Narrative:

I; the first officer; was pilot monitoring on a routine flight to charlottesville; va. Most of the flight was normal until the descent approach phase of the flight. The captain jumped on the radio and called field in sight at 34 miles indicated distance on the uns RNAV system even though I was operating the radios as pm. He didn't ask me if I had seen the field nor did he ask me to make the radio call and I did feel this was unusual. While I'm aware the ops specs allow a visual approach at 35 miles out; it didn't seem prudent to me. We were in cruise at 9;000ft. At 34 miles; ATC cleared us for the visual though I still did not have the field in sight and I made that known to the captain by asking him to point it out to me. He did; but I never confirmed I saw it because I didn't until later. The captain then initiated a steep approach using the auto pilot in vertical speed mode at approximately 1800ft per minute. Doing the math; I recognized this was a greater than needed glide path angle to intercept the ILS for runway 3 which was briefed and agreed to be used for guidance to the field. However; [the] captain used to be based at this airport. I thought he had to be more familiar with the surrounding terrain than myself so I did not ask any questions or voice any concern. The glide slope began working approximately 26 miles away and we were already one dot below it. Due to being cleared direct to the cho airport prior to gants intersection; we were also a few miles more west (left) of the runway than we would have been if we have flown the filed route all the way to gants before turning north. The end result was that we had a higher MSA of 4900ft and ultimately the captain descended below the MSA indicating more than 2 dots low on the glide slope in mountain terrain. I asked him why he was doing this; posing it as a question attempting to seem concerned but polite. He immediately corrected the glide path and intercepted the glideslope. He simply responded with 'I was intercepting the glide slope.' I do not think the captain was paying attention. In 1100 hours and 14 months of line flying I have never filed an as soon as possible report with any captain yet in a few days I have had to file 3 with this one. Sterile cockpit procedures had been adhered to as well; we were quiet and I thought focused yet the captain I was flying with made continual errors throughout the entire trip. Whether it was setting the wrong altitude; turning to the wrong heading on departure; he just seemed to not be focused on flying.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported the Captain; the pilot flying; descended below the MSA for unknown reasons on a night visual approach to CHO.

Narrative: I; the First Officer; was pilot monitoring on a routine flight to Charlottesville; VA. Most of the flight was normal until the Descent Approach phase of the flight. The Captain jumped on the radio and called field in sight at 34 miles indicated distance on the UNS RNAV system even though I was operating the radios as PM. He didn't ask me if I had seen the field nor did he ask me to make the radio call and I did feel this was unusual. While I'm aware the Ops Specs allow a visual approach at 35 miles out; it didn't seem prudent to me. We were in cruise at 9;000ft. At 34 miles; ATC cleared us for the visual though I still did not have the field in sight and I made that known to the Captain by asking him to point it out to me. He did; but I never confirmed I saw it because I didn't until later. The Captain then initiated a steep approach using the auto pilot in vertical speed mode at approximately 1800ft per minute. Doing the math; I recognized this was a greater than needed glide path angle to intercept the ILS for runway 3 which was briefed and agreed to be used for guidance to the field. However; [the] Captain used to be based at this airport. I thought he had to be more familiar with the surrounding terrain than myself so I did not ask any questions or voice any concern. The glide slope began working approximately 26 miles away and we were already one dot below it. Due to being cleared direct to the CHO airport prior to GANTS intersection; we were also a few miles more west (left) of the runway than we would have been if we have flown the filed route all the way to GANTS before turning north. The end result was that we had a higher MSA of 4900ft and ultimately the Captain descended below the MSA indicating more than 2 dots low on the glide slope in mountain terrain. I asked him why he was doing this; posing it as a question attempting to seem concerned but polite. He immediately corrected the glide path and intercepted the glideslope. He simply responded with 'I was intercepting the glide slope.' I do not think the Captain was paying attention. In 1100 hours and 14 months of line flying I have never filed an ASAP report with any Captain yet in a few days I have had to file 3 with this one. Sterile Cockpit procedures had been adhered to as well; we were quiet and I thought focused yet the Captain I was flying with made continual errors throughout the entire trip. Whether it was setting the wrong altitude; turning to the wrong heading on departure; he just seemed to not be focused on flying.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.