Narrative:

Wbound flight F/a (extra) stowed away in aft lav. Eastbound flight F/a tried to stow away, but caught and removed. Crew (first officer, second officer) not operating eastbound form their proper seats. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: captain, first officer, second officer and the cabin attendant have all been fired. During an investigation of how the cabin attendant was able to board the aircraft, it was revealed that the first officer and second officer were not operating in their assigned seats as flight crew, and the company released all involved except a dead-heading captain who was on the jump seat. The captain went into a lengthy account of the poor qualifications of company new hire first officer's and second officer's, and the poor training they receive before being released to the 'line.' he said he was giving them unauthorized training and used the dead-heading captain to back up the first officer at the F/east's station. The cabin attendant was a new hire and in uniform, and the reason for travel was personal, but not a family emergency. The second officer had been a flight instrument for the first officer and was more experience pilot, but neither were qualified at the respective stations. The reporter went into more detail about company management/training policy and the lack of record keeping for new hire coplts, all in an effort to justify his decision to allow the seat change. He said all large transport capts are told to be prepared to fly solo when working with new flight crew members. No FAA certification action to date.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: STOW AWAY CABIN ATTENDANT DISCOVERED ON AN ACR LGT BEFORE TKOF AND OFF-LOADED. FLT CREW IRREGULARITIES WERE DISCOVERED DURING AN INVESTIGATION AND THE FLT CREW ALL RELEASED FROM THE COMPANY.

Narrative: WBOUND FLT F/A (EXTRA) STOWED AWAY IN AFT LAV. EBND FLT F/A TRIED TO STOW AWAY, BUT CAUGHT AND REMOVED. CREW (F/O, S/O) NOT OPERATING EBND FORM THEIR PROPER SEATS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: CAPT, F/O, S/O AND THE CABIN ATTENDANT HAVE ALL BEEN FIRED. DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF HOW THE CABIN ATTENDANT WAS ABLE TO BOARD THE ACFT, IT WAS REVEALED THAT THE F/O AND S/O WERE NOT OPERATING IN THEIR ASSIGNED SEATS AS FLT CREW, AND THE COMPANY RELEASED ALL INVOLVED EXCEPT A DEAD-HEADING CAPT WHO WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT. THE CAPT WENT INTO A LENGTHY ACCOUNT OF THE POOR QUALIFICATIONS OF COMPANY NEW HIRE F/O'S AND S/O'S, AND THE POOR TRNING THEY RECEIVE BEFORE BEING RELEASED TO THE 'LINE.' HE SAID HE WAS GIVING THEM UNAUTH TRNING AND USED THE DEAD-HEADING CAPT TO BACK UP THE F/O AT THE F/E'S STATION. THE CABIN ATTENDANT WAS A NEW HIRE AND IN UNIFORM, AND THE REASON FOR TRAVEL WAS PERSONAL, BUT NOT A FAMILY EMER. THE S/O HAD BEEN A FLT INSTR FOR THE F/O AND WAS MORE EXPERIENCE PLT, BUT NEITHER WERE QUALIFIED AT THE RESPECTIVE STATIONS. THE REPORTER WENT INTO MORE DETAIL ABOUT COMPANY MGMNT/TRNING POLICY AND THE LACK OF RECORD KEEPING FOR NEW HIRE COPLTS, ALL IN AN EFFORT TO JUSTIFY HIS DECISION TO ALLOW THE SEAT CHANGE. HE SAID ALL LGT CAPTS ARE TOLD TO BE PREPARED TO FLY SOLO WHEN WORKING WITH NEW FLT CREW MEMBERS. NO FAA CERTIFICATION ACTION TO DATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.