Narrative:

It had been snowing all day and the light snow continued into the evening. We had a light cargo load. We deiced and planned for an engine anti ice departure. Before to; we did a momentary run up to 60% N1; and began our takeoff roll.the first officer called 80 KTS; I crossed checked my airspeed and responded 'check'. Thereafter the first officer called/said V1. Expecting to hear 'rotate' immediately following the v1 call (V1; vr were the same) and not hearing it; I waited a moment; glanced down at the primary flight display (pfd) and saw we were well beyond the 'blue' airspeed line. As I began to rotate; the rotation did not feel normal; I slowed the rotation rate and the airplane lifted off.bothered as to why the airplane rotated so sluggishly the first officer and I discussed what we both saw. At the 80 KTS call the first officer said he noticed the blue speed line had dropped to 100 KTS. He then saw V1 near the top of the pfd speed tape; and said or commented 'V1'. After hearing V1; I hesitated on the rotation because I didn't hear vr. A quick glance at the pfd airspeed blue line confirmed we were well above it; however; what I didn't recognize was the blue line that we were well past was at 100 KTS and not V1. The V2 speed had dropped out and the blue line speed defaulted to 100 KTS. -The correct V2 dropped from the FMS and the 100 KTS default speed was displayed on the pfd. -An early rotation was initiated as a result of this; and miscommunication. I heard V1; but the intent was not to call V1. It was uttered somewhat as a 'surprise'. -V1; vr and V2 were entered into the FMS and V2 bug set on standby airspeed indicator during the performance check; and confirmed again during the 'below the line' portion of the before takeoff checklist. -I relied on the blue line as a reference and being above it rather than the actual speed. -Even though I had heard V1 and confirmed we were above the blue line; I now make it a habit to confirm the speeds on both the pfd and standby airspeed indicators. -Pay even more attention to the actual speed; rather than the speed in relation the blue line. -Make a mental note of the takeoff speeds

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Airbus Captain experienced a loss of V speeds during the takeoff roll resulting in the First Officer calling V1 well before the actual V1 and the Captain initiating rotation. The Captain notes the sluggish rotation and the aircraft is allowed to fly off the runway.

Narrative: It had been snowing all day and the light snow continued into the evening. We had a light cargo load. We deiced and planned for an engine anti ice departure. Before TO; we did a momentary run up to 60% N1; and began our takeoff roll.The FO called 80 KTS; I crossed checked my airspeed and responded 'check'. Thereafter the FO called/said V1. Expecting to hear 'rotate' immediately following the v1 call (V1; Vr were the same) and not hearing it; I waited a moment; glanced down at the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and saw we were well beyond the 'blue' airspeed line. As I began to rotate; the rotation did not feel normal; I slowed the rotation rate and the airplane lifted off.Bothered as to why the airplane rotated so sluggishly the FO and I discussed what we both saw. At the 80 KTS call the FO said he noticed the blue speed line had dropped to 100 KTS. He then saw V1 near the top of the PFD speed tape; and said or commented 'V1'. After hearing V1; I hesitated on the rotation because I didn't hear Vr. A quick glance at the PFD airspeed blue line confirmed we were well above it; however; what I didn't recognize was the blue line that we were well past was at 100 KTS and not V1. The V2 speed had dropped out and the blue line speed defaulted to 100 KTS. -The correct V2 dropped from the FMS and the 100 KTS default speed was displayed on the PFD. -An early rotation was initiated as a result of this; and miscommunication. I heard V1; but the intent was not to call V1. It was uttered somewhat as a 'surprise'. -V1; Vr and V2 were entered into the FMS and V2 bug set on standby airspeed indicator during the performance check; and confirmed again during the 'below the line' portion of the before takeoff checklist. -I relied on the blue line as a reference and being above it rather than the actual speed. -Even though I had heard V1 and confirmed we were above the blue line; I now make it a habit to confirm the speeds on both the PFD and standby airspeed indicators. -Pay even more attention to the actual speed; rather than the speed in relation the blue line. -Make a mental note of the takeoff speeds

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.