Narrative:

On jan/sat/90 I was a first officer on flight departing sfo at XA00 and scheduled to arrive in geg at XB55 local time. The flight was normal until we received the ATIS which indicated -X 5 ovc RVR 2000 wind 160/18 G 24 with braking conditions reported as poor by a medium large transport. The active runway was 21 utilizing the geg ILS runway 21 approach. The second officer and captain looked at the x-wind and braking charts in the fom and discussed the findings while I monitored the radio and aircraft. The chart indicated that the maximum recommended x-wind component was 5 KTS with poor braking and 10 KTS with fair braking. During our apches the wind was winging from 160 to 190 degree at approximately 15 to 25 KTS giving us x-wind components of from 8 to 15 KTS. Neither the second officer nor I felt comfortable about making a landing under those conditions. The second officer was very insistent about the fact that we were exceeding the recommended x-wind component. The captain advised that it was only a recommended maximum and we would make a decision when we got closer. The captain was going to do a coupled approach and had the autoplt engaged. We were on heading of about 250 at 5000' when geg approach cleared us to 4000' to intercept the ILS runway 21 approach to geg. The captain was on the localizer frequency and I was on the geg VOR for DME, which is 9.8 mi beyond the airport. As the captain was approaching 4000' I advised him of his distance from the airport and that I was going to join him on the localizer. While tuning my radio the captain began a turn to the approach course. After I had tuned my radio I noticed that we were off scale down and to the left of the localizer at which time I advised him that we were full deflection left of course. I then noticed our altitude was descending through 3700' at the same time the second officer advised that our altitude was approaching 3600'. The glide slope warning came on and approach control asked us if were indicating below glide slope and what our altitude was? Supplemental information from acn 134844: the captain did not respond, despite the first officer and myself telling him to go around. I started to reach for the throttles as did the first officer to start a missed approach. The controller wanted to know what our altitude was and if we were climbing. The captain was still confused wondering why the warning went off. The first officer reported our altitude and the controller responded with a relieved 'you are now clear of the terrain.' [narrative continued from acn 135083]: the captain began a slow climb and I advised approach that we were indicating below glide slope and were climbing out of 3600'. Approach asked us if we were climbing and I again advised approach that we were climbing! I then advised that we were executing a missed approach. Approach gave us a heading and climb to 4000' for a vector for another approach. I advised the captain that we were approaching 4000', at 4200' the second officer called out 'altitude!!', at which time the captain told me to ask for 5000'. I did and we were given 5000'. The second approach was from the north this time. We were given a southerly heading, 4000' altitude, then cleared for the approach. With the heading approach gave us and the strong winds, we didn't begin to intercept the localizer until the LOM. At this point we were still at 4000' and well above the glide slope, so we executed a missed approach. We then discussed the wind and braking conditions again and the captain said that we would check the wind at 1000' AGL and make the decision to land or not at that time. Approach then vectored us for a third approach which was normal. An air carrier medium large transport landed in front of us and advised that the braking was fair to poor. At the LOM, the tower gave the wind as 190/20 G 25 and cleared us to land. At 1000' AGL I asked for the wind again, the tower said the wind was 180/25 G 33. I then told the captain that we should 'go around!!'. The second officer also strongly advocated this at which time the captain agreed. I advised the tower that we were 'going around.' after switching to departure I asked for vectors to sea. The rest of the flight was uneventful. I feel that the descent below 4000', before glide slope intercept, was probably due to the altitude hold not being engaged at 4000'. Supplemental information from acn 134844: I would say the main cause of this was the captain's attitude of 'if the medium large transport made it in, we should too.' he did acknowledge that I was uncomfortable landing with those conditions but disregarded my concerns. He refused to listen to the inputs from the first officer also. He became confused and disoriented and froze at the controls when the glide slope warning went off.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A WILD RIDE ENSUES AS FLT CREW ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST PIC DURING 3 APCHES AND MISSED APCHES.

Narrative: ON JAN/SAT/90 I WAS A F/O ON FLT DEPARTING SFO AT XA00 AND SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN GEG AT XB55 LCL TIME. THE FLT WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE RECEIVED THE ATIS WHICH INDICATED -X 5 OVC RVR 2000 WIND 160/18 G 24 WITH BRAKING CONDITIONS REPORTED AS POOR BY A MLG. THE ACTIVE RWY WAS 21 UTILIZING THE GEG ILS RWY 21 APCH. THE S/O AND CAPT LOOKED AT THE X-WIND AND BRAKING CHARTS IN THE FOM AND DISCUSSED THE FINDINGS WHILE I MONITORED THE RADIO AND ACFT. THE CHART INDICATED THAT THE MAX RECOMMENDED X-WIND COMPONENT WAS 5 KTS WITH POOR BRAKING AND 10 KTS WITH FAIR BRAKING. DURING OUR APCHES THE WIND WAS WINGING FROM 160 TO 190 DEG AT APPROX 15 TO 25 KTS GIVING US X-WIND COMPONENTS OF FROM 8 TO 15 KTS. NEITHER THE S/O NOR I FELT COMFORTABLE ABOUT MAKING A LNDG UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS. THE S/O WAS VERY INSISTENT ABOUT THE FACT THAT WE WERE EXCEEDING THE RECOMMENDED X-WIND COMPONENT. THE CAPT ADVISED THAT IT WAS ONLY A RECOMMENDED MAX AND WE WOULD MAKE A DECISION WHEN WE GOT CLOSER. THE CAPT WAS GOING TO DO A COUPLED APCH AND HAD THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. WE WERE ON HDG OF ABOUT 250 AT 5000' WHEN GEG APCH CLRED US TO 4000' TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 21 APCH TO GEG. THE CAPT WAS ON THE LOC FREQ AND I WAS ON THE GEG VOR FOR DME, WHICH IS 9.8 MI BEYOND THE ARPT. AS THE CAPT WAS APCHING 4000' I ADVISED HIM OF HIS DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT AND THAT I WAS GOING TO JOIN HIM ON THE LOC. WHILE TUNING MY RADIO THE CAPT BEGAN A TURN TO THE APCH COURSE. AFTER I HAD TUNED MY RADIO I NOTICED THAT WE WERE OFF SCALE DOWN AND TO THE LEFT OF THE LOC AT WHICH TIME I ADVISED HIM THAT WE WERE FULL DEFLECTION LEFT OF COURSE. I THEN NOTICED OUR ALT WAS DESCENDING THROUGH 3700' AT THE SAME TIME THE S/O ADVISED THAT OUR ALT WAS APCHING 3600'. THE GLIDE SLOPE WARNING CAME ON AND APCH CTL ASKED US IF WERE INDICATING BELOW GLIDE SLOPE AND WHAT OUR ALT WAS? SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 134844: THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND, DESPITE THE F/O AND MYSELF TELLING HIM TO GO AROUND. I STARTED TO REACH FOR THE THROTTLES AS DID THE F/O TO START A MISSED APCH. THE CTLR WANTED TO KNOW WHAT OUR ALT WAS AND IF WE WERE CLIMBING. THE CAPT WAS STILL CONFUSED WONDERING WHY THE WARNING WENT OFF. THE F/O REPORTED OUR ALT AND THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH A RELIEVED 'YOU ARE NOW CLEAR OF THE TERRAIN.' [NARRATIVE CONTINUED FROM ACN 135083]: THE CAPT BEGAN A SLOW CLIMB AND I ADVISED APCH THAT WE WERE INDICATING BELOW GLIDE SLOPE AND WERE CLIMBING OUT OF 3600'. APCH ASKED US IF WE WERE CLIMBING AND I AGAIN ADVISED APCH THAT WE WERE CLIMBING! I THEN ADVISED THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH. APCH GAVE US A HDG AND CLIMB TO 4000' FOR A VECTOR FOR ANOTHER APCH. I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE APCHING 4000', AT 4200' THE S/O CALLED OUT 'ALT!!', AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT TOLD ME TO ASK FOR 5000'. I DID AND WE WERE GIVEN 5000'. THE SECOND APCH WAS FROM THE N THIS TIME. WE WERE GIVEN A SOUTHERLY HDG, 4000' ALT, THEN CLRED FOR THE APCH. WITH THE HDG APCH GAVE US AND THE STRONG WINDS, WE DIDN'T BEGIN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC UNTIL THE LOM. AT THIS POINT WE WERE STILL AT 4000' AND WELL ABOVE THE GLIDE SLOPE, SO WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE WIND AND BRAKING CONDITIONS AGAIN AND THE CAPT SAID THAT WE WOULD CHECK THE WIND AT 1000' AGL AND MAKE THE DECISION TO LAND OR NOT AT THAT TIME. APCH THEN VECTORED US FOR A THIRD APCH WHICH WAS NORMAL. AN ACR MLG LANDED IN FRONT OF US AND ADVISED THAT THE BRAKING WAS FAIR TO POOR. AT THE LOM, THE TWR GAVE THE WIND AS 190/20 G 25 AND CLRED US TO LAND. AT 1000' AGL I ASKED FOR THE WIND AGAIN, THE TWR SAID THE WIND WAS 180/25 G 33. I THEN TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD 'GO AROUND!!'. THE S/O ALSO STRONGLY ADVOCATED THIS AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT AGREED. I ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE WERE 'GOING AROUND.' AFTER SWITCHING TO DEP I ASKED FOR VECTORS TO SEA. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. I FEEL THAT THE DSCNT BELOW 4000', BEFORE GLIDE SLOPE INTERCEPT, WAS PROBABLY DUE TO THE ALT HOLD NOT BEING ENGAGED AT 4000'. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 134844: I WOULD SAY THE MAIN CAUSE OF THIS WAS THE CAPT'S ATTITUDE OF 'IF THE MLG MADE IT IN, WE SHOULD TOO.' HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE LNDG WITH THOSE CONDITIONS BUT DISREGARDED MY CONCERNS. HE REFUSED TO LISTEN TO THE INPUTS FROM THE F/O ALSO. HE BECAME CONFUSED AND DISORIENTED AND FROZE AT THE CONTROLS WHEN THE GLIDE SLOPE WARNING WENT OFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.