Narrative:

On approach at 2500 feet autopilot off configuring to flaps 40; the stabilizer trim failed to move using the captain's control wheel trim switches. The stabilizer also failed to move using the long suitcase trim handles or the first officer's control wheel trim switches. Considerable back pressure was required as the aircraft pitched nose down. A go around was performed and an [ATC was advised]. When the flaps reached the 15 degree setting stabilizer movement was regained. The QRH stabilizer inoperative - in flight checklist was completed. With the stabilizer trim now operating a normal ILS approach with an extended final and early configuration was planned to the 12;000 foot runway. As fuel was becoming a concern; the stabilizer inoperative - in flight checklist was briefed as an immediate backup if necessary. On the second approach as the flaps were transitioning to the 40 position the stabilizer trim jammed again. The stabilizer inoperative - in flight checklist was immediately initiated and a flaps 15 landing with the appropriate speeds was accomplished per the checklist. The flight landed without incident.the excellent and detailed training I received especially on trim problems during recurrent training made this a non-event where the successful outcome was never in question. The improved stabilizer QRH checklist flow made the incident easy to diagnose and remedy with relative ease during a stressful situation. The first officer performed perfectly and with calm deliberation. With support from these resources it creates a safe flight environment during those times of mechanical failures that cannot be totally eliminated. My gratitude and thanks goes out to all of our instructors and check airmen that prepared me for this problem.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-83 flight crew reported experiencing a stabilizer trim failure on approach.

Narrative: On approach at 2500 feet autopilot off configuring to flaps 40; the stabilizer trim failed to move using the Captain's control wheel trim switches. The stabilizer also failed to move using the long suitcase trim handles or the First Officer's control wheel trim switches. Considerable back pressure was required as the aircraft pitched nose down. A go around was performed and an [ATC was advised]. When the flaps reached the 15 degree setting stabilizer movement was regained. The QRH STAB INOP - IN FLIGHT checklist was completed. With the stabilizer trim now operating a normal ILS approach with an extended final and early configuration was planned to the 12;000 foot runway. As fuel was becoming a concern; the STAB INOP - IN FLIGHT checklist was briefed as an immediate backup if necessary. On the second approach as the flaps were transitioning to the 40 position the stabilizer trim jammed again. The STAB INOP - IN FLIGHT checklist was immediately initiated and a flaps 15 landing with the appropriate speeds was accomplished per the checklist. The flight landed without incident.The excellent and detailed training I received especially on trim problems during recurrent training made this a non-event where the successful outcome was never in question. The improved stabilizer QRH checklist flow made the incident easy to diagnose and remedy with relative ease during a stressful situation. The First Officer performed perfectly and with calm deliberation. With support from these resources it creates a safe flight environment during those times of mechanical failures that cannot be totally eliminated. My gratitude and thanks goes out to all of our instructors and check airmen that prepared me for this problem.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.