the Crew swap out briefing; the Captain giving us the airplane mentioned the fuel gage MEL and the need to drip stick; but did not mention any other aircraft maintenance issues.During my preflight; I discovered that the Engine Number 1 anti-ice indicator lights and both of the wing anti-ice indicator lights were not indicating correctly. I checked circuit breakers and discovered the Engine Number 1 Engine and Wing Control circuit breaker was popped. I then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control informed me that the circuit breaker had been reported popped in the recent past and a Flight Crew reset would not be allowed. Maintenance Control then requested we contact Contract Maintenance.When Contract Maintenance arrived; the issue was explained and the Mechanic began working on a fix to the problem. Shortly after this; I was contacted by Dispatch who informed me that the system could be deferred due to the absence of icing conditions on the west coast. I informed the Mechanic and he then contacted Maintenance Control to apply the special procedures for the deferral. After completing the special procedures and making the appropriate documentation in the logbook; we pushed from the gate.We started Engine Number 2 first and it started normally through EGT roll back. Number 1 engine start was then initiated and during that start the Number 2 engine failed. We then stopped the Number 1 engine start and accomplished the Aborted Engine Start procedures for the Number 2 engine. At this point we decided to return to the gate and in an effort to clear the taxiway expeditiously; we elected to start Engine Number 1 and taxi back to the gate using that engine. Engine Number 1 started normally to EGT rollback; but then it too failed. We then called Ops and were towed back to the gate.Dispatch and Maintenance Control were then contacted again and Contract Maintenance was called to return to the gate. After explaining to the Mechanic what had happened; he contacted Maintenance Control and discovered; 'While deactivating Wing Anti-Ice valve; inadvertently disconnected spare valve.' The Mechanic then; 'Reconnected Spare Valve IAW SP.' Per Maintenance Control's request; both engines were started two separate times and operated normally. Appropriate logbook entries were made and the flight pushed the gate four hours late and made an uneventful flight.I would recommend when Contract Maintenance is being used; that a verbal readback to Maintenance Control of what was accomplished while the Mechanic is looking directly at the system being worked on be done to confirm the proper procedures were followed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.