Narrative:

The sector had approximately 25-30 planes on the frequency. I was briefed that aircraft X was NORDO. After the event it was determined that aircraft X was aircraft Y. Eram (en route automation modernization); using the beacon code; tagged the flight as [north-number/aircraft X] not [the expected callsign/ aircraft Y].I assumed the sector. The sector had between 25 and 30 aircraft on the frequency. The sector was extremely busy. I called aircraft X on the frequency. I called the flight on the guard frequency; previous sector controller had called [commercial radio] and requested that they put the flight on my frequency.I asked [another aircraft] to attempt contact with aircraft X on an adjacent sectors frequency. They advised (he was approximately 40 miles behind aircraft X) that he heard aircraft X calling on the frequency but it appeared he couldn't hear ATC and ATC couldn't hear him.I gave a clearance to relay to aircraft X. The clearance is the standard clearance for arrivals. 'Cross 60 miles southeast of rbv at 100'. Based on where aircraft X was at this time he would need to start down immediately to make the cross restriction.[the relaying aircraft] advised the flight got the clearance. I observed that aircraft X still didn't start down. I told [the flight crew] to tell aircraft X to start his descent immediately. During this time aircraft Y called and asked about his descent clearance. I did a quick scan of my aircraft (about 25 flights) and didn't see aircraft Y. I believed that the flight was approaching my airspace from non-radar and I would respond when I saw him. I was too busy to answer the flight at that moment.I once again broadcasted on guard for aircraft X to start his descent immediately. At this point the controller I relieved told me that she believed that the target we showed was not aircraft X. I immediately broadcasted 'aircraft over ceete say callsign.' aircraft Y advised they were over ceete at 36000 feet. I immediately turned the flight to a 050 heading to keep him in my airspace and get him to 10;000 feet.I descended the flight and turned him to a 090 heading and started him down. I now had to fit the flight into the lineup of about 4 more ewr/teb arrivals. I had to vector multiple aircraft to accomplish this and was extremely busy. I shipped aircraft X to the next sector.aircraft X checked on the frequency over okonu descending from 29000 feet to 10;000 feet as per his clearance. I radar identified aircraft X and stopped the flights descent at 28000 feet. In review of the event. Aircraft X called 33 miles south of okonu (in non-radar airspace). Aircraft X then called in over okonu at 36000 feet. Eram auto acquired the beacon code to [aircraft X's north number]. This was the last assigned code aircraft X was squawking from [the previous center]. Aircraft X is approximately 200 miles from okonu at this time. The R86 called the flight 'radar contact'the data tag showed an right in front of the computer identification. We have had this problem in the past. The solution is to enter /ok to gain data tag track control. Aircraft X had transitioned R81 bermuda which was leg one of his eram flight plan. The radar associate /ok'ed the data block. The radar associate prepped the data block for arrival by inserting interim altitude of 36000 feet and planned altitude at 10;000 feet. I assumed the sector from the R86 controller.multiple losses of separation occurred because aircraft X did as instructed and descended immediately to 10;000 feet. Aircraft X (the real flight) descended in non-radar airspace and had a loss of separation (oceanic non-radar standards) with approximately 3 aircraft. (One northbound and two southbound)also; I realized on the playback that aircraft X called me several times in a short period of time. Prior to the playback; I would have sworn that aircraft X called about his descent clearance and one other time. I believed that he was not yet in my airspace and had time to respond to him when I got caught up. I was definitely experiencing inattentional blindness because of the amount of information that I was being exposed to at the sector.eram needs to be fixed. I was told this event has happened before and was determined to be 'working as designed' (wad) feature. Traffic management unit (tmu) initiatives need to be developed. There were zero tmu initiatives in place to protect the sector from a several hour period of traffic volume that was almost twice the operational acceptable level of traffic for that sector. Repeatedly we hear nothing can be done with non-radar traffic.a holiday route plan was developed locally. However; it was poorly executed. There were numerous aircraft that failed to comply with the routing advisories put out by the command center as per the [holiday] routes. The plan was poorly briefed to the controller workforce. The support offices failed to get the new fixes published in time to be utilized for this time period needed. Command center repeatedly put out the command center advisory late or inaccurately resulting in the dispatchers starting out the day with aircraft on the wrong routes. [Company] has been working on a plan to modify R86 but none of their recommendations have moved beyond the discussion phase. To keep this exact event from occurring again.atop passes all the flight data it has to eram including the beacon code. Unfortunately; the beacon codes are not required to be assigned. There has been a request in for several years for atop to automatically assign codes to flights as they approach the radar boundary. It is not a high enough priority to get done.when the a-side posts flight progress strips indicating that the flight needs a different code they need to call [commercial radio] and issue the code.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZNY ARTCC Controller reported an ATC Computer assigned a beacon code to an aircraft 200 miles from the Controller's airspace. The inconsistency was only realized after the Controller issued control instructions to the aircraft and none were complied with. Eventually the error was caught shortly before the aircraft transitioned out of the sector.

Narrative: The sector had approximately 25-30 planes on the frequency. I was briefed that Aircraft X was NORDO. After the event it was determined that Aircraft X was Aircraft Y. ERAM (En Route Automation Modernization); using the beacon code; tagged the flight as [N-Number/Aircraft X] not [the expected callsign/ Aircraft Y].I assumed the sector. The sector had between 25 and 30 aircraft on the frequency. The sector was extremely busy. I called Aircraft X on the frequency. I called the flight on the Guard Frequency; previous sector controller had called [commercial radio] and requested that they put the flight on my frequency.I asked [another aircraft] to attempt contact with Aircraft X on an adjacent sectors frequency. They advised (He was approximately 40 miles behind Aircraft X) that he heard Aircraft X calling on the frequency but it appeared he couldn't hear ATC and ATC couldn't hear him.I gave a clearance to relay to Aircraft X. The clearance is the standard clearance for arrivals. 'Cross 60 miles SE of RBV at 100'. Based on where Aircraft X was at this time he would need to start down immediately to make the cross restriction.[The relaying aircraft] advised the flight got the clearance. I observed that Aircraft X still didn't start down. I told [the flight crew] to tell Aircraft X to start his descent immediately. During this time Aircraft Y called and asked about his descent clearance. I did a quick scan of my aircraft (about 25 flights) and didn't see Aircraft Y. I believed that the flight was approaching my airspace from non-radar and I would respond when I saw him. I was too busy to answer the flight at that moment.I once again broadcasted on guard for Aircraft X to start his descent immediately. At this point the controller I relieved told me that she believed that the target we showed was not Aircraft X. I immediately broadcasted 'Aircraft over CEETE say callsign.' Aircraft Y advised they were over CEETE at 36000 feet. I immediately turned the flight to a 050 heading to keep him in my airspace and get him to 10;000 feet.I descended the flight and turned him to a 090 heading and started him down. I now had to fit the flight into the lineup of about 4 more EWR/TEB arrivals. I had to vector multiple aircraft to accomplish this and was extremely busy. I shipped Aircraft X to the next sector.Aircraft X checked on the frequency over OKONU descending from 29000 feet to 10;000 feet as per his clearance. I radar identified Aircraft X and stopped the flights descent at 28000 feet. In review of the event. Aircraft X called 33 miles south of OKONU (in non-radar airspace). Aircraft X then called in over OKONU at 36000 feet. ERAM auto acquired the beacon code to [Aircraft X's N Number]. This was the last assigned code Aircraft X was squawking from [the previous center]. Aircraft X is approximately 200 miles from OKONU at this time. The R86 called the flight 'Radar Contact'The data tag showed an R in front of the Computer ID. We have had this problem in the past. The solution is to enter /OK to gain data tag track control. Aircraft X had transitioned R81 Bermuda which was leg one of his ERAM flight plan. The Radar Associate /ok'ed the data block. The Radar Associate prepped the data block for arrival by inserting Interim Altitude of 36000 feet and planned altitude at 10;000 feet. I assumed the sector from the R86 controller.Multiple losses of separation occurred because Aircraft X did as instructed and descended immediately to 10;000 feet. Aircraft X (The real flight) descended in non-radar airspace and had a loss of separation (Oceanic Non-Radar Standards) with approximately 3 aircraft. (One northbound and two southbound)Also; I realized on the playback that Aircraft X called me several times in a short period of time. Prior to the playback; I would have sworn that Aircraft X called about his descent clearance and one other time. I believed that he was not yet in my airspace and had time to respond to him when I got caught up. I was definitely experiencing Inattentional Blindness because of the amount of information that I was being exposed to at the sector.ERAM needs to be fixed. I was told this event has happened before and was determined to be 'Working as Designed' (WAD) feature. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) Initiatives need to be developed. There were zero TMU initiatives in place to protect the sector from a several hour period of traffic volume that was almost twice the operational acceptable level of traffic for that sector. Repeatedly we hear nothing can be done with non-radar traffic.A holiday route plan was developed locally. However; it was poorly executed. There were numerous aircraft that failed to comply with the routing advisories put out by the Command Center as per the [holiday] Routes. The plan was poorly briefed to the controller workforce. The support offices failed to get the new fixes published in time to be utilized for this time period needed. Command Center repeatedly put out the Command Center Advisory late or inaccurately resulting in the dispatchers starting out the day with aircraft on the wrong routes. [Company] has been working on a plan to modify R86 but none of their recommendations have moved beyond the discussion phase. To keep this exact event from occurring again.ATOP passes all the flight data it has to ERAM including the beacon code. Unfortunately; the beacon codes are not required to be assigned. There has been a request in for several years for ATOP to automatically assign codes to flights as they approach the Radar boundary. It is not a high enough priority to get done.When the A-side posts flight progress strips indicating that the flight needs a different code they need to call [commercial radio] and issue the code.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.