Narrative:

During our descent into bos; we were told to expect runway 33L. We set the FMS up with the approach for runway 33L. Later in the descent we were given a runway change to runway 32 visual. At this point the captain was the pilot flying and had disconnected the autopilot; at this point we were above 3000 ft MSL. The captain asked for the autopilot to be re-engaged. I pressed the 'autopilot' button on the fgcp and confirmed with the captain that the autopilot was engaged. We changed the FMS to reflect the runway change and continued with the approach. The captain and myself verbally confirmed with each other that the runway was in sight and notified ATC. At this point we were cleared for the runway 32 visual approach and told to contact the tower. Upon contacting the boston tower we were cleared to land on runway 32. We had discussed the fact that the runway was only 5;000 feet long and that a proper landing would be important. We were landing at flaps 45 with almost a direct headwind. The landing distance available was greater than our min field length as well as our landing distance received by [our flight computer]. The landed was successfully accomplished in touchdown zone and on centerline. After we taxied off of the runway and completed the after landing checklist the captain informed me that he had missed some information on the 10-7L page for the airport and that we should not have landed on runway 32 due to missed approach climb performance limitations. I quickly opened the page in question and realized that I too had not seen that information during our briefing. After arriving at the gate we the captain and I discussed the incident again and talked about reviewing the pages more in depth for the departure to make sure that we avoided any further oversights. The major threat during this event was the possibility of a go-around. Even though we did not anticipate having to do a go-around the possibility is always present. Had a go-around been required or necessary we may have had difficulty with the climb performance? After reflecting on this incident and learning from the mistake I will definitely be reviewing the 10-7 pages [more] thoroughly in the future. After receiving a runway change in the future I will be sure to take more time to take a second look at the 10-7 pages to ensure that nothing in them or any other documents available would prevent us from using the runway we are being given by ATC. Had I been aware of the information on the 10-7L page for bos we would have notified ATC that we were unable to use runway 32 and asked for an alternate landing runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 First Officer reported that after a late runway change they landed on a runway that was operationally restricted for their aircraft type.

Narrative: During our descent into BOS; we were told to expect runway 33L. We set the FMS up with the approach for runway 33L. Later in the descent we were given a runway change to runway 32 visual. At this point the Captain was the pilot flying and had disconnected the autopilot; at this point we were above 3000 ft MSL. The Captain asked for the autopilot to be re-engaged. I pressed the 'autopilot' button on the FGCP and confirmed with the Captain that the autopilot was engaged. We changed the FMS to reflect the runway change and continued with the approach. The Captain and myself verbally confirmed with each other that the runway was in sight and notified ATC. At this point we were cleared for the runway 32 visual approach and told to contact the tower. Upon contacting the Boston Tower we were cleared to land on runway 32. We had discussed the fact that the runway was only 5;000 feet long and that a proper landing would be important. We were landing at flaps 45 with almost a direct headwind. The landing distance available was greater than our min field length as well as our landing distance received by [our flight computer]. The landed was successfully accomplished in touchdown zone and on centerline. After we taxied off of the runway and completed the after landing checklist the Captain informed me that he had missed some information on the 10-7L page for the airport and that we should not have landed on runway 32 due to missed approach climb performance limitations. I quickly opened the page in question and realized that I too had not seen that information during our briefing. After arriving at the gate we the Captain and I discussed the incident again and talked about reviewing the pages more in depth for the departure to make sure that we avoided any further oversights. The major threat during this event was the possibility of a go-around. Even though we did not anticipate having to do a go-around the possibility is always present. Had a go-around been required or necessary we may have had difficulty with the climb performance? After reflecting on this incident and learning from the mistake I will definitely be reviewing the 10-7 pages [more] thoroughly in the future. After receiving a runway change in the future I will be sure to take more time to take a second look at the 10-7 pages to ensure that nothing in them or any other documents available would prevent us from using the runway we are being given by ATC. Had I been aware of the information on the 10-7L page for BOS we would have notified ATC that we were unable to use runway 32 and asked for an alternate landing runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.