Narrative:

While waiting for takeoff; we were notified that we had a wheels up time in approximately 25 minutes. We were 300 pounds from takeoff fuel; and wanted to conserve fuel due to weather at our destination; the first officer (first officer) and I decided to shut down both engines to conserve fuel. Our wheels up time was delayed one more time. At five minutes prior to our wheels up time we started engine number two; per aom procedures. Upon lifting the number two engine start lever to idle; and getting a light off; I noticed the caution annunciator panel ovrt/det illuminate. We both saw that the engine 2 overheat light was illuminated. The first officer immediately aborted the engine start; and left the starter switch on for 60 seconds per the QRH. At the same time I called for the qrc engine overheat checklist. We ran that checklist; and the light was still illuminated. Per the qrc we were directed to the engine fire qrc checklist. We ran the checklist and discharged both fire bottles. The engine 2 overheat light was still on. I asked the flight attendants to look out the first officer side of the aircraft at the engine to see if there were any visible signs of smoke or fire; I also immediately notified ground control of our situation; and that we needed fire trucks to check our right engine for any signs of smoke or fire. After approximately two minutes of discharging the fire bottles; and during coordinating with the fire trucks and ops; I noticed that the engine 2 overheat light had gone out. The fire crew did a thermal check of the engine and did not see any abnormal heat signatures. At that time the first officer; fire crews; and I concluded that it was safe to get towed back to the gate. I notified dispatch and coordinated with ops that we needed a tow back to the gate; as it was unsafe to start any engines at that time. I kept the passengers in the loop after things slowed down; so they all knew what was going on. We were towed back to the gate uneventfully and I debriefed maintenance; and handed off the aircraft to them after appropriate logbook entries were made.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew experienced an 'ENG/OVHT' light during start of the number two engine just after the start lever is lifted. The start lever is returned to cut off and the engine is motored for 60 seconds. The light remains illuminated; even after both fire bottles are discharged. Fire trucks are summoned but the light extinguishes before they arrive.

Narrative: While waiting for takeoff; we were notified that we had a wheels up time in approximately 25 minutes. We were 300 pounds from takeoff fuel; and wanted to conserve fuel due to weather at our destination; the First Officer (FO) and I decided to shut down both engines to conserve fuel. Our wheels up time was delayed one more time. At five minutes prior to our wheels up time we started engine number two; per AOM procedures. Upon lifting the number two engine start lever to idle; and getting a light off; I noticed the caution annunciator panel OVRT/DET illuminate. We both saw that the ENG 2 OVERHEAT light was illuminated. The FO immediately aborted the engine start; and left the starter switch on for 60 seconds per the QRH. At the same time I called for the QRC Engine Overheat Checklist. We ran that checklist; and the light was still illuminated. Per the QRC we were directed to the Engine Fire QRC Checklist. We ran the checklist and discharged both fire bottles. The ENG 2 OVERHEAT light was still on. I asked the Flight Attendants to look out the FO side of the aircraft at the engine to see if there were any visible signs of smoke or fire; I also immediately notified Ground Control of our situation; and that we needed fire trucks to check our right engine for any signs of smoke or fire. After approximately two minutes of discharging the fire bottles; and during coordinating with the fire trucks and Ops; I noticed that the ENG 2 OVERHEAT light had gone out. The fire crew did a thermal check of the engine and did not see any abnormal heat signatures. At that time the FO; fire crews; and I concluded that it was safe to get towed back to the gate. I notified Dispatch and coordinated with ops that we needed a tow back to the gate; as it was unsafe to start any engines at that time. I kept the Passengers in the loop after things slowed down; so they all knew what was going on. We were towed back to the gate uneventfully and I debriefed Maintenance; and handed off the aircraft to them after appropriate logbook entries were made.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.