Narrative:

I arrived for my 4th of 4 days; xa:20 show to operate me scheduled flight. The plane had 4 mels to begin with. The two I'll focus on are 27-xx-xx-Y. After reviewing the MEL; there were several people questioning whether we could even apply this specific MEL. The modification (mod) list needed to be referenced and after that was complete it came down to the word 'or' as the aircraft had one mod installed but not the other. After 40 minutes of discussion; the tlr was modified. If you also include the passenger medical issue requiring a paramedic sign off; you can see it was a very busy morning already. After successful engine start; we performed the first control check (not required by the MEL) and observed only 'pair 3' locked out. Per the sign off; the aircraft needed both sets disabled. We needed to leave the ramp for company to push. With all the GA traffic the only place to go was the end of the runway. After a quick review of the MEL; for either a paperwork swap to one pair inoperative or for two pair inoperative; we needed a mechanic (mx). We verified this with maintenance control; :25 later (can't remember exactly) we parked at the gate. Just to take a second here ... The system was 'meled' on the 4th and flew. We're the spoilers correctly disconnected? If so; did they trouble shoot overnight and not re-comply? These two items I don't have the information for but I do know for a fact I was given the plane with a non-compliant MEL procedure. The flight ops assistant met us and inquired about the situation. I gave him a quick airbus systems dissertation on why we were back at the gate. Mx quickly met us and took the logbook to examine the work and why we weren't in compliance. Within: 10 or so they were back and another: 03 the new procedure was apparently completed. 'Wow I thought that was quick'. Looking at the flight control (F/control) page we now had 3/4 spoilers 'X-ed' out. Even though it did not call for the next step; I insisted we do a control check prior to push. They cleared the outside and the 'visible cockpit indications' showed correct deflections. We buttoned up and pushed back; check automatic information system (ais) for times. Maybe an hour late? This is the second time we were apparently MEL compliant. I can't speak for what the other crew saw but as for us; everything we saw on the instruments and paperwork said we were compliant. My first officer (first officer) was flying the first leg. It was windy for our departure; rotation was normal but the coordination and turning were sloppy. Probably due to both turbulence and 1/2 of the roll spoilers gone. As we accelerated thru 12;000' and the ride calmed down thru the upper teens; we started to notice the left hand (lh) wing started to indicate a slight wing down indication on the primary flight display (pfd). As we climbed further and transitioned to mach; the indication continued. We changed to the #1 dfgc; at first there appeared to be some improvement but that later mimicked #2. We disconnected the autopilot and manually trimmed the plane out with the rudder. We couldn't fully right the wings. Once we leveled at FL360; we reengaged #2 and watched the pfd/F/control indications. 2-3deg lh turn on the pfd; lh ail outside the cruise ticks; rh ail normal. Rudder showing a 1.7deg right deflection. We started communication via ACARS with dispatch and mx. Over the next hour the problem continued to progress to a greater offset and more rudder correction. We tried again to disconnect and manually fly but this time there was no correction to be had. We couldn't level the wings. Very uneasy feeling in a fbw plane that has no aileron trim installedat our time of departure (TOD); the first step down; it actually felt like the plane was in a mild 'slip'. Not indicated as much but we were definitely not tracking straight. We took a conservative descent approach. The headwinds helped get us down in time. We vectored into the pattern eventually on the downwind. Everytime we turned (especially to the left) we experienced a very noticeable uncoordinated slip all the way thru the turn. These factors continued to worsen until we passed flaps 2. Then all indications flopped. Rudder inputs remained but opposite aileron and spoiler indications. At 600' we has lh ail deflected 50-60% down; rh ail deflected 30-40% up. All remaining spoilers on rh wing extended normal rudder indications but we were in a slip down the GS. We increased speed and flew a shallow approach as we had 11;000'+ to land on. It was a positive touchdown in light winds and VFR conditions. We used more braking than reverse for this landing; the rollout was normal. I felt very uneasy and out of control while operating this airplane that I have trusted now for 2 1/2 years.when we arrived at the gate; a mechanic (as I requested) met the plane. As I began to enter as much data into the logbook; the first officer sends me a picture of the lh wing ... The locked out #4 spoiler is deflected 10-15deg. This is impossible I said to myself! It's locked out electrically via SEC1 and the mx procedure should have had the existing hydraulic pressure holding it in place. We've all read the articles about spoiler float and it can present in different ways; poor rotation or extended to run; poor handling; rumbling; etc. Of which the handling was assumed; initially; to be the missing spoilers.after a very thorough search by our 'unexperienced airbus on call mx' (who worked at night on the line); we discovered the panel was never locked out. Only two of the three steps were followed. This was the 3rd miss by our maintenance team. I talked in great length with 3 different dispatchers; one in training; the duty pilot and my crew about the situation and how we felt the plane may be unsafe to fly. I think what I was looking for was a 100% '... Yes this was a spoiler float event and not electrically influenced ...' we would never receive such a statement. For a large portion of the delay I was convinced I was not moving the plane anywhere. We eventually came to an agreement after several control checks; inspecting the spoilers myself and factoring in all the other 'pros' we had (long runway; VFR; light winds; only 142k) that we would take the plane. We planned on engaging the autopilot very early in the flight and if the wing dipped; even a bit; we were going to declare an emergency; apply the penalty and land overweight. We loaded after an extensive delay. During engine #2 start; we experienced an ign B failure that needed to be deferred. I'll just mention here this system has been deferred more than just once. I reluctantly say more than 10 because that may not be factual but if someone was looking at the history; I'd bet I'm not far off. I know they have replaced several parts and continue to troubleshoot but the #2 motors' initial power applications lag; and normal starts have taken 1:40. All significantly different than others but that's another story ... At times this aircraft has carried 8+ mels at one time. This (and apparently sister ships which are both at out departure airport) are a great barrier to completing on time; reliable and predictable operations for our customers. During this delay; we needed to amend the release for fuel burn and extend: 30 to complete our mission. At no time did the company or safety or the duty pilot or whoever just ask how we were. Look at this chain of events? It's not supposed to be like this. I hope I caught everything I needed to because we were definitely doing the job of several departments this day. This was easily one of the top 5 most challenging days I've had here in all my years. The possibility of an aircraft accident was created by incomplete maintenance procedures; and the lack of possibly parts; tools; or personnel to complete either the deferral of a repair. This is supposed to be a fairly routine procedure. This incident indicates a need for properly trained maintenance technicians andsome sort of cross check being implemented for these aircraft. It highlights the need for readdressing how this company perceives its maintenance function. While maintenance may have failed to accomplish a maintenance procedure; other links in the chain held fast. A properly trained crew was able to safely fly a compromised airframe; without further damage. I hope that I have been able to convey the importance of this incident. This event points out how dangerously thin this company's resources are apparently being pulled. It's also apparent that the schedule pressured is obviously elevated at the expense of a thorough procedure. Our [company] does not enjoy the luxury of any mistake!multiple mechanics doing every MEL procedure. Some system of cross checks must be implemented by maintenance.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported MEL procedures were not complied with completely causing irregular flight characteristics.

Narrative: I arrived for my 4th of 4 days; XA:20 show to operate me scheduled flight. The plane had 4 MELs to begin with. The two I'll focus on are 27-XX-XX-Y. After reviewing the MEL; there were several people questioning whether we could even apply this specific MEL. The Modification (MOD) list needed to be referenced and after that was complete it came down to the word 'OR' as the aircraft had one MOD installed but not the other. After 40 minutes of discussion; the TLR was modified. If you also include the passenger medical issue requiring a paramedic sign off; you can see it was a very busy morning already. After successful engine start; we performed the first control check (not required by the MEL) and observed only 'pair 3' locked out. Per the sign off; the aircraft needed both sets disabled. We needed to leave the ramp for company to push. With all the GA traffic the only place to go was the end of the runway. After a quick review of the MEL; for either a paperwork swap to one pair inoperative or for two pair inoperative; we needed a Mechanic (MX). We verified this with Maintenance Control; :25 later (can't remember exactly) we parked at the gate. Just to take a second here ... The system was 'MELed' on the 4th and flew. We're the spoilers correctly disconnected? If so; did they trouble shoot overnight and not re-comply? These two items I don't have the information for but I do know for a fact I was given the plane with a non-compliant MEL procedure. The flight Ops assistant met us and inquired about the situation. I gave him a quick airbus systems dissertation on why we were back at the gate. MX quickly met us and took the logbook to examine the work and why we weren't in compliance. Within: 10 or so they were back and another: 03 the new procedure was apparently completed. 'Wow I thought that was quick'. Looking at the Flight Control (F/CTL) page we now had 3/4 spoilers 'X-ed' out. Even though it did not call for the next step; I insisted we do a control check prior to push. They cleared the outside and the 'visible cockpit indications' showed correct deflections. We buttoned up and pushed back; check Automatic Information System (AIS) for times. Maybe an hour late? This is the SECOND TIME we were apparently MEL compliant. I can't speak for what the other crew saw but as for us; everything we saw on the instruments and paperwork said we were compliant. My First Officer (FO) was flying the first leg. It was windy for our departure; rotation was normal but the coordination and turning were sloppy. Probably due to both turbulence and 1/2 of the roll spoilers gone. As we accelerated thru 12;000' and the ride calmed down thru the upper teens; we started to notice the Left Hand (LH) wing started to indicate a slight wing down indication on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). As we climbed further and transitioned to Mach; the indication continued. We changed to the #1 DFGC; at first there appeared to be some improvement but that later mimicked #2. We disconnected the autopilot and manually trimmed the plane out with the rudder. We couldn't fully right the wings. Once we leveled at FL360; we reengaged #2 and watched the PFD/F/CTL indications. 2-3deg LH turn on the PFD; LH AIL outside the cruise ticks; RH AIL normal. Rudder showing a 1.7deg R deflection. We started communication via ACARS with dispatch and MX. Over the next hour the problem continued to progress to a greater offset and more rudder correction. We tried again to disconnect and manually fly but this time there was no correction to be had. We couldn't level the wings. VERY uneasy feeling in a FBW plane that has no aileron trim installedAt our Time of Departure (TOD); the first step down; it actually felt like the plane was in a mild 'slip'. Not indicated as much but we were definitely not tracking straight. We took a conservative descent approach. The headwinds helped get us down in time. We vectored into the pattern eventually on the downwind. Everytime we turned (especially to the left) we experienced a very noticeable uncoordinated slip all the way thru the turn. These factors continued to worsen until we passed flaps 2. Then all indications flopped. Rudder inputs remained but opposite aileron and spoiler indications. At 600' we has LH AIL deflected 50-60% down; RH AIL deflected 30-40% up. ALL REMAINING spoilers on RH wing extended normal rudder indications but we were in a slip down the GS. We increased speed and flew a shallow approach as we had 11;000'+ to land on. It was a positive touchdown in light winds and VFR conditions. We used more braking than reverse for this landing; the rollout was normal. I felt VERY uneasy and out of control while operating this airplane that I have trusted now for 2 1/2 years.When we arrived at the gate; a mechanic (as I requested) met the plane. As I began to enter as much data into the logbook; the FO sends me a picture of the LH wing ... THE LOCKED OUT #4 SPOILER IS DEFLECTED 10-15deg. This is impossible I said to myself! It's locked out electrically via SEC1 and the MX procedure should have had the existing hydraulic pressure holding it in place. We've all read the articles about spoiler float and it can present in different ways; poor rotation or extended TO run; poor handling; rumbling; etc. of which the handling was assumed; initially; to be the missing spoilers.After a very thorough search by our 'unexperienced airbus on call MX' (who worked at night on the line); we discovered the panel WAS NEVER LOCKED OUT. ONLY TWO OF THE THREE STEPS WERE FOLLOWED. This was the 3rd miss by our maintenance team. I talked in great length with 3 different dispatchers; one in training; the duty pilot and my crew about the situation and how we felt the plane may be unsafe to fly. I think what I was looking for was a 100% '... Yes this was a spoiler float event and not electrically influenced ...' We would never receive such a statement. For a large portion of the delay I was convinced I was not moving the plane anywhere. We eventually came to an agreement after several control checks; inspecting the spoilers myself and factoring in all the other 'pros' we had (long runway; VFR; light winds; only 142k) that we would take the plane. We planned on engaging the autopilot very early in the flight and if the wing dipped; even a bit; we were going to declare an emergency; apply the penalty and land overweight. We loaded after an extensive delay. During Engine #2 start; we experienced an IGN B failure that needed to be deferred. I'll just mention here this system has been deferred more than just once. I reluctantly say more than 10 because that may not be factual but if someone was looking at the history; I'd bet I'm not far off. I know they have replaced several parts and continue to troubleshoot but the #2 motors' initial power applications lag; and normal starts have taken 1:40. All significantly different than others but that's another story ... At times this aircraft has carried 8+ MELs at one time. This (and apparently sister ships which are both at out departure airport) are a great barrier to completing on time; reliable and predictable operations for our customers. During this delay; we needed to amend the release for fuel burn AND extend: 30 to complete our mission. At no time did the company or safety or the duty pilot or whoever just ask how we were. Look at this chain of events? It's NOT supposed to be like this. I hope I caught everything I needed to because we were definitely doing the job of SEVERAL departments this day. This was easily one of the top 5 most challenging days I've had here in all my years. The possibility of an aircraft accident was created by incomplete maintenance procedures; and the lack of possibly parts; tools; or personnel to complete either the deferral of a repair. This is supposed to be a fairly routine procedure. This incident indicates a need for properly trained maintenance technicians andsome sort of cross check being implemented for these aircraft. It highlights the need for readdressing how this company perceives its maintenance function. While maintenance may have failed to accomplish a maintenance procedure; other links in the chain held fast. A properly trained crew was able to safely fly a compromised airframe; without further damage. I hope that I have been able to convey the importance of this incident. This event points out how dangerously thin this company's resources are apparently being pulled. It's also apparent that the schedule pressured is obviously elevated at the expense of a thorough procedure. Our [company] does not enjoy the luxury of any mistake!Multiple mechanics doing every MEL procedure. Some system of cross checks MUST be implemented by maintenance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.