Narrative:

I was the first officer of the two man crew for flight from omdb. This was the 7th of 8 duty periods. This was a night flight and I was the pilot flying; the second of two opportunities in the right seat on this trip (mixed international relief officer/first officer duties). Our preflight preparation was completed for an on time pushback. Takeoff was planned for 30R; which had just been reopened for the evening; from the shorter N8 intersection with a davmo departure/early call to iran air defense on climb out. Weather was the typical cavok. We were very heavy. Aero data T/O limit of 618k lbs and we opted for flaps 15/maximum thrust with V speeds of 158/174/182.I can provide this information from the clipboard briefing card I always prepare. I take my job serious and methodically and ardently prepare for each leg: always have and always will. So what happened this time; and why am submitting a report? Because our first opportunity on the runway resulted in a rejected takeoff. When cleared we lined up; verified the runway; and transferred control. Dubai runway 30R has a very bright high intensity white centerline lighting system which I can recall registered as unusual to me. I executed aom procedures commencing the takeoff and directional control seemed right down the centerline. With the nfp callout of '80 knots'; I recall a quick scan of the pfd that caught the right side FMA 'to clamp' change in the altitude box but I did not linger to verify '80' and the green trend line on the pfd left side speed tape before redirecting my attention outside the cockpit. I believe I instinctively made the inappropriate callout 'checked' but was troubled enough so as to try and correct the error by making at least two quick scans back to the pfd. Regrettably; both times I glanced down; I captured the right side altitude tape and not the left side speed tape. What clicked in my mind was '40' (i.e. Takeoff zone elevation) both times. Well immediately all those years of company training kicked in for the perceived malfunction and I struggled with calling it out clearly and precisely. Nevertheless; the safety of flight threat was communicated for the protocol 'rejected takeoff' procedure (I'd guess from around 100 knots but I thought I had no airspeed). The cpt's response was without hesitation and as control was relinquished I know I verified the spoiler handle retarded; notified the tower; and once sighting the functioning (and decreasing) speed tape; my error became clear. There was no frozen '40' indication. With a safe stop assured on the long runway I briefed the cpt on my error; answered ATC calls (declining the immediate need for emergency equipment); regained my runway location sa and assisted the cpt on positioning to our directed hold location: off at N5 holding short of N4. From that point forward; procedures flowed quite well and our crew coordination efforts I feel were superb. I got right into the aom and on to section rejected takeoff non-normal maneuvers page. We worked the consideration problems of remote parking; fuse plugs; max temps; brake cooling requirements; dispatcher(s) involvement; satcom irregularities; etc. To say I was embarrassed by my error is an understatement. I have beaten myself up over it but still can't pinpoint the root cause. Fatigue on a long trip? Less currency in the seat than usual for me? Distraction with the centerline lighting? Pfd lighting too low? Nevertheless; vigilance and commitment to 'speak up' is a trait we have put emphasis on since accident and I take/took it to heart. My flying is almost exclusively international operations where we are predominately max performing the aircraft to its limits. This flight was no exception. There is no excess room for error at these conditions. The requirement was there and I responded as trained. This event was my first and hopefully last rejected takeoff. And by the way; the 187;000 lbs of payload was all of 43 minutes late to ZZZZ on an undamaged aircraft. Sorry to have to take up your time with this report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A fatigued air carrier First Officer rejected the OMDB takeoff when he mistook his PFD altimeter of 40 feet for his airspeed which he perceived as not accelerating.

Narrative: I was the FO of the two man crew for Flight from OMDB. This was the 7th of 8 duty periods. This was a night flight and I was the pilot flying; the second of two opportunities in the right seat on this trip (mixed IRO/FO duties). Our preflight preparation was completed for an on time pushback. Takeoff was planned for 30R; which had just been reopened for the evening; from the shorter N8 intersection with a DAVMO departure/early call to IRAN Air Defense on climb out. Weather was the typical CAVOK. We were very heavy. Aero data T/O limit of 618k lbs and we opted for Flaps 15/MAX Thrust with V speeds of 158/174/182.I can provide this information from the clipboard briefing card I always prepare. I take my job serious and methodically and ardently prepare for each leg: always have and always will. So what happened this time; and why am submitting a report? Because our first opportunity on the runway resulted in a rejected takeoff. When cleared we lined up; verified the runway; and transferred control. Dubai runway 30R has a very bright high intensity white centerline lighting system which I can recall registered as unusual to me. I executed AOM procedures commencing the takeoff and directional control seemed right down the centerline. With the NFP callout of '80 knots'; I recall a quick scan of the PFD that caught the right side FMA 'TO CLAMP' change in the ALTITUDE Box but I did not linger to verify '80' and the green trend line on the PFD left side speed tape before redirecting my attention outside the cockpit. I believe I instinctively made the inappropriate callout 'CHECKED' but was troubled enough so as to try and correct the error by making at least two quick scans back to the PFD. Regrettably; both times I glanced down; I captured the right side altitude tape and not the left side speed tape. What clicked in my mind was '40' (i.e. takeoff zone elevation) both times. Well immediately all those years of company training kicked in for the perceived malfunction and I struggled with calling it out clearly and precisely. Nevertheless; the safety of flight threat was communicated for the protocol 'REJECTED TAKEOFF' procedure (I'd guess from around 100 knots but I thought I had no airspeed). The CPT's response was without hesitation and as control was relinquished I know I verified the spoiler handle retarded; notified the tower; and once sighting the functioning (and decreasing) speed tape; my error became clear. There was no frozen '40' indication. With a safe stop assured on the long runway I briefed the CPT on my error; answered ATC calls (declining the immediate need for emergency equipment); regained my runway location SA and assisted the CPT on positioning to our directed hold location: off at N5 holding short of N4. From that point forward; procedures flowed quite well and our crew coordination efforts I feel were superb. I got right into the AOM and on to Section Rejected Takeoff Non-Normal Maneuvers page. We worked the consideration problems of remote parking; fuse plugs; max temps; brake cooling requirements; dispatcher(s) involvement; SATCOM irregularities; etc. To say I was embarrassed by my error is an understatement. I have beaten myself up over it but still can't pinpoint the root cause. Fatigue on a long trip? Less currency in the seat than usual for me? Distraction with the centerline lighting? PFD lighting too low? Nevertheless; vigilance and commitment to 'speak up' is a trait we have put emphasis on since accident and I take/took it to heart. My flying is almost exclusively international operations where we are predominately max performing the aircraft to its limits. This flight was no exception. There is no excess room for error at these conditions. The requirement was there and I responded as trained. This event was my first and hopefully last rejected takeoff. And by the way; the 187;000 lbs of payload was all of 43 minutes late to ZZZZ on an undamaged aircraft. Sorry to have to take up your time with this report.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.