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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 135677 |
Time | |
Date | 199002 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Flight Phase | ground : holding other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 2170 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 135677 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 2400 flight time type : 750 |
ASRS Report | 135195 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 65 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
After completion of the before-taxi checklist, I put on my headset and called sfo ground control for a pushback clearance. We were told to 'hold in the gate, I'll call you back...' the captain was apparently still putting on his headset and didn't hear the entire conversation, which I assumed (yes, I know) he had. The captain gave the tug operator the brake release signal and we began to push out of our position at the gate and into the alleyway. I then said to the captain 'they want us to hold in the gate.' what I didn't know at the time was that another of our company aircraft was waiting with engines running behind us and couldn't get out until we were pushed out of the way. The captain said 'we need to get out of this guy's way.' by this time we were moving and the ground controller became aware of our movement, upon which he became very agitated and vocal in his insistence that we stop immediately. The captain then gave the tug operator th emergency stop signal, which he totally ignored (or didn't see) for several seconds. By the time that we finally came to a stop, we narrowly missed hitting an air carrier medium large transport that had entered the alleyway from our blind side. I should have been much more forceful in telling the captain that ground control wanted us to stay put. The captain's assumption that we were cleared to push was likewise faulty. Supplemental information from acn 136195: I tried to communicate with ground control, but had my transmit selector on the wrong radio. I should have confirmed the clearance prior to my action.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMMUTER SMT UNAUTH PUSHBACK FROM GATE AT SFO, CAUSING CRITICAL GND CONFLICT.
Narrative: AFTER COMPLETION OF THE BEFORE-TAXI CHKLIST, I PUT ON MY HEADSET AND CALLED SFO GND CTL FOR A PUSHBACK CLRNC. WE WERE TOLD TO 'HOLD IN THE GATE, I'LL CALL YOU BACK...' THE CAPT WAS APPARENTLY STILL PUTTING ON HIS HEADSET AND DIDN'T HEAR THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION, WHICH I ASSUMED (YES, I KNOW) HE HAD. THE CAPT GAVE THE TUG OPERATOR THE BRAKE RELEASE SIGNAL AND WE BEGAN TO PUSH OUT OF OUR POS AT THE GATE AND INTO THE ALLEYWAY. I THEN SAID TO THE CAPT 'THEY WANT US TO HOLD IN THE GATE.' WHAT I DIDN'T KNOW AT THE TIME WAS THAT ANOTHER OF OUR COMPANY ACFT WAS WAITING WITH ENGS RUNNING BEHIND US AND COULDN'T GET OUT UNTIL WE WERE PUSHED OUT OF THE WAY. THE CAPT SAID 'WE NEED TO GET OUT OF THIS GUY'S WAY.' BY THIS TIME WE WERE MOVING AND THE GND CTLR BECAME AWARE OF OUR MOVEMENT, UPON WHICH HE BECAME VERY AGITATED AND VOCAL IN HIS INSISTENCE THAT WE STOP IMMEDIATELY. THE CAPT THEN GAVE THE TUG OPERATOR TH EMER STOP SIGNAL, WHICH HE TOTALLY IGNORED (OR DIDN'T SEE) FOR SEVERAL SECS. BY THE TIME THAT WE FINALLY CAME TO A STOP, WE NARROWLY MISSED HITTING AN ACR MLG THAT HAD ENTERED THE ALLEYWAY FROM OUR BLIND SIDE. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE FORCEFUL IN TELLING THE CAPT THAT GND CTL WANTED US TO STAY PUT. THE CAPT'S ASSUMPTION THAT WE WERE CLRED TO PUSH WAS LIKEWISE FAULTY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 136195: I TRIED TO COMMUNICATE WITH GND CTL, BUT HAD MY XMIT SELECTOR ON THE WRONG RADIO. I SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THE CLRNC PRIOR TO MY ACTION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.