Narrative:

Aircraft X was a departure southbound requesting FL190. Powder river 4 atcaa was active from 15000 feet to FL260. Aircraft Y was in the airspace. I received a call from the ZLC supervisor stating the sector (20 or 23) had asked their controller to see if the airspace could be recalled. I went to the area to see what was happening and aircraft X was at 14500 feet flying under the western boundary below the airspace. I confirmed with the ZLC supervisor that we would like it recalled FL190 and below to accommodate the medevac aircraft. The sector 20 controller called me later and said they were talking to aircraft Y and had issued him FL200 and above and the medevac was going to use the airspace. I told her we did not control the airspace and it was hot until it was released. I observed aircraft X within 1-2 miles of the PRC4 airspace boundary at FL190 prior to the airspace being recalled. The ZLC supervisor called to release the airspace and felt the medevac was too close to PRC4 prior to that. I agreed and stated I would file an mandatory occurrence report. Proper recall procedures were not followed; and aircraft X entered the protected airspace of PR4 prior to official airspace recall.I was the operation manager on the midshift. The traffic management unit (tmu) had gone home so I also had that position. The supervisor in area 4 asked if she could plug in because she had two controllers going home. There were two midshift controllers who had signed in and not worked; and 1 controller who had been on break for 1:45. I told her the midshift controllers could work. There is a common practice in this area that the midshifts do not work when they come in. So the first one does not plug in for two hours; and the other one closer to 5 hours. Several of the supervisors enable this by plugging in instead of doing their job of supervising the area. She said she needed time anyway; so I allowed it. I believe she is the one who initiated the recall procedures sector to sector. When the ZLC supervisor called I had no idea what he was talking about since the proper coordination of having the sup (now me) call tmu (also me) and coordinated through the ZLC tmu to recall the airspace. This airspace affects 3 centers; and ZLC is the focal to deal with the scheduling agency. Also; this airspace goes hot on the requested times; not real time when aircraft are cleared into the airspace. In this case; aircraft Y was in the airspace; so that isn't relevant. After the supervisor in area 4; currently working sector 20; had talked to aircraft Y and had him maintain an altitude above the medevac; there was a belief they could use this airspace. We have no control or coordination of this airspace and that is incorrect. Issues that lead to this event:recall procedures are to coordinate through tmu. I was staffing tmu and no request was made. I was staffing area 4 os and no request was made. Area 4 os was in the sector. Common practice to not make the mids plug in. Mid shifters had been here and hadn't worked. Another employee had been on break for over two hours and the sup was working. The supervisor should not have been plugged in. This would have allowed proper supervision of the area and proper coordination procedures for the recall of the airspace in a timely manner. In this instance; the supervisor; working sector 20; either didn't know or didn't care that she couldn't use that airspace so I highly doubt the airspace deviation would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Several ATC Controllers reported that an aircraft was allowed to get less than the required distance from an active ATC Assigned Airspace. A Controller had used incorrect procedures to allow the aircraft to proceed toward the airspace.

Narrative: Aircraft X was a departure southbound requesting FL190. Powder River 4 ATCAA was active from 15000 feet to FL260. Aircraft Y was in the airspace. I received a call from the ZLC supervisor stating the sector (20 or 23) had asked their controller to see if the airspace could be recalled. I went to the area to see what was happening and Aircraft X was at 14500 feet flying under the western boundary below the airspace. I confirmed with the ZLC supervisor that we would like it recalled FL190 and below to accommodate the medevac aircraft. The sector 20 controller called me later and said they were talking to Aircraft Y and had issued him FL200 and above and the medevac was going to use the airspace. I told her we did not control the airspace and it was hot until it was released. I observed Aircraft X within 1-2 miles of the PRC4 airspace boundary at FL190 prior to the airspace being recalled. The ZLC supervisor called to release the airspace and felt the medevac was too close to PRC4 prior to that. I agreed and stated I would file an Mandatory Occurrence Report. Proper recall procedures were not followed; and Aircraft X entered the protected airspace of PR4 prior to official airspace recall.I was the Operation Manager on the midshift. The Traffic Management Unit (TMU) had gone home so I also had that position. The supervisor in Area 4 asked if she could plug in because she had two controllers going home. There were two midshift controllers who had signed in and not worked; and 1 controller who had been on break for 1:45. I told her the midshift controllers could work. There is a common practice in this area that the midshifts do not work when they come in. So the first one does not plug in for two hours; and the other one closer to 5 hours. Several of the supervisors enable this by plugging in instead of doing their job of supervising the area. She said she needed time anyway; so I allowed it. I believe she is the one who initiated the recall procedures sector to sector. When the ZLC supervisor called I had no idea what he was talking about since the proper coordination of having the sup (now me) call TMU (also me) and coordinated through the ZLC TMU to recall the airspace. This airspace affects 3 centers; and ZLC is the focal to deal with the scheduling agency. Also; this airspace goes hot on the requested times; not real time when aircraft are cleared into the airspace. In this case; Aircraft Y was in the airspace; so that isn't relevant. After the supervisor in Area 4; currently working sector 20; had talked to Aircraft Y and had him maintain an altitude above the medevac; there was a belief they could use this airspace. We have no control or coordination of this airspace and that is incorrect. Issues that lead to this event:Recall procedures are to coordinate through TMU. I was staffing TMU and no request was made. I was staffing Area 4 OS and no request was made. Area 4 OS was in the sector. Common practice to not make the mids plug in. Mid shifters had been here and hadn't worked. Another employee had been on break for over two hours and the sup was working. The supervisor should not have been plugged in. This would have allowed proper supervision of the area and proper coordination procedures for the recall of the airspace in a timely manner. In this instance; the supervisor; working sector 20; either didn't know or didn't care that she couldn't use that airspace so I highly doubt the airspace deviation would have been avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.