Narrative:

A collision hazard exists and is caused by improper airspace management procedures. There is a high vol of aircraft requesting VFR practice INS approachs to a user drawn NDB-like approach to a commercial radio station. This broadcast station bacon is located at a point approximately 5 NM east of love field, prescott, az. These aircraft enter the traffic pattern at an angle and altitude that creates a high collision hazard with aircraft arriving and departing runway 21. Runway 21 is the calm wind runway and is in use the majority of time. Additionally, there is a large amount of traffic requesting VFR practice approachs on the VOR-a procedure to love field. These aircraft are in conflict with those making the approach from the eon the user drawn NDB-like procedures, particularly on the missed approach segment of the procedures. Prc tower is a non radar VFR tower facility. The facility is already highly taxed with a large vol of traffic. The tower is unable to provide any kind of meaningful traffic information to these aircraft. Contributing factors: management has instructed the controllers at prc tower to restrict the inbound traffic on the VOR a approach procedure to at or above 6500' MSL, and the inbound traffic on the opp side of the airport on the NDB-type approach at or above 7000' MSL. This is a very dangerous procedure as the traffic is not in level flight, but actually descending and climbing throughout the procedure--particularly the portion of the procedure that is within the air traffic area. (Note: the air traffic area at love field extends up to approximately 8000' MSL--see attached sheets.) the controllers can always deny the approach to the users; however, they are under pressure both from management and peers to approve this type of operation. Additionally, most controllers at prc are at their first facility; they follow instructions from seemingly more experienced peers and do not question management's decisions and instructions even though sometimes, as in this example, hazards are introduced into the system. Corrective actions: notify users that the user drawn NDB approach is no longer valid. Suggest to users that they draw an approach somewhere that is outside of the air traffic area. Love field has no NDB approach. It is not really necessary that an NDB approach terminate at an airport. This should have little impact on training. Management should be counseled that practice INS approachs constitute a special hazard. At present, the management of prc tower states that these operations are 'just another way of entering the traffic pattern.' this is not true. During a practice INS approach the safety pilot's view is restr by the PF wearing a view restricting device. Many incidents have pointed to the need of extra precautions (reference aim paragraph 244).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORT DESCRIBES HEAVY TRAFFIC ADJACENT TO ATA WITH REPEATED ENTRY TO ATA FROM USER DRAWN COM BROADCAST STATION APCH PROC.

Narrative: A COLLISION HAZARD EXISTS AND IS CAUSED BY IMPROPER AIRSPACE MGMNT PROCS. THERE IS A HIGH VOL OF ACFT REQUESTING VFR PRACTICE INS APCHS TO A USER DRAWN NDB-LIKE APCH TO A COMMERCIAL RADIO STATION. THIS BROADCAST STATION BACON IS LOCATED AT A POINT APPROX 5 NM E OF LOVE FIELD, PRESCOTT, AZ. THESE ACFT ENTER THE TFC PATTERN AT AN ANGLE AND ALT THAT CREATES A HIGH COLLISION HAZARD WITH ACFT ARRIVING AND DEPARTING RWY 21. RWY 21 IS THE CALM WIND RWY AND IS IN USE THE MAJORITY OF TIME. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TFC REQUESTING VFR PRACTICE APCHS ON THE VOR-A PROC TO LOVE FIELD. THESE ACFT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH THOSE MAKING THE APCH FROM THE EON THE USER DRAWN NDB-LIKE PROCS, PARTICULARLY ON THE MISSED APCH SEGMENT OF THE PROCS. PRC TWR IS A NON RADAR VFR TWR FAC. THE FAC IS ALREADY HIGHLY TAXED WITH A LARGE VOL OF TFC. THE TWR IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY KIND OF MEANINGFUL TFC INFO TO THESE ACFT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MGMNT HAS INSTRUCTED THE CTLRS AT PRC TWR TO RESTRICT THE INBND TFC ON THE VOR A APCH PROC TO AT OR ABOVE 6500' MSL, AND THE INBND TFC ON THE OPP SIDE OF THE ARPT ON THE NDB-TYPE APCH AT OR ABOVE 7000' MSL. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS PROC AS THE TFC IS NOT IN LEVEL FLT, BUT ACTUALLY DSNDING AND CLBING THROUGHOUT THE PROC--PARTICULARLY THE PORTION OF THE PROC THAT IS WITHIN THE ATA. (NOTE: THE ATA AT LOVE FIELD EXTENDS UP TO APPROX 8000' MSL--SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.) THE CTLRS CAN ALWAYS DENY THE APCH TO THE USERS; HOWEVER, THEY ARE UNDER PRESSURE BOTH FROM MGMNT AND PEERS TO APPROVE THIS TYPE OF OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, MOST CTLRS AT PRC ARE AT THEIR FIRST FAC; THEY FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS FROM SEEMINGLY MORE EXPERIENCED PEERS AND DO NOT QUESTION MGMNT'S DECISIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS EVEN THOUGH SOMETIMES, AS IN THIS EXAMPLE, HAZARDS ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE SYS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NOTIFY USERS THAT THE USER DRAWN NDB APCH IS NO LONGER VALID. SUGGEST TO USERS THAT THEY DRAW AN APCH SOMEWHERE THAT IS OUTSIDE OF THE ATA. LOVE FIELD HAS NO NDB APCH. IT IS NOT REALLY NECESSARY THAT AN NDB APCH TERMINATE AT AN ARPT. THIS SHOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON TRNING. MGMNT SHOULD BE COUNSELED THAT PRACTICE INS APCHS CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL HAZARD. AT PRESENT, THE MGMNT OF PRC TWR STATES THAT THESE OPS ARE 'JUST ANOTHER WAY OF ENTERING THE TFC PATTERN.' THIS IS NOT TRUE. DURING A PRACTICE INS APCH THE SAFETY PLT'S VIEW IS RESTR BY THE PF WEARING A VIEW RESTRICTING DEVICE. MANY INCIDENTS HAVE POINTED TO THE NEED OF EXTRA PRECAUTIONS (REF AIM PARAGRAPH 244).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.