Narrative:

I had filed and obtained a WX brief update at approximately pm:30 local at the fob. At approximately pm:00 the aircraft was started and call for clearance made and obtained. The WX was quite cold and there were several patches of ice on txwys. Breaking action had been reported good on runways. I called ground and was told to taxi to 2C. Since there was no chart in FBO and I was totally unfamiliar with airport, I told ground that I was unfamiliar and asked for progressive taxi. No other aircraft had recently come or gone while I was there. As it turned out, the FBO outlet was very close to the runway entrance and I stopped well back for long run-up to warm engine thoroughly. When ready I called and switched to the tower who gave me urgent and rapid directions to roll for immediate takeoff. I started to roll from my run-up position, but as I felt the nomenclature was nonstandard, I asked for confirmation. I was given an urgent confirmation to continue roll for immediate takeoff. I complied. Unfortunately, as I did so, I was not yet at the runway, but at a large taxiway which I was later told was an old runway about 30 degrees off runway 2. The sign identing it as a taxi ramp was behind my run-up spot in the confluence of the pad. As I turned into the taxiway the runway sign 2C appeared to be directing me correctly. I continued my roll as the tower was again instructing for immediate takeoff. Power, note some ice on 'runway,' quick check for overboost in cold, focus on controls, down the runway, damn!--a big carrier is sticking his nose across at the end of the runway. Suddenly the tower changed their tune--to stop! I made an immediate decision not to takeoff over such big iron although I was certain I could. It instinctively seemed poor form and the risk/reward ratio infinite. Things got exciting because I was on a sheet of ice midway down with no braking action till I cleared the lower end of the taxiway. I was in control; however, and took a large veering turn to the right. In an effort to stay absolutely as far away from the carriers as possible, I went into a skid and when I came to a stop my front gear was 2' off of the pavement. There was no aircraft damage. Even though I was near rotation speed when I shut down there would have been little excitement had it not been for the ice. I hold myself at fault for allowing a tower controller to push me for no discernable reason. There were no other planes in line on this runway, and I was in no hurry. I felt at the time his nomenclature was non standard, and I was unsure of what he said initially. I had asked for progressive taxi and was handed off to tower before I was at the runway--unknowingly. The urgent tower instruction and supporting visibility clues led me to continue roll west/O double-checking compass as I was rolling. The complicating surface conditions demanded my attention. I still think that I made the right decision to abort. Afterward, lcls in the FBO told me this was 'not the first time.' had the ice not complicated my stop, had I not asked for precautionary tow-back, I doubt that they would have said anything. There is nothing new here but I have some recommendations: improve the signs at this busy location, and fast talking controllers never save time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT WITH LOW TIME IN ACFT CITES SLIPPERY TXWYS AND RWYS ALONG WITH BEING PUSHED BY CTLR AS REASON FOR SELECTING A TXWY FOR TKOF. ABORTS WHEN TOLD BY TWR AS ACR ACFT LOOMS AT END OF TXWY. GOES OFF TXWY WITHOUT ANY DAMAGE. CLAIMS SIGN PLACEMENT FOR RWY 2C IS IMPROPER, THEREBY INVOLVING HIM IN HIS SELECTION OF TXWY FOR TKOF.

Narrative: I HAD FILED AND OBTAINED A WX BRIEF UPDATE AT APPROX PM:30 LCL AT THE FOB. AT APPROX PM:00 THE ACFT WAS STARTED AND CALL FOR CLRNC MADE AND OBTAINED. THE WX WAS QUITE COLD AND THERE WERE SEVERAL PATCHES OF ICE ON TXWYS. BREAKING ACTION HAD BEEN RPTED GOOD ON RWYS. I CALLED GND AND WAS TOLD TO TAXI TO 2C. SINCE THERE WAS NO CHART IN FBO AND I WAS TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH ARPT, I TOLD GND THAT I WAS UNFAMILIAR AND ASKED FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXI. NO OTHER ACFT HAD RECENTLY COME OR GONE WHILE I WAS THERE. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE FBO OUTLET WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE RWY ENTRANCE AND I STOPPED WELL BACK FOR LONG RUN-UP TO WARM ENG THOROUGHLY. WHEN READY I CALLED AND SWITCHED TO THE TWR WHO GAVE ME URGENT AND RAPID DIRECTIONS TO ROLL FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. I STARTED TO ROLL FROM MY RUN-UP POS, BUT AS I FELT THE NOMENCLATURE WAS NONSTANDARD, I ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION. I WAS GIVEN AN URGENT CONFIRMATION TO CONTINUE ROLL FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. I COMPLIED. UNFORTUNATELY, AS I DID SO, I WAS NOT YET AT THE RWY, BUT AT A LARGE TXWY WHICH I WAS LATER TOLD WAS AN OLD RWY ABOUT 30 DEGS OFF RWY 2. THE SIGN IDENTING IT AS A TAXI RAMP WAS BEHIND MY RUN-UP SPOT IN THE CONFLUENCE OF THE PAD. AS I TURNED INTO THE TXWY THE RWY SIGN 2C APPEARED TO BE DIRECTING ME CORRECTLY. I CONTINUED MY ROLL AS THE TWR WAS AGAIN INSTRUCTING FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. PWR, NOTE SOME ICE ON 'RWY,' QUICK CHK FOR OVERBOOST IN COLD, FOCUS ON CTLS, DOWN THE RWY, DAMN!--A BIG CARRIER IS STICKING HIS NOSE ACROSS AT THE END OF THE RWY. SUDDENLY THE TWR CHANGED THEIR TUNE--TO STOP! I MADE AN IMMEDIATE DECISION NOT TO TKOF OVER SUCH BIG IRON ALTHOUGH I WAS CERTAIN I COULD. IT INSTINCTIVELY SEEMED POOR FORM AND THE RISK/REWARD RATIO INFINITE. THINGS GOT EXCITING BECAUSE I WAS ON A SHEET OF ICE MIDWAY DOWN WITH NO BRAKING ACTION TILL I CLRED THE LOWER END OF THE TXWY. I WAS IN CONTROL; HOWEVER, AND TOOK A LARGE VEERING TURN TO THE RIGHT. IN AN EFFORT TO STAY ABSOLUTELY AS FAR AWAY FROM THE CARRIERS AS POSSIBLE, I WENT INTO A SKID AND WHEN I CAME TO A STOP MY FRONT GEAR WAS 2' OFF OF THE PAVEMENT. THERE WAS NO ACFT DAMAGE. EVEN THOUGH I WAS NEAR ROTATION SPD WHEN I SHUT DOWN THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN LITTLE EXCITEMENT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE ICE. I HOLD MYSELF AT FAULT FOR ALLOWING A TWR CTLR TO PUSH ME FOR NO DISCERNABLE REASON. THERE WERE NO OTHER PLANES IN LINE ON THIS RWY, AND I WAS IN NO HURRY. I FELT AT THE TIME HIS NOMENCLATURE WAS NON STANDARD, AND I WAS UNSURE OF WHAT HE SAID INITIALLY. I HAD ASKED FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXI AND WAS HANDED OFF TO TWR BEFORE I WAS AT THE RWY--UNKNOWINGLY. THE URGENT TWR INSTRUCTION AND SUPPORTING VIS CLUES LED ME TO CONTINUE ROLL W/O DOUBLE-CHKING COMPASS AS I WAS ROLLING. THE COMPLICATING SURFACE CONDITIONS DEMANDED MY ATTN. I STILL THINK THAT I MADE THE RIGHT DECISION TO ABORT. AFTERWARD, LCLS IN THE FBO TOLD ME THIS WAS 'NOT THE FIRST TIME.' HAD THE ICE NOT COMPLICATED MY STOP, HAD I NOT ASKED FOR PRECAUTIONARY TOW-BACK, I DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SAID ANYTHING. THERE IS NOTHING NEW HERE BUT I HAVE SOME RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPROVE THE SIGNS AT THIS BUSY LOCATION, AND FAST TALKING CTLRS NEVER SAVE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.