Narrative:

Both the captain and I were completely fatigued on the last leg of the trip because of the pairing schedule. We started with an all-nighter; with 13 hours rest during the daytime; flew a late nighter [east coast to west coast] and arrived near midnight. Then we had a short 11 hour rest and then a very early wake up on the last day for a xa:45 am van pickup for a three leg; 11 hour day. We both realized that we shouldn't have left [on second leg] that morning because we were already feeling the fatigue. But; due to our devotion to the airline and our professionalism we thought we could handle the turn [out and back]. We were wrong. We both were so fatigued on the third leg we were making mistakes. I personally exceeded the 250 KIAS below 10;000 feet MSL limit by about 15 knots; because of my fatigue and the fact that with the sun angle; and even with the pfd (primary flight display) as bright as it would go; I did not see the lvr climb flashing on the pfd to cue me to select climb power; because the pfd was too dim. If I had not been fatigued I'm sure I would have noticed that we were not maintaining 250 KIAS based on the noise not because I could see the airspeed well enough. I realized at that point just how fatigued I was and it was a painful flight all the way back.the captain was making his mistakes too; including clearing the ground crew to disconnect electrical power without verifying the APU was operating. He also nearly made some taxi mistakes that I barely caught in time after finishing my 'heads down' taxi out duties; e.g.; runway change and runway data acquisition. I won't mention any other mistakes the captain made; but it was obvious our fatigue was serious. Our communication skills suffered severely because of or fatigue.this pairing is a disaster for crew rest. The next time I feel like I did that morning; and have two flights to go; I will not hesitate to call in fatigued. I will just feel bad that the flight will most likely have to cancel. These pairings that mix two all-nighters with [an early morning] departure are a disaster. Haven't we learned that after an all-nighter that a lot more rest is needed than normal? If that pairing had the last flight be the one leg to base that would have been bad enough; but to add on a turn? Disaster! When I mention this screen intensity problem to standards captains; lcas (line check airmen); and pis (pilot instructors) I fly with; they all indicate there's nothing they or anyone can do. I emailed the [chief pilot] about it who said he would look into it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer described an extremely fatiguing three day pairing that is exacerbated by insufficient brightness of the cockpit display screens.

Narrative: Both the captain and I were completely fatigued on the last leg of the trip because of the pairing schedule. We started with an all-nighter; with 13 hours rest during the daytime; flew a late nighter [east coast to west coast] and arrived near midnight. Then we had a short 11 hour rest and then a very early wake up on the last day for a XA:45 AM van pickup for a three leg; 11 hour day. We both realized that we shouldn't have left [on second leg] that morning because we were already feeling the fatigue. But; due to our devotion to the airline and our professionalism we thought we could handle the turn [out and back]. We were wrong. We both were so fatigued on the third leg we were making mistakes. I personally exceeded the 250 KIAS below 10;000 feet MSL limit by about 15 knots; because of my fatigue and the fact that with the sun angle; and even with the PFD (Primary Flight Display) as bright as it would go; I did not see the LVR CLB flashing on the PFD to cue me to select climb power; because the PFD was too dim. If I had not been fatigued I'm sure I would have noticed that we were not maintaining 250 KIAS based on the noise not because I could see the airspeed well enough. I realized at that point just how fatigued I was and it was a painful flight all the way back.The captain was making his mistakes too; including clearing the ground crew to disconnect electrical power without verifying the APU was operating. He also nearly made some taxi mistakes that I barely caught in time after finishing my 'heads down' taxi out duties; e.g.; runway change and runway data acquisition. I won't mention any other mistakes the captain made; but it was obvious our fatigue was serious. Our communication skills suffered severely because of or fatigue.This pairing is a disaster for crew rest. The next time I feel like I did that morning; and have two flights to go; I will not hesitate to call in fatigued. I will just feel bad that the flight will most likely have to cancel. These pairings that mix two all-nighters with [an early morning] departure are a disaster. Haven't we learned that after an all-nighter that a lot more rest is needed than normal? If that pairing had the last flight be the one leg to base that would have been bad enough; but to add on a turn? Disaster! When I mention this screen intensity problem to Standards Captains; LCAs (Line Check Airmen); and PIs (Pilot Instructors) I fly with; they all indicate there's nothing they or anyone can do. I emailed the [Chief Pilot] about it who said he would look into it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.