Narrative:

I was working the departure sector; rhv tower was calling for an IFR release. Sjc was on runway 30 configuration; but rhv was on runway 13 configuration; which is odd. Rhv was reporting winds variable at 5 knots; as well; not an indication of strong runway 12 winds. I was working normal traffic; but was paying extra attention to the final controller's traffic because he was working busy and complex traffic with a rhv IFR arrival and many sjc arrivals. My release off of rhv is dependent upon the sjc final traffic. I coordinated with the finals controller that I was going to go with the release between a gap of 2 sjc arrivals. With the relatively light winds and the major airport in the area being in a runway 30 configuration; and with most of my attention being focused on final's traffic; I had forgotten that rhv was departing runway 13. So I released the departure with the mental image of a rhv 31 departure and developed my plan accordingly. About 15 seconds later; I realized that rhv was on runway 13 and I called rhv and told them to hold the departure. Rhv replied that the airplane was already airborne. A veteran controller who saw the situation advised that a left turn to a heading of 290 may be my best option; instead of a right turn that the aircraft normally does. I am very familiar with the airspace and terrain in that area; and I knew that although the MVA in that area is 3700 feet; a tight left turn would have been better than a right turn directly into/under a descending B737 into sjc. I told the aircraft to turn left heading 290; which is a minimum vectoring altitude violation; but I wanted to get him away from the sjc final traffic and the incoming opposite direction rhv arrival and into the diverse vectoring area (dva) on the northwest side of rhv. Once he was in the dva; I could vector him according to the dva. Of course the easy answer is to have controllers remain constantly vigilant on which runway configurations are in use. Memory lapses do occur; people make mistakes. A benefit to the entire operation would be to have a few procedures where rhv traffic is procedurally separated from sjc traffic; at least in some form. As of right now; the rhv arrival course is not separated from the sjc arrival course; and rhv departure procedures are not separated from sjc arrivals; and can almost immediately come into direct conflict with sjc departures. It is a difficult situation to work around; and if procedures could be developed to have a procedurally separated rhv IFR departure procedure from at least sjc departures; and a rhv arrival procedure that is separated from sjc arrivals; the traffic situation in the south bay would be much more efficient (no more final approach speeds from 15 miles out for sjc arrivals; and rhv departures would not have to hold on the ground for 5-10 minutes) and much safer. The mvas and the proximity of the traffic dictates that you are either working very inefficiently; or relatively unsafely with respect to rhv/sjc arrivals and departures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NCT TRACON Controller reported releasing a departure from RHV without recognizing the runway in use was the opposite direction from what the controller planned. The controller had to vector the aircraft below the minimum vectoring altitude to avoid arrivals to nearby SJC.

Narrative: I was working the departure sector; RHV Tower was calling for an IFR release. SJC was on runway 30 configuration; but RHV was on Runway 13 configuration; which is odd. RHV was reporting winds Variable at 5 knots; as well; not an indication of strong runway 12 winds. I was working normal traffic; but was paying extra attention to the Final controller's traffic because he was working busy and complex traffic with a RHV IFR arrival and many SJC arrivals. My release off of RHV is dependent upon the SJC final traffic. I coordinated with the Finals controller that I was going to go with the release between a gap of 2 SJC arrivals. With the relatively light winds and the major airport in the area being in a Runway 30 configuration; and with most of my attention being focused on Final's traffic; I had forgotten that RHV was departing runway 13. So I released the departure with the mental image of a RHV 31 departure and developed my plan accordingly. About 15 seconds later; I realized that RHV was on runway 13 and I called RHV and told them to hold the departure. RHV replied that the airplane was already airborne. A veteran controller who saw the situation advised that a left turn to a heading of 290 may be my best option; instead of a right turn that the aircraft normally does. I am very familiar with the airspace and terrain in that area; and I knew that although the MVA in that area is 3700 feet; a tight left turn would have been better than a right turn directly into/under a descending B737 into SJC. I told the aircraft to turn left heading 290; which is a Minimum Vectoring Altitude violation; but I wanted to get him away from the SJC final traffic and the incoming opposite direction RHV arrival and into the Diverse Vectoring Area (DVA) on the northwest side of RHV. Once he was in the DVA; I could vector him according to the DVA. Of course the easy answer is to have controllers remain constantly vigilant on which runway configurations are in use. Memory lapses do occur; people make mistakes. A benefit to the entire operation would be to have a few procedures where RHV traffic is procedurally separated from SJC traffic; at least in some form. As of right now; the RHV arrival course is not separated from the SJC arrival course; and RHV departure procedures are not separated from SJC arrivals; and can almost immediately come into direct conflict with SJC departures. It is a difficult situation to work around; and if procedures could be developed to have a procedurally separated RHV IFR departure procedure from at least SJC departures; and a RHV arrival procedure that is separated from SJC arrivals; the traffic situation in the South Bay would be much more efficient (no more final approach speeds from 15 miles out for SJC arrivals; and RHV departures would not have to hold on the ground for 5-10 minutes) and MUCH safer. The MVAs and the proximity of the traffic dictates that you are either working very inefficiently; or relatively unsafely with respect to RHV/SJC arrivals and departures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.