Narrative:

On approach into iad runway 19L the flaps were still in transit to the final flap setting of 40 degrees at 1;000 feet above field elevation (afl) and we elected to continue the approach. I was pilot monitoring (pm) and the captain was pilot flying (PF). We had an over enthusiastic jumpseater who continually was offering us flying instructions. Enroute to iad; ATIS was reporting freezing rain and light freezing rain with mu readings of the low thirties to the mid-twenties for the landing runway 19C; with reports of poor braking action. The weather at our original alternate deteriorated and the dispatcher changed our alternate. [The new alternate] was forecast for possible snow at arrival time.we briefed a flap 40 landing. During radar vectors to final; approach control informed us 19C was closed and 19L was open; requiring us to set up an approach for 19L; re-brief and re-check landing data for that runway. A preceding aircraft reported fair braking on runway 19L. Prior to the glide path interception point; iad tower cleared us to land; but was now reporting a tailwind. Prior weather reports did not contain a tailwind. We checked the penalty for the tailwind; found we were within limits and selected max autobrakes. The last-minute tailwind report definitely rushed things.the landing was at the 1;000 foot markers and we stopped the aircraft. The captain and I debriefed the event thoroughly and decided to file as soon as possible reports because we believe in the importance of stabilized approaches and wanted to be proactive. Reflecting on this I would call for a go-around if not completely configured for the approach. Additionally jumpseaters should be just that; an extra set of eyes; not flight instructors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew describe passing 1;000 feet AGL on final with the flaps still in transit to 40 degrees. They cite distractions from weather; last minute runway change and comments from a jumpseating First Officer.

Narrative: On approach into IAD Runway 19L the flaps were still in transit to the final flap setting of 40 degrees at 1;000 feet Above Field Elevation (AFL) and we elected to continue the approach. I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the Captain was Pilot Flying (PF). We had an over enthusiastic jumpseater who continually was offering us flying instructions. Enroute to IAD; ATIS was reporting freezing rain and light freezing rain with Mu readings of the low thirties to the mid-twenties for the landing Runway 19C; with reports of poor braking action. The weather at our original alternate deteriorated and the dispatcher changed our alternate. [The new alternate] was forecast for possible snow at arrival time.We briefed a flap 40 landing. During radar vectors to final; Approach Control informed us 19C was closed and 19L was open; requiring us to set up an approach for 19L; re-brief and re-check landing data for that runway. A preceding aircraft reported fair braking on Runway 19L. Prior to the glide path interception point; IAD Tower cleared us to land; but was now reporting a tailwind. Prior weather reports did not contain a tailwind. We checked the penalty for the tailwind; found we were within limits and selected max autobrakes. The last-minute tailwind report definitely rushed things.The landing was at the 1;000 foot markers and we stopped the aircraft. The Captain and I debriefed the event thoroughly and decided to file ASAP reports because we believe in the importance of stabilized approaches and wanted to be proactive. Reflecting on this I would call for a go-around if not completely configured for the approach. Additionally jumpseaters should be just that; an extra set of eyes; not flight instructors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.