Narrative:

Takeoff ewr at approximately BX20 EST on flight to london gatwick. On autoplt, somewhere near 10000', approaching lga VOR, to then track out on the 055 degree right to merit intersection. Shortly before we reached the lga VOR, the second officer informed me that the #2 engine pneumatic supply high stage open light was 'on' (he had previously informed me of a #1 fill valve light 'on,' which we had discussed, but no corrected). Upon crossing the lga VOR, I initiated a turn toward the 055 degree right using the heading marking of the autoplt. We then sustained a master caution light and some pressurization bumps,' accompanied by a #2 temperature high light, indicating excessive temperatures in the pneumatic supply line. As I was receiving input from the second officer re: the failure, the ZNY controller asked us where we were going. The first officer and I both confirmed that the autoplt was indeed turning us toward the appropriate radial. However, the controller stated that we had overshot the VOR by 4 mi, and we had better steepen up the turn. At that pint I disengaged the autoplt and hand-flew the aircraft, steepening up the bank angle. From this point on, I am unable to reconstruct the events accurately. The controller began chipping away at me, and my control of the aircraft deteriorated while trying to comply with his instructions, as well as trying to coordinate our in flight problems. The first officer was able to tell the controller that we were having pressurization problems, but that seemed to have no effect on him--nor did my flying improve. Quite simply, I let the pressures get to me and probably broke both altitude and arwy constraints--I was all over the sky. In retrospect, I see a # of things I should have done differently: 1) as soon as I recognized that my flying skills were not adequate to the situation, I should have given control of the aircraft to the first officer. I should then have requested a firm altitude and heading from ATC until we were able to sort out all of our problems (none of where were life threatening). 2) I believe the controller could have been more helpful; instead, he compounded our problems by his rapid fire orders and tone of voice. Perhaps he was unaware that the time, I could have used some help from him rather than criticism. However, I do understand his responsibility for traffic sep, so we certainly caused him a # of problems too. 3) my own crew might have suggested I left the first officer fly. Yes, I might have snapped their heads off for suggesting that I was not in control I like to think, however, that I would have realized that my skills were rock bottom, and responded favorably to any constructive suggestions. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states does not know 'why' he lost control, except perhaps he was trying to problem solve and fly the aircraft. Should not have tried both. Felt like controller was just nagging at him. Had some self-doubt after the experience, but recently passed simulator check ride with flying colors. Solved all the aircraft problems. Found a new trick with high speed pneumatic system. Continued on their way. Says he learned a lot about himself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB FLT CREW WAS HIGH SPEED PNEUMATIC PROBLEM, #1 FILL VALVE LIGHT 'ON,' MASTER CAUTION LIGHT, AND SOME PRESSURIZATION PROBLEMS, PLUS #2 TEMPERATURE HIGH LIGHT. DISTR CAUSES COURSE DEVIATION. CTLR4 BEGINS TO 'CHIP AWAY,' AND CAPT LOSES IT.

Narrative: TKOF EWR AT APPROX BX20 EST ON FLT TO LONDON GATWICK. ON AUTOPLT, SOMEWHERE NEAR 10000', APCHING LGA VOR, TO THEN TRACK OUT ON THE 055 DEG R TO MERIT INTXN. SHORTLY BEFORE WE REACHED THE LGA VOR, THE S/O INFORMED ME THAT THE #2 ENG PNEUMATIC SUPPLY HIGH STAGE OPEN LIGHT WAS 'ON' (HE HAD PREVIOUSLY INFORMED ME OF A #1 FILL VALVE LIGHT 'ON,' WHICH WE HAD DISCUSSED, BUT NO CORRECTED). UPON XING THE LGA VOR, I INITIATED A TURN TOWARD THE 055 DEG R USING THE HDG MARKING OF THE AUTOPLT. WE THEN SUSTAINED A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT AND SOME PRESSURIZATION BUMPS,' ACCOMPANIED BY A #2 TEMP HIGH LIGHT, INDICATING EXCESSIVE TEMPS IN THE PNEUMATIC SUPPLY LINE. AS I WAS RECEIVING INPUT FROM THE S/O RE: THE FAILURE, THE ZNY CTLR ASKED US WHERE WE WERE GOING. THE F/O AND I BOTH CONFIRMED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS INDEED TURNING US TOWARD THE APPROPRIATE RADIAL. HOWEVER, THE CTLR STATED THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT THE VOR BY 4 MI, AND WE HAD BETTER STEEPEN UP THE TURN. AT THAT PINT I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND-FLEW THE ACFT, STEEPENING UP THE BANK ANGLE. FROM THIS POINT ON, I AM UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT THE EVENTS ACCURATELY. THE CTLR BEGAN CHIPPING AWAY AT ME, AND MY CONTROL OF THE ACFT DETERIORATED WHILE TRYING TO COMPLY WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS, AS WELL AS TRYING TO COORDINATE OUR IN FLT PROBS. THE F/O WAS ABLE TO TELL THE CTLR THAT WE WERE HAVING PRESSURIZATION PROBS, BUT THAT SEEMED TO HAVE NO EFFECT ON HIM--NOR DID MY FLYING IMPROVE. QUITE SIMPLY, I LET THE PRESSURES GET TO ME AND PROBABLY BROKE BOTH ALT AND ARWY CONSTRAINTS--I WAS ALL OVER THE SKY. IN RETROSPECT, I SEE A # OF THINGS I SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY: 1) AS SOON AS I RECOGNIZED THAT MY FLYING SKILLS WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO THE SITUATION, I SHOULD HAVE GIVEN CONTROL OF THE ACFT TO THE F/O. I SHOULD THEN HAVE REQUESTED A FIRM ALT AND HDG FROM ATC UNTIL WE WERE ABLE TO SORT OUT ALL OF OUR PROBS (NONE OF WHERE WERE LIFE THREATENING). 2) I BELIEVE THE CTLR COULD HAVE BEEN MORE HELPFUL; INSTEAD, HE COMPOUNDED OUR PROBS BY HIS RAPID FIRE ORDERS AND TONE OF VOICE. PERHAPS HE WAS UNAWARE THAT THE TIME, I COULD HAVE USED SOME HELP FROM HIM RATHER THAN CRITICISM. HOWEVER, I DO UNDERSTAND HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR TFC SEP, SO WE CERTAINLY CAUSED HIM A # OF PROBS TOO. 3) MY OWN CREW MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTED I LEFT THE F/O FLY. YES, I MIGHT HAVE SNAPPED THEIR HEADS OFF FOR SUGGESTING THAT I WAS NOT IN CONTROL I LIKE TO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT I WOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT MY SKILLS WERE ROCK BOTTOM, AND RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATES DOES NOT KNOW 'WHY' HE LOST CONTROL, EXCEPT PERHAPS HE WAS TRYING TO PROB SOLVE AND FLY THE ACFT. SHOULD NOT HAVE TRIED BOTH. FELT LIKE CTLR WAS JUST NAGGING AT HIM. HAD SOME SELF-DOUBT AFTER THE EXPERIENCE, BUT RECENTLY PASSED SIMULATOR CHK RIDE WITH FLYING COLORS. SOLVED ALL THE ACFT PROBS. FOUND A NEW TRICK WITH HIGH SPD PNEUMATIC SYS. CONTINUED ON THEIR WAY. SAYS HE LEARNED A LOT ABOUT HIMSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.