Narrative:

The takeoff was rejected due to the wheel not turning light illuminating between 50 and 60 KIAS. After taxiing clear of the runway; I spoke to the lead flight attendant (flight attendant); and then to the passengers. During this time; the first officer ran the quick reference handbook (QRH). At this time; the right inboard brake was over 200 degrees; while the other three were at or below 100 degrees. We returned to the gate. The right inboard brake temperature had continued to climb; eventually settling at about 250-260 degrees. The right outboard was at about 125 degrees. The two left brakes remained at about 100 degrees. We were boarded by a mechanic who asked me the details of the event. He returned several minutes later and informed me that he planned on deferring the wheel not turning light and; potentially; the brake temperature display. I literally thought he was playing a joke on me. It quickly became apparent that he was not. His contention was that I had a failure of two separate indicating systems at exactly the same time; and that both indications were 'unrelated.' he offered no explanation for the heat emanating from the right main - he only stated that the tires 'had no flat spots.' I informed him that I would refuse the aircraft if he took that course of action. He then went on to tell me that the MEL allows him to do this if there are no anti-skid messages. I informed him that I didn't recall seeing any messages; but was also very clear that a pilot is not looking for these during the process of rejecting a takeoff. I ran the anti-skid test at the gate; and the aircraft failed the test: right outbd anti-skid remained illuminated. This was interesting because the left inboard brake was running hot; yet the anti-skid system detected a fault on the right inboard brake. I asked him for the logbook to enter this new condition as a separate write-up. He informed me that he had the logbook and that he would do it. After following up with the captain who was assigned this aircraft several hours later; it was; in fact; not entered in the logbook.when an aircraft has an obvious legitimate issue; the course of action should not be to immediately defer the indicating system(s) in order to simply 'move the aircraft' as quickly as possible. This is one of the most egregious instances of this I have ever seen. This is absolutely unacceptable. In the future; I will also seek out the logbook when a discrepancy occurs and see with my own eyes that it was actually recorded accurately and legally per the fars.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 Captain reported the takeoff was rejected due to the Wheel Not Turning light. The right hand brake temperature was over 250 degrees.

Narrative: The takeoff was rejected due to the Wheel Not Turning light illuminating between 50 and 60 KIAS. After taxiing clear of the runway; I spoke to the Lead Flight Attendant (FA); and then to the passengers. During this time; the first officer ran the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). At this time; the right inboard brake was over 200 degrees; while the other three were at or below 100 degrees. We returned to the gate. The right inboard brake temperature had continued to climb; eventually settling at about 250-260 degrees. The right outboard was at about 125 degrees. The two left brakes remained at about 100 degrees. We were boarded by a mechanic who asked me the details of the event. He returned several minutes later and informed me that he planned on deferring the Wheel Not Turning light and; potentially; the brake temperature display. I literally thought he was playing a joke on me. It quickly became apparent that he was not. His contention was that I had a failure of two separate indicating systems at exactly the same time; and that both indications were 'unrelated.' He offered no explanation for the heat emanating from the right main - he only stated that the tires 'had no flat spots.' I informed him that I would refuse the aircraft if he took that course of action. He then went on to tell me that the MEL allows him to do this if there are no anti-skid messages. I informed him that I didn't recall seeing any messages; but was also very clear that a pilot is not looking for these during the process of rejecting a takeoff. I ran the anti-skid test at the gate; and the aircraft failed the test: RIGHT OUTBD ANTI-SKID remained illuminated. This was interesting because the LEFT inboard brake was running hot; yet the anti-skid system detected a fault on the RIGHT inboard brake. I asked him for the logbook to enter this new condition as a separate write-up. He informed me that he had the logbook and that he would do it. After following up with the captain who was assigned this aircraft several hours later; it was; in fact; NOT entered in the logbook.When an aircraft has an obvious legitimate issue; the course of action should not be to immediately defer the indicating system(s) in order to simply 'move the aircraft' as quickly as possible. This is one of the most egregious instances of this I have ever seen. This is absolutely unacceptable. In the future; I will also seek out the logbook when a discrepancy occurs and see with my own eyes that it was actually recorded accurately and legally per the FARs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.