Narrative:

Left bleed inop MEL prior. It was a xa:15 am van ride from the hotel. A 30 minute ride to the airport had us with 5 minutes to spare prior to scheduled show time. All until the point of incident was normal except for the MEL mentioned above. Anti-ice (wing/cowl) was used during about 15-20 minutes into the flight. For about 3 minutes. This is when we 1st noticed the issue of the airplane not keeping cabin pressure climbing through 26;0000 ft. My first officer was first to notice the cabin pressure was inadequate. It got up to 8;600 feet when once I understood that we had a problem we received a 'right bleed' EICAS warning. Followed by right bleed caution & cabin attendant press caution. We leveled off at 26;000ft-30;000ft. Requested decent to 10;000 ft & complied with QRH. I realized that the first officer was much better at running the checklists and I was better at flying the airplane and notifying the flight attendants and passengers so now became the flying pilot and he became the monitoring pilot. Told center of our issues. Coordinated with dispatch. I made the final decision to divert because I felt like we had new crew; with less experience than average crews in a similar situation. We had endured the early start and diversion. There was no need to expose ourselves to disadvantageous probabilities. So with the lack of significant help from dispatch and ATC; we slowed the airplane down and completed our necessary tasks and checklists. Landed without further event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reports being dispatched with a L BLEED inop MEL and discovers during climb that cabin pressure cannot be maintained with wing and engine anti ice on. The Captain elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport.

Narrative: L BLEED Inop MEL prior. It was a XA:15 am van ride from the hotel. A 30 minute ride to the airport had us with 5 minutes to spare prior to scheduled show time. All until the point of incident was normal except for the MEL mentioned above. Anti-ice (wing/cowl) was used during about 15-20 minutes into the flight. For about 3 minutes. This is when we 1st noticed the issue of the airplane not keeping cabin pressure climbing through 26;0000 ft. My First Officer was first to notice the cabin pressure was inadequate. It got up to 8;600 feet when once I understood that we had a problem we received a 'R BLEED' EICAS WARNING. Followed by R BLEED CAUTION & CAB PRESS CAUTION. WE LEVELED OFF AT 26;000ft-30;000ft. Requested decent to 10;000 ft & Complied with QRH. I realized that the First officer was much better at running the checklists and I was better at flying the airplane and notifying the Flight Attendants and passengers so now became the flying pilot and he became the monitoring pilot. Told center of our issues. Coordinated with dispatch. I made the final decision to divert because I felt like we had new crew; with less experience than average crews in a similar situation. We had endured the early start and diversion. There was no need to expose ourselves to disadvantageous probabilities. So with the lack of significant help from dispatch and ATC; we slowed the airplane down and completed our necessary tasks and checklists. Landed without further event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.