Narrative:

We accepted an aircraft from inbound crew. The plane had one deferral: 'autospoilers'. Upon performing 'captains flow'; and during the takeoff configuration check; the aural 'auto brakes' was heard. Performed the test multiple times same result. Called mx (maintenance) and wrote up the discrepancy in aircraft log. Mx came out and essentially reconfigured the aircraft to the MEL's specifications multiple times until we finally got a good test. The auto brakes aural should not have been heard at all due to one of the auto spoiler circuit breaker (circuit breaker) being pulled and collared; so there was quite a bit of troubleshooting involved as to why this aural was happening under the planes current deferral condition. My main concern as expressed to mx was that the 'auto brakes' aural (with the auto brake switch in off position) warns a pilot that his auto spoiler is in fact armed and his auto brakes are not set and armed; the problem being that there should have been no way for the autospoiler to be armed if it was in fact correctly configured and deactivated per the MEL by mx personnel. Mx talked about there being multiple circuit breaker dealing with the autospoiler and we again checked verbiage of MEL to make sure the correct one was pulled and collared. At this point the plane is re-signed off; operating under the same deferral; and the tko (takeoff) configuration check performed as it should. Push back and engine starts non eventful. Before taxi check non eventful with a satisfactory 'brakes-brakes' aural on the tko configuration check. Taxi non eventful. Cleared for tko; we took the runway and ran the before tko checklist; plane was configured as it should be for tko under the deferral. We set power for tko; auto throttles on; and started tko roll. No tko configuration aural noted; all is operating as it should. At the '80 knots thrust normal' callout; my eyes were scanning the engine instruments; so as to complete the call with 'checks'. At this point the 'auto brakes' aural comes on and I aborted the tko. Normal deceleration and non-eventful taxi in. Brake temps peaked at 180 degrees. First officer consulted QRH for guidance as appropriate with the brake temp/rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) graph procedure. Returned to gate and wrote up the discrepancy in log. In subsequent conversation with duty pilot; mx control; and line mx; I asked that a high energy mx checklist be performed by mx personnel due to the timing of the abort and my instrument scan at the time abort decision was made. I wanted to take the safest possible route; due to the possibility of speed being actually above 80 knots at peak of our tko roll. I was advised by all parties that they were in agreement of this course of action as the safest and that it would be complied with. There are many inter-related systems in the MD80; for example the auto ground spoilers. While the MEL only directed mx to pull and collar one circuit breaker; there was obviously another interconnected system still powered to the autospoilers. Upon returning on the evening of this trip; I again spoke with mx personnel. I was advised that they had just determined the cause of the tko configuration warning as being one of three relays in the switch pack in front of the spoiler handle that was out of tolerances; this providing what ended up being an intermittent signal to the configuration system. Perhaps going forward; the MEL should be revised in its procedures to address some of the codependent and interconnected systems. Our MEL is extremely ambiguous in a number of deferrals; as evidenced in this particular event. Mx control had somehow got the following idea by misinterpreting the MEL: mx control at one point wanted us to takeoff with the auto brakes set for tko but not armed as a way to silence the warning. Obviously this produces the 'autospoiler' aural unless the autospoilers are armed. So in other words; if we would have done this and the 'autospoiler' aural was silent; it would mean that somehow the system still had potential power to the autospoilers and that they were armed. And if the autospoilers were correctly de-powered as per the MEL procedure; then the absence of the spoilers being armed with the auto brakes set but not armed would have produced a continuous aural 'autospoilers' with every takeoff attempt. This series of events tells me the MEL is quite ambiguous in a number of its deferrals; as evidenced in mx control's advice and direction to line mx personnel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Due to incorrectly applying the MEL for the 'AutoSpoilers' the crew incurred an 'AutoBrakes' aural warning during takeoff roll leading to the decision to reject the takeoff.

Narrative: We accepted an aircraft from inbound crew. The plane had one deferral: 'AUTOSPOILERS'. Upon performing 'captains flow'; and during the takeoff Configuration check; the aural 'auto brakes' was heard. Performed the test multiple times same result. Called MX (Maintenance) and wrote up the discrepancy in aircraft log. MX came out and essentially reconfigured the aircraft to the MEL's specifications multiple times until we finally got a good test. The auto brakes aural should not have been heard at all due to one of the auto spoiler CB (Circuit Breaker) being pulled and collared; so there was quite a bit of troubleshooting involved as to why this aural was happening under the planes current deferral condition. My main concern as expressed to MX was that the 'auto brakes' aural (with the auto brake switch in off position) warns a pilot that his auto spoiler is in fact armed and his auto brakes are not set and armed; the problem being that there should have been no way for the AUTOSPOILER to be armed if it was in fact correctly Configured and deactivated per the MEL by MX personnel. MX talked about there being multiple CB dealing with the AUTOSPOILER and we again checked verbiage of MEL to make sure the correct one was pulled and collared. At this point the plane is re-signed off; operating under the same deferral; and the TKO (takeoff) Configuration check performed as it should. Push back and engine starts non eventful. Before taxi check non eventful with a satisfactory 'BRAKES-BRAKES' aural on the TKO Configuration check. Taxi non eventful. Cleared for TKO; we took the runway and ran the before TKO checklist; plane was Configured as it should be for TKO under the deferral. We set power for TKO; auto throttles on; and started TKO roll. No TKO Configuration aural noted; all is operating as it should. At the '80 Knots thrust normal' callout; my eyes were scanning the engine instruments; so as to complete the call with 'checks'. At this point the 'auto brakes' aural comes on and I aborted the TKO. Normal deceleration and non-eventful taxi in. Brake temps peaked at 180 degrees. First Officer consulted QRH for guidance as appropriate with the brake temp/RTO (Rejected Takeoff) graph procedure. Returned to gate and wrote up the discrepancy in log. In subsequent conversation with duty pilot; MX control; and line MX; I asked that a high energy MX checklist be performed by MX personnel due to the timing of the abort and my instrument scan at the time abort decision was made. I wanted to take the safest possible route; due to the possibility of speed being actually above 80 Knots at peak of our TKO roll. I was advised by all parties that they were in agreement of this course of action as the safest and that it would be complied with. There are many inter-related systems in the MD80; for example the auto ground spoilers. While the MEL only directed MX to pull and collar one circuit breaker; there was obviously another interconnected system still powered to the AUTOSPOILERS. Upon returning on the evening of this trip; I again spoke with MX personnel. I was advised that they had just determined the cause of the TKO CONFIG warning as being one of three relays in the switch pack in front of the spoiler handle that was out of tolerances; this providing what ended up being an intermittent signal to the CONFIG system. Perhaps going forward; the MEL should be revised in its procedures to address some of the codependent and interconnected systems. Our MEL is extremely ambiguous in a number of deferrals; as evidenced in this particular event. MX control had somehow got the following idea by misinterpreting the MEL: MX control at one point wanted us to takeoff with the auto brakes set for TKO but not armed as a way to silence the warning. Obviously this produces the 'AUTOSPOILER' aural unless the AUTOSPOILERS are armed. So in other words; if we would have done this and the 'AUTOSPOILER' aural was silent; it would mean that somehow the system still had potential power to the AUTOSPOILERS and that they were armed. And if the AUTOSPOILERS were correctly de-powered as per the MEL procedure; then the absence of the spoilers being armed with the auto brakes set but not armed would have produced a continuous aural 'AUTOSPOILERS' with every takeoff attempt. This series of events tells me the MEL is quite ambiguous in a number of its deferrals; as evidenced in MX control's advice and direction to line MX personnel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.