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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1315961 |
Time | |
Date | 201512 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | HSV.TRACON |
State Reference | AL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 79 Flight Crew Total 5600 Flight Crew Type 2463 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125 Flight Crew Total 10100 Flight Crew Type 500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 6000 Vertical 100 |
Narrative:
We were vectored by approach to the east for runway 18L. We were vectored well north of the airport; and then to the west. We were then given traffic; and then cleared for a visual approach. At some point; we lost sight of hsv; and acquired hua by mistake. As we proceeded inbound to the runway; we had traffic called to us; and then were given a go-around. It was at this point that we realized we had the wrong airport identified. We were given straight ahead to 4;000 feet; and then heading 090. The first officer and I are filling this out together; and after discussion we believe the biggest contributing factor in this situation is that we fly international missions frequently. So in this case; we failed to put proper emphasis on this flight as we naturally do in all of our flights. This is; of course; not an excuse; just that we could have put more emphasis on this flight so as not to become complacent. Further contributing factors were several. First; the lights on runway 18L at hsv were not very brightly lit. The lights of runway 17 at redstone; hua; were lit to full intensity. So as we were vectored to the west and given the traffic the brighter runway visually prevailed. Also there was a shift change with the approach controller we were talking to. This happened when we were on the downwind leg. We believe this extended our downwind leg further; and thus caused two things: first; for us; that as close as the two airports are together; by the time we were turned back to where we could see the runway; visually; the two airports seemed way closer together. Secondly; at some point; the new controller asked which airport we were going to; so we believe there was confusion there; as well; which allowed the approach to continue maybe a bit further than would have otherwise.after much discussion; we believe in moving forward; what we will do to prevent further occurrence; is; #1...that we will not consider any flight of lesser importance. We will consider every takeoff and landing to be of utmost importance. Complacency is not an option. #2...we intend to; whenever going in to a runway served by an approach; to shoot that approach even if in VFR.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Flight crew reported lining up for HUA airport instead of their destination; HSV; during a night visual approach.
Narrative: We were vectored by approach to the East for runway 18L. We were vectored well North of the airport; and then to the west. We were then given traffic; and then cleared for a visual approach. At some point; we lost sight of HSV; and acquired HUA by mistake. As we proceeded inbound to the runway; we had traffic called to us; and then were given a go-around. It was at this point that we realized we had the wrong airport identified. We were given straight ahead to 4;000 feet; and then heading 090. The first officer and I are filling this out together; and after discussion we believe the biggest contributing factor in this situation is that we fly international missions frequently. So in this case; we failed to put proper emphasis on this flight as we naturally do in all of our flights. This is; of course; not an excuse; just that we could have put more emphasis on this flight so as not to become complacent. Further contributing factors were several. First; the lights on runway 18L at HSV were not very brightly lit. The lights of runway 17 at Redstone; HUA; were lit to full intensity. So as we were vectored to the west and given the traffic the brighter runway visually prevailed. Also there was a shift change with the approach controller we were talking to. This happened when we were on the downwind leg. We believe this extended our downwind leg further; and thus caused two things: first; for us; that as close as the two airports are together; by the time we were turned back to where we could see the runway; visually; the two airports seemed way closer together. Secondly; at some point; the new controller asked which airport we were going to; so we believe there was confusion there; as well; which allowed the approach to continue maybe a bit further than would have otherwise.After much discussion; we believe in moving forward; what we will do to prevent further occurrence; is; #1...that we will not consider any flight of lesser importance. We will consider every takeoff and landing to be of utmost importance. Complacency is not an option. #2...We intend to; whenever going in to a runway served by an approach; to shoot that approach even if in VFR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.