Narrative:

We were on the second duty day of a trip. The pick up at our hotel was at xa:50 local time. We flew [the] flight prior to ZZZ. On the second leg; we had a hydraulic yellow rsvr lo ECAM right after takeoff. The yellow system hydraulic fluid was completely lost and empty. We performed the ECAM and the checklist. Although I wanted to return; after consulting the company and my first officer (first officer) (who had recently experienced the same problem) they all recommended that we continue (3+ hours left in the flight). According to them; that recommendation was made based on: the remaining system was operating normally; QRH does not call for 'land(ing) at the nearest suitable'; and QRH is 'controlling'. Although I felt somewhat uncomfortable continuing the flight with the loss of a major hydraulic system; especially on a dark night; I agreed with the recommendation to continue. Soon into the cruise; I reviewed both the 'yellow & green hydraulic system loss' checklists; just in case we also lost the green system; which I thought; would put us in a challenging situation for sure. Plus; I was still feeling that we were in a state where 'a critical system redundancy is lost.' so; I reestablished the radio conference. After a careful review; they now all agreed with me that we should divert instead of continuing. We diverted to ZZZ1. The flight landed overweight and completed the loss of accumulator pressure on approach. We were not even at the gate when the station was calling us on the radio to see if we would agree to continue the flight to ZZZ2. Immediately after completing the flight; both a mechanic and station personnel came on board asking about continuing the flight. I had not even had a chance to talk with dispatch or scheduling; when people started bombarding me with questions. I asked them to give me a chance to talk with the company. I next had a talk with maintenance; the station manager; dispatch; and the ops manager. He asked me to waive the 30 min duty extension to continue the flight to ZZZ2. He told me the new plane would arrive in time for an xb:15 departure and I agreed to extend.soon after that conversation; I received information that the arrival of the plane would not be until after xb:04. I called back only the operations manager had already gone home. Now I was on the phone with another operations manager who told us that he needed a 2 hour extension. I couldn't tell the passengers that we wouldn't be flying the flight just a few minutes after announcing the flight would continue based on the 30 minute extension. For the sake of our customers; we decided to press on and reluctantly agreed to extend. First officer confirmed with me several times that the crew critical off time (cco) time was now xh:57 even though an ACARS message said xh:00. He 'updated' the cco and we received the revised ACARS message of xh:57. During the climb we received the ACARS message 'extension not available. Must return to the gate.' dispatch stated that we had exceeded the cco time of xh:05 when we took off at xh:06. This cco time of xh:05 was never addressed before. I asked what they wanted us to do at that point. Dispatch was consulting with the far 117 desk and ops manager. It took a while for them to respond and when they did; dispatch informed us that if we expedited the taxi after landing in ZZZ1; we should be okay. I further asked dispatch if we had in fact exceeded the cco time or not. Dispatch said they were reviewing the information to find the answer. After some wait; the ops manager sent us an ACARS message saying we had not exceeded the FAA time but the company cco time. I do not have full confidence in that explanation. If we were okay; then why had they sent us the 'must return to the gate' message to begin with? The flight continued and landed normally in the very early hours of the morning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The A320 lost the yellow hydraulic system and diverted; which put them in a confusing FAR 117 situation.

Narrative: We were on the second duty day of a trip. The pick up at our hotel was at XA:50 local time. We flew [the] flight prior to ZZZ. On the second leg; we had a HYD YELLOW RSVR LO ECAM right after takeoff. The Yellow system hydraulic fluid was completely lost and empty. We performed the ECAM and the checklist. Although I wanted to return; after consulting the Company and my First Officer (FO) (who had recently experienced the same problem) they all recommended that we continue (3+ hours left in the flight). According to them; that recommendation was made based on: the remaining system was operating normally; QRH does not call for 'land(ing) at the nearest suitable'; and QRH is 'controlling'. Although I felt somewhat uncomfortable continuing the flight with the loss of a major hydraulic system; especially on a dark night; I agreed with the recommendation to continue. Soon into the cruise; I reviewed both the 'Yellow & Green HYD System Loss' checklists; just in case we also lost the Green system; which I thought; would put us in a challenging situation for sure. Plus; I was still feeling that we were in a state where 'A critical system redundancy is lost.' So; I reestablished the radio conference. After a careful review; they now all agreed with me that we should divert instead of continuing. We diverted to ZZZ1. The flight landed overweight and completed the loss of Accumulator pressure on approach. We were not even at the gate when the station was calling us on the radio to see if we would agree to continue the flight to ZZZ2. Immediately after completing the flight; both a mechanic and station personnel came on board asking about continuing the flight. I had not even had a chance to talk with Dispatch or Scheduling; when people started bombarding me with questions. I asked them to give me a chance to talk with the company. I next had a talk with Maintenance; the Station Manager; Dispatch; and the Ops Manager. He asked me to waive the 30 min duty extension to continue the flight to ZZZ2. He told me the new plane would arrive in time for an XB:15 departure and I agreed to extend.Soon after that conversation; I received information that the arrival of the plane would not be until after XB:04. I called back only the Operations Manager had already gone home. Now I was on the phone with another Operations manager who told us that he needed a 2 hour extension. I couldn't tell the passengers that we wouldn't be flying the flight just a few minutes after announcing the flight would continue based on the 30 minute extension. For the sake of our customers; we decided to press on and reluctantly agreed to extend. FO confirmed with me several times that the Crew Critical Off time (CCO) time was now XH:57 even though an ACARS message said XH:00. He 'updated' the CCO and we received the revised ACARS message of XH:57. During the climb we received the ACARS message 'Extension not available. Must return to the gate.' Dispatch stated that we had exceeded the CCO time of XH:05 when we took off at XH:06. This CCO time of XH:05 was never addressed before. I asked what they wanted us to do at that point. Dispatch was consulting with the FAR 117 desk and Ops Manager. It took a while for them to respond and when they did; Dispatch informed us that if we expedited the taxi after landing in ZZZ1; we should be okay. I further asked Dispatch if we had in fact exceeded the CCO time or not. Dispatch said they were reviewing the information to find the answer. After some wait; the Ops Manager sent us an ACARS message saying we had not exceeded the FAA time but the company CCO time. I do not have full confidence in that explanation. If we were okay; then why had they sent us the 'must return to the gate' message to begin with? The flight continued and landed normally in the very early hours of the morning.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.