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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1360441 |
Time | |
Date | 201606 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Falcon 50 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
This event has many facets for its occurrence. The short version of this event and the root cause is pressure from a high valued passenger combined with an asymmetrical authority gradient on the flight deck. The error chain began with a passenger who was running late and putting undue pressure on the flight crew. There was a lack of communication between the pilot flying and the pilot not flying regarding the ATC clearance when departing an uncontrolled field. The clearance was received from the pilot not flying via telephone and not clearly communicated to the pilot flying. This coupled with the 'we are in go-fast mode' mantra from the pilot not flying (senior captain with the operation) and the peer pressure to keep up with the high value passenger's pace led to a navigational error. Rather than simply asking for vectors to a fix; the PNF (pilot not flying) became somewhat combative with the controller. This whole event could have been avoided by respect of the pilot flying's assigned authority and slowing down the pace of operations. Cockpit and checklist discipline were violated due to the pilot-not-flying perceived necessity to rush to satisfy a high value passenger. Assignment of PIC responsibility needs to be veritable regardless of seniority with a company. The clearance was to fly to mxe VOR; then to ptw VOR; then to saraa intersection. We headed to ptw VOR first; not to mxe VOR. The controller then gave us a heading of 150 degrees; then a heading of 090 degrees; then a heading of 060 degrees. To note; the PNF was absorbed in the FMS; and without asking the PF; began changing routing and flight guidance against ATC instructions. Loss of sa (situational awareness) and the pressure to rush reigns supreme here. I can state with absolute certainty; that if the high value passenger was running on-time and did not put pressure on the flight crew; and if the senior member of the flight crew (who was assigned to be sic) did not see the value in being obsequious to the high value passenger; this event would not have been reported to this system.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Falcon 50 Captain reported a track deviation occurred because the crew was under time pressure.
Narrative: This event has many facets for its occurrence. The short version of this event and the root cause is pressure from a high valued passenger combined with an asymmetrical authority gradient on the flight deck. The error chain began with a passenger who was running late and putting undue pressure on the flight crew. There was a lack of communication between the pilot flying and the pilot not flying regarding the ATC clearance when departing an uncontrolled field. The clearance was received from the pilot not flying via telephone and not clearly communicated to the pilot flying. This coupled with the 'we are in go-fast mode' mantra from the pilot not flying (senior captain with the operation) and the peer pressure to keep up with the high value passenger's pace led to a navigational error. Rather than simply asking for vectors to a fix; the PNF (Pilot Not Flying) became somewhat combative with the controller. This whole event could have been avoided by respect of the pilot flying's assigned authority and slowing down the pace of operations. Cockpit and checklist discipline were violated due to the pilot-not-flying perceived necessity to rush to satisfy a high value passenger. Assignment of PIC responsibility needs to be veritable regardless of seniority with a company. The clearance was to fly to MXE VOR; then to PTW VOR; then to SARAA intersection. We headed to PTW VOR first; not to MXE VOR. The controller then gave us a heading of 150 degrees; then a heading of 090 degrees; then a heading of 060 degrees. To note; the PNF was absorbed in the FMS; and without asking the PF; began changing routing and flight guidance against ATC instructions. Loss of SA (situational awareness) and the pressure to rush reigns supreme here. I can state with absolute certainty; that if the high value passenger was running on-time and did not put pressure on the flight crew; and if the senior member of the flight crew (who was assigned to be SIC) did NOT see the value in being obsequious to the high value passenger; this event would not have been reported to this system.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.