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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1345428 |
Time | |
Date | 201604 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | EWR.Airport |
State Reference | NJ |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Type 171 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Type 927 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
We were aware of forecasts for extreme winds in ewr at the time of our arrival; and had coordinated with dispatch for an alternate with forecast winds that we felt gave us the strongest diversion option if landing at ewr was not possible. On arrival into ewr; the wind was gusting at over 40 knots and favoring the shorter runway 29. We used the RNAV approach; which got quite rough below 2;000 feet. Additionally; the window between our gust protection speed and our max flap speed was very narrow. Within about the final 800 feet of descent; maintaining runway alignment became increasingly difficult; and maintaining speed within tolerance proved impossible; at which point we executed a go-around. Given the difficulty of the previous approach at such a low altitude; and our having flown all night; we felt that attempting another approach was not the safest option; and opted to divert to ZZZ. Someway into the diversion; dispatch contacted us to request we change our diversion airport to ZZZ1. The combination of the go-around and the two diversions; followed by another fairly high-wind gust approach to landing into ZZZ1 was quite labor-intensive; and through the process; we found ourselves making a number of small mistakes with automation management; CRM; etc. When we landed; we were advised that the company was planning on having us refuel and operate the aircraft on to ewr. Upon weighing the conditions in ewr against our own physical state; and the mental fatigue of the preceding hour of flight; we felt that it was not possible for us to provide an acceptable margin of safety for the continuing flight to ewr; at which point we advised the company of our need to remove ourselves from that flight segment.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 flight crew reporting diverting to an alternate after executing a go-around at EWR due to high winds; turbulence; and an unstable approach.
Narrative: We were aware of forecasts for extreme winds in EWR at the time of our arrival; and had coordinated with dispatch for an alternate with forecast winds that we felt gave us the strongest diversion option if landing at EWR was not possible. On arrival into EWR; the wind was gusting at over 40 knots and favoring the shorter runway 29. We used the RNAV approach; which got quite rough below 2;000 feet. Additionally; the window between our gust protection speed and our max flap speed was very narrow. Within about the final 800 feet of descent; maintaining runway alignment became increasingly difficult; and maintaining speed within tolerance proved impossible; at which point we executed a go-around. Given the difficulty of the previous approach at such a low altitude; and our having flown all night; we felt that attempting another approach was not the safest option; and opted to divert to ZZZ. Someway into the diversion; dispatch contacted us to request we change our diversion airport to ZZZ1. The combination of the go-around and the two diversions; followed by another fairly high-wind gust approach to landing into ZZZ1 was quite labor-intensive; and through the process; we found ourselves making a number of small mistakes with automation management; CRM; etc. When we landed; we were advised that the company was planning on having us refuel and operate the aircraft on to EWR. Upon weighing the conditions in EWR against our own physical state; and the mental fatigue of the preceding hour of flight; we felt that it was not possible for us to provide an acceptable margin of safety for the continuing flight to EWR; at which point we advised the company of our need to remove ourselves from that flight segment.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.