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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1316669 |
Time | |
Date | 201512 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-800 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Autopilot |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
We were established on the localizer to the ILS approach. As we were approaching the FAF with the glide slope indication of a half dot above the aircraft; I as the pilot flying; called for gear down and flaps to 15. At the point that I thought the pilot monitoring lowered the gear; the autopilot and auto throttles suddenly disconnected. At that point; I tried to figure out why and didn't noticed that I went through the glide slope to being above the glide slope. I then applied correction to recapture the glide slope. When I adjusted pitch and power to capture glide slope; I then noticed that the flight director was not showing in the pfd. Having directional information still showing in the HUD and having clear sight of the runway; runway lights and approach light; I elected to continue with hand flying using the HUD and PAPI lights. I then began to notice that I was getting below the glide slope and began to correct too much and went above it again. By 1000 feet; I elected to continue because I still had the runway environment in sight and was correcting back to the glide slope. By 500 feet; I was still correcting to the glide slope that was below the aircraft; and because airspeed was under control and still in visual conditions; continued to correct pitch to catch glide slope and then got an aural 'sink rate' announcement. Made necessary pitch adjustment; landed under better control in touchdown zone. I know; in hindsight; that I should have gone around on a couple of locations on the approach because I was not stable. I fully admit that my false sense of desire to salvage the unstable approach caused me to make the poor decision to not go around throughout the approach.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The B737 crew experienced an autopilot and autothrottle disconnect at glideslope intercept; which led to an unstable approach. The Captain elected to land.
Narrative: We were established on the localizer to the ILS approach. As we were approaching the FAF with the glide slope indication of a half dot above the aircraft; I as the Pilot Flying; called for gear down and flaps to 15. At the point that I thought the Pilot Monitoring lowered the gear; the autopilot and auto throttles suddenly disconnected. At that point; I tried to figure out why and didn't noticed that I went through the glide slope to being above the glide slope. I then applied correction to recapture the glide slope. When I adjusted pitch and power to capture glide slope; I then noticed that the flight director was not showing in the PFD. Having directional information still showing in the HUD and having clear sight of the runway; runway lights and approach light; I elected to continue with hand flying using the HUD and PAPI lights. I then began to notice that I was getting below the glide slope and began to correct too much and went above it again. By 1000 feet; I elected to continue because I still had the runway environment in sight and was correcting back to the glide slope. By 500 feet; I was still correcting to the glide slope that was below the aircraft; and because airspeed was under control and still in visual conditions; continued to correct pitch to catch glide slope and then got an aural 'SINK RATE' announcement. Made necessary pitch adjustment; landed under better control in touchdown zone. I know; in hindsight; that I should have gone around on a couple of locations on the approach because I was not stable. I fully admit that my false sense of desire to salvage the unstable approach caused me to make the poor decision to not go around throughout the approach.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.