Narrative:

We were to ferry an aircraft to sdf for contract work for frt. We were light, approximately 165000# for takeoff. V1 and vr were the same. At V1R I started rotation and simultaneously the stick shaker went off. We were using 35L, 11300' of runway. There was still 7500' of runway left. I elected to abort. Contributing heavily to this decision was the fact that the aircraft had just finished a heavy check (B), and also the lack of confidence I have in my company's maintenance. I have worked in the past on the fgt as a mechanic and F/east, first officer, and finally as captain. I've written letters to congressmen, been involved with safety functions and am presently involved in litigation with a similar caliber company. As it turned out, our maintenance did nothing more than wire over a stall warning computer so that the test function would work, never thinking what the end result would be. In hindsight, or better, retrospect, my decision would have been the same whether I was heavy and with passenger and a shorter runway. When is the FAA going to do a better job of policing this industry? What is going on is criminal. Please feel free to call and discuss further this letter. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter was very sincere in his beliefs re' the deterioration of maintenance quality in the area of supplemental and charter carriers. That is where his expertise has been for the last 10 yrs or so. His background is that of a line mechanic, F/east, first officer and now captain. He has worked for at least 3 supplemental freight airlines and his complaints rest mainly with them, and in particular his current employer. His event in question relates to acn 131673. He appears to be the type of individual who will speak up when the situation calls for it, and as a result, was terminated from his position as a F/east. He has been to the FAA, where he gave testimony re: one of his previous employers--and even wrote a letter last year to a well-known elected representative in washington on the subject. No response to any of these events. He wrote a letter to the chief pilot of his present airline, who seemingly appreciated the effort put forth, but did nothing as he is there 'to fill in his pre-retirement yrs.' a lame duck, so to speak. The chief pilot had brought the letter to the attention of the higher ups, but they thought that this was just 'sensationalizing.' the incident reported on acn 131673 was created by a mechanic who had wired the stick shaker control unit so it would respond in a test mode, but he totally denatured the integrity of the control sensing box by doing so. The mechanic is young--25 yrs of age, and also acted as supervisor for the procedure on the aircraft, and was thus able to sign off his own work. Normal procedure in GA, but is that acceptable procedure on an airline? Reporter complains of the attitude that most of these freight operators have--to let the open items ride. He claims they arrive to perform maintenance services with sharpened pencils. He would commit himself to any hearing or appearance necessary in order to have the FAA focus on this problem which he feels is long overdue in being properly faced up to and resolved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ABORTED TKOF DUE TO STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION ON ROTATION. REPORTER COMMENTS REGARDING LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MAINTENANCE PROCS USED BY HIS COMAPNY.

Narrative: WE WERE TO FERRY AN ACFT TO SDF FOR CONTRACT WORK FOR FRT. WE WERE LIGHT, APPROX 165000# FOR TKOF. V1 AND VR WERE THE SAME. AT V1R I STARTED ROTATION AND SIMULTANEOUSLY THE STICK SHAKER WENT OFF. WE WERE USING 35L, 11300' OF RWY. THERE WAS STILL 7500' OF RWY LEFT. I ELECTED TO ABORT. CONTRIBUTING HEAVILY TO THIS DECISION WAS THE FACT THAT THE ACFT HAD JUST FINISHED A HVY CHK (B), AND ALSO THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE I HAVE IN MY COMPANY'S MAINT. I HAVE WORKED IN THE PAST ON THE FGT AS A MECH AND F/E, F/O, AND FINALLY AS CAPT. I'VE WRITTEN LETTERS TO CONGRESSMEN, BEEN INVOLVED WITH SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND AM PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN LITIGATION WITH A SIMILAR CALIBER COMPANY. AS IT TURNED OUT, OUR MAINT DID NOTHING MORE THAN WIRE OVER A STALL WARNING COMPUTER SO THAT THE TEST FUNCTION WOULD WORK, NEVER THINKING WHAT THE END RESULT WOULD BE. IN HINDSIGHT, OR BETTER, RETROSPECT, MY DECISION WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME WHETHER I WAS HVY AND WITH PAX AND A SHORTER RWY. WHEN IS THE FAA GOING TO DO A BETTER JOB OF POLICING THIS INDUSTRY? WHAT IS GOING ON IS CRIMINAL. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL AND DISCUSS FURTHER THIS LETTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR WAS VERY SINCERE IN HIS BELIEFS RE' THE DETERIORATION OF MAINT QUALITY IN THE AREA OF SUPPLEMENTAL AND CHARTER CARRIERS. THAT IS WHERE HIS EXPERTISE HAS BEEN FOR THE LAST 10 YRS OR SO. HIS BACKGROUND IS THAT OF A LINE MECH, F/E, F/O AND NOW CAPT. HE HAS WORKED FOR AT LEAST 3 SUPPLEMENTAL FREIGHT AIRLINES AND HIS COMPLAINTS REST MAINLY WITH THEM, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS CURRENT EMPLOYER. HIS EVENT IN QUESTION RELATES TO ACN 131673. HE APPEARS TO BE THE TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL WHO WILL SPEAK UP WHEN THE SITUATION CALLS FOR IT, AND AS A RESULT, WAS TERMINATED FROM HIS POSITION AS A F/E. HE HAS BEEN TO THE FAA, WHERE HE GAVE TESTIMONY RE: ONE OF HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS--AND EVEN WROTE A LETTER LAST YEAR TO A WELL-KNOWN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT. NO RESPONSE TO ANY OF THESE EVENTS. HE WROTE A LETTER TO THE CHIEF PLT OF HIS PRESENT AIRLINE, WHO SEEMINGLY APPRECIATED THE EFFORT PUT FORTH, BUT DID NOTHING AS HE IS THERE 'TO FILL IN HIS PRE-RETIREMENT YRS.' A LAME DUCK, SO TO SPEAK. THE CHIEF PLT HAD BROUGHT THE LETTER TO THE ATTN OF THE HIGHER UPS, BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS JUST 'SENSATIONALIZING.' THE INCIDENT RPTED ON ACN 131673 WAS CREATED BY A MECH WHO HAD WIRED THE STICK SHAKER CONTROL UNIT SO IT WOULD RESPOND IN A TEST MODE, BUT HE TOTALLY DENATURED THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONTROL SENSING BOX BY DOING SO. THE MECH IS YOUNG--25 YRS OF AGE, AND ALSO ACTED AS SUPVR FOR THE PROC ON THE ACFT, AND WAS THUS ABLE TO SIGN OFF HIS OWN WORK. NORMAL PROC IN GA, BUT IS THAT ACCEPTABLE PROC ON AN AIRLINE? RPTR COMPLAINS OF THE ATTITUDE THAT MOST OF THESE FREIGHT OPERATORS HAVE--TO LET THE OPEN ITEMS RIDE. HE CLAIMS THEY ARRIVE TO PERFORM MAINT SVCS WITH SHARPENED PENCILS. HE WOULD COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANY HEARING OR APPEARANCE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO HAVE THE FAA FOCUS ON THIS PROBLEM WHICH HE FEELS IS LONG OVERDUE IN BEING PROPERLY FACED UP TO AND RESOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.