Narrative:

After push back and engines start; I shut down the APU. 30 seconds later; a caution message appeared on the EICAS alerting the first officer and I that the APU door was not closed. We asked ground control to taxi to remote ramp area and after setting the parking brake; I started; then shut down the APU. The message persisted. I used my cell phone to call the company maintenance control and at the same time instructed the first officer to run the QRH for such a message. The maintenance controller asked me if I had recycled the APU then put me on hold. When he came back on the line; he said to operate the aircraft at a maximum of 220kias as instructed per the QRH. I told him that I was not willing to do that and that I would rather fly with the APU running. He advised that in order to do that a maintenance technician would have to inhibit the door open and make an entry into the maintenance logbook. He also added that since I was not willing to follow his recommendations he would have to call the chief pilot. I told him that I was fine with him doing that and that I was taxiing to the gate to wait for a maintenance tech.upon return to the gate my phone rang as expected. Instead of the chief pilot on the line; I was surprised when the caller identified himself as the director of operations. From the very beginning of the call; I found the caller very combative. He asked me why I was refusing to fly the airplane. I explained that I was not comfortable flying a CRJ900 at 220kts at FL350 and 79;000lbs. I also said that the speed book showed very tight margins for error. He then said that 'they ran the numbers' ( I do not know what numbers he was referring to) and the flight was good to proceed. He also pointed that the test pilots at bombardier showed that could be done. I replied that I was not a test pilot and that I had 76 lives onboard. He became even more combative telling me that I was being too conservative and that there was no reason why the airplane was sitting at the gate.at that point I felt bullied. I told him that he was literally pressuring me into operating an airplane outside of my comfort zone and that he was putting into question my pilot-in-command decision making abilities as well. He toned changed a bit and he advised me that he would call me back. 5 minutes later he called back to advised me that a maintenance technician was on his way. The phone conversation was very upsetting to me and to the first officer as well. Never have we ever felt so pressured into doing something I was not comfortable with. The pressure by the director of operations to operate an airplane outside of my comfort zone is the safety issue here. No captain at the company should experience what I experienced that morning.it is stressed in training that we should be very vigilant not to put the crj-900 in the region of reverse command. We are taught to climb at and maintain a faster speed in the aircraft. Our dispatch releases have our climbs calculated at 290kts. The fact that I felt being cornered into doing something I was not comfortable makes me wonder if safety is really the number one priority at the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Regional Jet Captain was pressured by management to fly with an APU problem that required a slower speed at altitude very close to the margins. Captain instead required Maintenance to make an adjustment and logbook entry that allowed the use of the APU & normal speeds.

Narrative: After push back and engines start; I shut down the APU. 30 seconds later; a caution message appeared on the EICAS alerting the First Officer and I that the APU door was not closed. We asked ground control to taxi to remote ramp area and after setting the parking brake; I started; then shut down the APU. The message persisted. I used my cell phone to call the company maintenance control and at the same time instructed the First Officer to run the QRH for such a message. The maintenance controller asked me if I had recycled the APU then put me on hold. When he came back on the line; he said to operate the aircraft at a maximum of 220kias as instructed per the QRH. I told him that I was not willing to do that and that I would rather fly with the APU running. He advised that in order to do that a maintenance technician would have to inhibit the door open and make an entry into the maintenance logbook. He also added that since I was not willing to follow his recommendations he would have to call the chief pilot. I told him that I was fine with him doing that and that I was taxiing to the gate to wait for a maintenance tech.Upon return to the gate my phone rang as expected. Instead of the Chief Pilot on the line; I was surprised when the caller identified himself as the Director of Operations. From the very beginning of the call; I found the caller very combative. He asked me why I was refusing to fly the airplane. I explained that I was not comfortable flying a CRJ900 at 220kts at FL350 and 79;000lbs. I also said that the speed book showed very tight margins for error. He then said that 'they ran the numbers' ( I do not know what numbers he was referring to) and the flight was good to proceed. He also pointed that the test pilots at Bombardier showed that could be done. I replied that I was not a test pilot and that I had 76 lives onboard. He became even more combative telling me that I was being too conservative and that there was no reason why the airplane was sitting at the gate.At that point I felt bullied. I told him that he was literally pressuring me into operating an airplane outside of my comfort zone and that he was putting into question my Pilot-in-Command decision making abilities as well. He toned changed a bit and he advised me that he would call me back. 5 minutes later he called back to advised me that a maintenance technician was on his way. The phone conversation was very upsetting to me and to the First Officer as well. Never have we ever felt so pressured into doing something I was not comfortable with. The pressure by the Director of Operations to operate an airplane outside of my comfort zone is the safety issue here. No captain at the company should experience what I experienced that morning.It is stressed in training that we should be very vigilant not to put the CRJ-900 in the region of reverse command. We are taught to climb at and maintain a faster speed in the aircraft. Our dispatch releases have our climbs calculated at 290kts. The fact that I felt being cornered into doing something I was not comfortable makes me wonder if safety is really the number one priority at the company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.