Narrative:

[Early morning] 'show' for a one hour airline flight. Multiple mechanical delays with the airline. Arrived one hour prior to departure. Arrived plane side and started preflight. Multiple issues: aircraft coming out of maintenance; switches in wrong position; panels open or unlocked; temporary cable supporting cabin door; wings over lapped with another aircraft on the ramp; etc. Noticed controls were not locked. Observed that the yoke control lock mechanism was properly secured. Became distracted. Failed to check that the rudder gust lock was secured in its proper location on the bulkhead behind the copilot's seat. I completed the interior & exterior preflight and the power on checklist. When my sic arrived; I advised that we were power on; checklist complete and preflight complete with some exceptions. I briefed those exceptions and stated that we needed to be careful about switch positions due to maintenance. Operated [as a] ferry. Operated [next leg as a] revenue [flight]. While performing the securing checklist [after landing]; I observed that the rudder gust lock was not in its usual stowed location. Notified [operations and maintenance]. Completed discrepancy [report]. [Aircraft] aog for the missing item.classic set up and the classic failure. Multiple issues and distractions with [the aircraft] coming out of maintenance. As the PIC; I made the mistake and failed to spot the missing rudder gust lock. In our aircraft; this rod also serves as the handle for the auxiliary hydraulic system pump. Fortunately; we did not need the aux hydraulic system. The 'aux hydraulic pump handle - stowed' is on the cockpit preparation flow. While indicating that I had only completed the power on checklist; I sent a mixed message to my sic by saying that we were preflight complete (with some exceptions). Instead; I should have emphasized the necessity for a thorough cockpit preparation check using standard terminology/language to increase the likelihood of discovering the issue. While this mistake is totally on me; sound maintenance practice should include leaving this rod/gust lock on the flight deck unless it is absolutely necessary to do otherwise. However; such a practice would not relieve the flight crew of its preflight responsibility. I made a mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HS-125-900XP Captain reported operating several legs with the rudder gust lock not on board in its proper stow position.

Narrative: [Early morning] 'show' for a one hour airline flight. Multiple mechanical delays with the airline. Arrived one hour prior to departure. Arrived plane side and started preflight. Multiple issues: Aircraft coming out of maintenance; switches in wrong position; panels open or unlocked; temporary cable supporting cabin door; wings over lapped with another aircraft on the ramp; etc. Noticed controls were not locked. Observed that the yoke control lock mechanism was properly secured. Became distracted. Failed to check that the rudder gust lock was secured in its proper location on the bulkhead behind the copilot's seat. I completed the interior & exterior preflight and the power on checklist. When my SIC arrived; I advised that we were power on; checklist complete and preflight complete with some exceptions. I briefed those exceptions and stated that we needed to be careful about switch positions due to maintenance. Operated [as a] ferry. Operated [next leg as a] revenue [flight]. While performing the securing checklist [after landing]; I observed that the rudder gust lock was not in its usual stowed location. Notified [Operations and Maintenance]. Completed discrepancy [report]. [Aircraft] AOG for the missing item.Classic set up and the classic failure. Multiple issues and distractions with [the aircraft] coming out of maintenance. As the PIC; I made the mistake and failed to spot the missing rudder gust lock. In our aircraft; this rod also serves as the handle for the auxiliary hydraulic system pump. Fortunately; we did not need the aux hydraulic system. The 'aux hydraulic pump handle - stowed' is on the cockpit preparation flow. While indicating that I had only completed the power on checklist; I sent a mixed message to my SIC by saying that we were preflight complete (with some exceptions). Instead; I should have emphasized the necessity for a thorough cockpit preparation check using standard terminology/language to increase the likelihood of discovering the issue. While this mistake is totally on me; sound maintenance practice should include leaving this rod/gust lock on the flight deck unless it is absolutely necessary to do otherwise. However; such a practice would not relieve the flight crew of its preflight responsibility. I made a mistake.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.