Narrative:

I contacted ground for taxi. I then requested runway 24 at gulf (G) intersection for takeoff. Upon reaching intersection G, I called the tower and told them I was ready for takeoff. Bdl tower cleared me for immediate takeoff from G intersection due to large transport on short final (2 mi). As I initiated my taxi onto and takeoff form runway 24, I noticed some areas of snow and ice on the edges of the runway (approximately 20' wide). As I applied power (partial) to 'start' the takeoff roll and accelerate to the middle of the runway from the intersection, the aircraft yawed to the left. I applied full right rudder and decreased the power on the right engine. The aircraft continued to yaw left and went into the bank off the left side of the runway and came to rest. By this time I had closed both throttles. At this point I did the after-landing and shut-down checklists and secured the airplane. I contacted the tower and advised them of my situation. I believe that the condition of the runway contributed to this incident. Additionally, I feel that the clearance for and acceptance of the 'immediate takeoff' clearance with patchy snow and ice on the runway, and even more snow and ice on all taxiway contributed. Other contributing factors: ATIS and FSS IFR briefing on (date of incident) contained no NOTAM information for runway conditions at bdl. However, on (the day after), both of the aforementioned sources had a NOTAM for 1/2' patchy snow & ice on runway 6/29 edges. To prevent this situation again (I believe the left wheel contacted snow/joe, causing the aircraft to exit the runway), I would recommend better pilot/controller communication and consider placing some restrictions on clrncs for immediate takeoff clrncs on less than good runway surfaces.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT THE START OF TKOF PLT OF GA SMT LOST CONTROL OF THE ACFT AND HIT A SNOW BANK.

Narrative: I CONTACTED GND FOR TAXI. I THEN REQUESTED RWY 24 AT GULF (G) INTXN FOR TKOF. UPON REACHING INTXN G, I CALLED THE TWR AND TOLD THEM I WAS READY FOR TKOF. BDL TWR CLRED ME FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF FROM G INTXN DUE TO LGT ON SHORT FINAL (2 MI). AS I INITIATED MY TAXI ONTO AND TKOF FORM RWY 24, I NOTICED SOME AREAS OF SNOW AND ICE ON THE EDGES OF THE RWY (APPROX 20' WIDE). AS I APPLIED PWR (PARTIAL) TO 'START' THE TKOF ROLL AND ACCELERATE TO THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY FROM THE INTXN, THE ACFT YAWED TO THE LEFT. I APPLIED FULL RIGHT RUDDER AND DECREASED THE PWR ON THE RIGHT ENG. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO YAW LEFT AND WENT INTO THE BANK OFF THE LEFT SIDE OF THE RWY AND CAME TO REST. BY THIS TIME I HAD CLOSED BOTH THROTTLES. AT THIS POINT I DID THE AFTER-LNDG AND SHUT-DOWN CHKLISTS AND SECURED THE AIRPLANE. I CONTACTED THE TWR AND ADVISED THEM OF MY SITUATION. I BELIEVE THAT THE CONDITION OF THE RWY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. ADDITIONALLY, I FEEL THAT THE CLRNC FOR AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE 'IMMEDIATE TKOF' CLRNC WITH PATCHY SNOW AND ICE ON THE RWY, AND EVEN MORE SNOW AND ICE ON ALL TXWY CONTRIBUTED. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ATIS AND FSS IFR BRIEFING ON (DATE OF INCIDENT) CONTAINED NO NOTAM INFO FOR RWY CONDITIONS AT BDL. HOWEVER, ON (THE DAY AFTER), BOTH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED SOURCES HAD A NOTAM FOR 1/2' PATCHY SNOW & ICE ON RWY 6/29 EDGES. TO PREVENT THIS SITUATION AGAIN (I BELIEVE THE LEFT WHEEL CONTACTED SNOW/JOE, CAUSING THE ACFT TO EXIT THE RWY), I WOULD RECOMMEND BETTER PLT/CTLR COM AND CONSIDER PLACING SOME RESTRICTIONS ON CLRNCS FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNCS ON LESS THAN GOOD RWY SURFACES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.