Narrative:

ILS 22L circle to 29. On initial contact with newark tower; we were cleared to land on 29 and told to make short approach. I had programmed the FMS with the points for the stadium visual to aid in descent planning; but we circled closer to the runway than the fixes and the magenta glideslope was guiding us higher. I should have been looking out the window more. I would have recognized that we were getting too high to complete the stable approach. At about 800 AGL after the first officer (first officer) advised '4 white' on the PAPI. I initiated the go-around by saying go-around but failed to call toga (takeoff go around) and that resulted in the first officer not being queued to respond with his callouts and we got behind the airplane. ATC told us to maintain 2000 as we were passing through 1950 at more than 2000 fpm with 2500 feet set for the missed approach altitude. I immediately initiated a level off and it was at this time that the flaps were over sped. They were in transit from flaps 5 to flaps 2 and the speed tape was showing a limit of 180 knots. The speed reached 185 knots for about 3 seconds approximately. This hindered my ability to return to 2000 feet assigned and reached 2400 feet before returning to 2000 feet. During the commotion we also missed the positive rate callout and flew about 5 miles west before retracting the landing gear. A circling approach is hard enough. ATC probably shouldn't be asking for short approaches on top of that. Having said that; it was my responsibility to refuse the clearance if I had concerns about safety. With the increased likelihood of a go around; I should have briefed the go around callouts thoroughly so that they were fresh in our minds. Regardless; it is my responsibility to be adequately prepared to execute a go around on every approach and to know and make the callouts precisely. I relied too much on automation (magenta glideslope; and auto throttles) and it caused more problems than they avoided.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC requested an air carrier crew make a short approach from the EWR ILS Runway 22L circle to land 29. The approach became unstabilized so a go around was initiated which result in oversped flaps; late landing gear retraction and an altitude overshoot.

Narrative: ILS 22L circle to 29. On initial contact with Newark Tower; we were cleared to land on 29 and told to make short approach. I had programmed the FMS with the points for the stadium visual to aid in descent planning; but we circled closer to the runway than the fixes and the magenta glideslope was guiding us higher. I should have been looking out the window more. I would have recognized that we were getting too high to complete the stable approach. At about 800 AGL after the FO (First Officer) advised '4 white' on the PAPI. I initiated the go-around by saying go-around but failed to call TOGA (Takeoff Go Around) and that resulted in the FO not being queued to respond with his callouts and we got behind the airplane. ATC told us to maintain 2000 as we were passing through 1950 at more than 2000 fpm with 2500 feet set for the missed approach altitude. I immediately initiated a level off and it was at this time that the flaps were over sped. They were in transit from flaps 5 to flaps 2 and the speed tape was showing a limit of 180 knots. The speed reached 185 knots for about 3 seconds approximately. This hindered my ability to return to 2000 feet assigned and reached 2400 feet before returning to 2000 feet. During the commotion we also missed the positive rate callout and flew about 5 miles west before retracting the landing gear. A circling approach is hard enough. ATC probably shouldn't be asking for short approaches on top of that. Having said that; it was my responsibility to refuse the clearance if I had concerns about safety. With the increased likelihood of a go around; I should have briefed the go around callouts thoroughly so that they were fresh in our minds. Regardless; it is my responsibility to be adequately prepared to execute a go around on every approach and to know and make the callouts precisely. I relied too much on automation (magenta glideslope; and auto throttles) and it caused more problems than they avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.