Narrative:

We were parked at gate X; awaiting pushback with a two-man wired crew. The ramp metering controller told us to monitor ground; which we did. The ground controller cleared us to 'push; reference company pushing adjacent at gate Y.' the first officer (first officer) read back that instruction; and I read it back to the first officer. I then told the ground crew; 'parking brake released; reference company to your left (my right); cleared to push when able.' the ground crew read back the instruction to me; acknowledging that they needed to wait for the company aircraft pushing next to us.a moment later; we started pushback; which involved a straight-back push; followed by a counter-clockwise 90 degree turn. During pushback; I was monitoring ground on COMM1; company ops on COMM2; and the ground crew on the flight interphone. Ground and company ops frequencies were very congested; as the ground controller was giving rapid-fire instructions to vehicles regarding an inbound emergency aircraft; and company ops had multiple radio calls. I heard the word 'stop' on one of the radios; but I had no idea who had said it; or to whom. At this moment; our ground crew stopped our pushback; and we had both engines running. I cleared-off our ground crew and read our before taxi checklist.suddenly; on the ground frequency; it sounded like the aircraft that had pushed adjacent to us was calling ground; telling ground that the aircraft in front of them (us) needed to shut-down the engines and be towed forward. The ground controller called us and asked if the other aircraft was referring to us. I had no idea what was being referred to; and I recall asking what the problem was. The other aircraft then said that our ground crew pushed us back such that our horizontal stabilizer was immediately over the nose of their aircraft. I had no idea that our ground crew had pushed us back; nearly colliding us into the aircraft behind us.we shut down both engines; and I called our ground crew back out to tow us forward. At no time did I realize how close we had come to a collision.our ground crew clearly did not ensure sufficient clearance between our aircraft and the other pushed aircraft during pushback. They either were not being observant and cautious; or they could not see the aircraft that they almost pushed us into. Plus; with only two people pushing us back; it was an insufficient number of ground crew; given the extremely tight ramp space in that area. I think that all of our push operations should involve three ramp crew; minimum. I also think that our ground crew must be trained to recognize the geometry of pushing the longer-body (-800 series) aircraft in turns; and how a collision can be more likely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reported experiencing a near-collision when his ground tractor crew almost pushed his aircraft into another.

Narrative: We were parked at Gate X; awaiting pushback with a two-man wired Crew. The Ramp Metering Controller told us to monitor Ground; which we did. The Ground Controller cleared us to 'Push; reference Company pushing adjacent at Gate Y.' The First Officer (FO) read back that instruction; and I read it back to the FO. I then told the Ground Crew; 'Parking brake released; reference Company to YOUR left (my right); cleared to push when able.' The Ground Crew read back the instruction to me; acknowledging that they needed to wait for the Company aircraft pushing next to us.A moment later; we started pushback; which involved a straight-back push; followed by a counter-clockwise 90 degree turn. During pushback; I was monitoring Ground on COMM1; Company Ops on COMM2; and the Ground Crew on the Flight Interphone. Ground and Company Ops frequencies were very congested; as the Ground Controller was giving rapid-fire instructions to vehicles regarding an inbound emergency aircraft; and Company Ops had multiple radio calls. I heard the word 'stop' on one of the radios; but I had no idea who had said it; or to whom. At this moment; our Ground Crew stopped our pushback; and we had both engines running. I cleared-off our Ground Crew and read our Before Taxi checklist.Suddenly; on the Ground frequency; it sounded like the aircraft that had pushed adjacent to us was calling Ground; telling Ground that the aircraft in front of them (us) needed to shut-down the engines and be towed forward. The Ground Controller called us and asked if the other aircraft was referring to us. I had no idea what was being referred to; and I recall asking what the problem was. The other aircraft then said that our Ground Crew pushed us back such that our horizontal stabilizer was immediately over the nose of their aircraft. I had no idea that our Ground Crew had pushed us back; nearly colliding us into the aircraft behind us.We shut down both engines; and I called our Ground Crew back out to tow us forward. At no time did I realize how close we had come to a collision.Our Ground Crew clearly did not ensure sufficient clearance between our aircraft and the other pushed aircraft during pushback. They either were not being observant and cautious; or they could not see the aircraft that they almost pushed us into. Plus; with only two people pushing us back; it was an insufficient number of Ground Crew; given the extremely tight ramp space in that area. I think that ALL of our push operations should involve three Ramp Crew; minimum. I also think that our Ground Crew must be trained to recognize the geometry of pushing the longer-body (-800 series) aircraft in turns; and how a collision can be more likely.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.