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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1318494 |
Time | |
Date | 201512 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
During take-off roll; noticed a 'red' message appear on ECAM. Could not immediately determine its significance; so I rejected the takeoff and returned to the gate. Flight was subsequently cancelled.this was a mistake on my part. The message I had actually seen was a magenta 'T.O. Inhibit' message; which is a normal take-off message which appears when the takeoff inhibit function of the ECAM activates. I guess I thought the message would be in green; and so seeing it in (almost) red; made me think there must be a problem. I have to admit; in the instant before I commenced the rejected takeoff; the A320 rejected takeoff accident in philly a couple years ago flashed thru my mind. Given that background; I thought it would be better to reject early and get a handle on what I was seeing; rather than continue the takeoff and regret it at a higher speed or in the air.when we got back to the gate; I called dispatch and was put through to maintenance. At this point; the situation went from bad to worse. I thought I would be able to get some more eyes on the problem and maybe get a resolution; or maybe someone would say; 'hey; the T.O. Inhibit is supposed to be magenta'. But instead; they kept thinking 'configuration warning'; and the conversation veered off course a little.the following morning; we went out and made a high speed taxi run to verify that the ECAM present was in fact; the correct one for the situation.I think the environment also contributed to my confusion. It was dark; I was looking across the cockpit at the message while steering the aircraft down the runway and accelerating; and my eyes were straining to look thru one of three different lenses on my eyewear to read the message.I guess my first suggestion; which of course; gets tossed right away; modify the message presentation on ECAM so (nearly) red messages don't flash up during takeoff! Why would they do that?! Airbus supposedly spent so much effort to create a 'lights out' environment for takeoff; and then have an almost red message appear halfway through takeoff? That's just dumb.my second suggestion; and this is just for me; is to be more specifically aware of exactly what will be presented at every phase of flight. I swear; in that moment; I thought the T.O. Inhibit would come up in green along with the other messages which were already present.a couple months ago; I patted myself on the back for catching egt indications more than 200 degrees apart; early on a takeoff run. Wasn't an ECAM; but clearly something amiss. I guess engine indications are where I tend to focus most of my inside attention during takeoff. Seeing a magenta ECAM caught me by surprise this time; although it presents on every takeoff.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 Captain reported unnecessarily rejecting the takeoff when the standard message 'T.O. Inhibit' was displayed on the ECAM.
Narrative: During take-off roll; noticed a 'red' message appear on ECAM. Could not immediately determine its significance; so I rejected the takeoff and returned to the gate. Flight was subsequently cancelled.This was a mistake on my part. The message I had actually seen was a magenta 'T.O. Inhibit' message; which is a normal take-off message which appears when the takeoff inhibit function of the ECAM activates. I guess I thought the message would be in green; and so seeing it in (almost) red; made me think there must be a problem. I have to admit; in the instant before I commenced the rejected takeoff; the A320 rejected takeoff accident in Philly a couple years ago flashed thru my mind. Given that background; I thought it would be better to reject early and get a handle on what I was seeing; rather than continue the takeoff and regret it at a higher speed or in the air.When we got back to the gate; I called Dispatch and was put through to Maintenance. At this point; the situation went from bad to worse. I thought I would be able to get some more eyes on the problem and maybe get a resolution; or maybe someone would say; 'Hey; the T.O. Inhibit is supposed to be magenta'. But instead; they kept thinking 'configuration warning'; and the conversation veered off course a little.The following morning; we went out and made a high speed taxi run to verify that the ECAM present was in fact; the correct one for the situation.I think the environment also contributed to my confusion. It was dark; I was looking across the cockpit at the message while steering the aircraft down the runway and accelerating; and my eyes were straining to look thru one of three different lenses on my eyewear to read the message.I guess my first suggestion; which of course; gets tossed right away; modify the message presentation on ECAM so (nearly) red messages don't flash up during takeoff! Why would they do that?! Airbus supposedly spent so much effort to create a 'lights out' environment for takeoff; and then have an almost red message appear halfway through takeoff? That's just dumb.My second suggestion; and this is just for me; is to be more specifically aware of exactly what will be presented at every phase of flight. I swear; in that moment; I thought the T.O. Inhibit would come up in green along with the other messages which were already present.A couple months ago; I patted myself on the back for catching EGT indications more than 200 degrees apart; early on a takeoff run. Wasn't an ECAM; but clearly something amiss. I guess engine indications are where I tend to focus most of my inside attention during takeoff. Seeing a magenta ECAM caught me by surprise this time; although it presents on every takeoff.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.