Narrative:

I was upstairs working local control/controller in charge (controller in charge) when the TRACON controller in charge called. TRACON controller in charge asked whether we would be willing to change runways to runway 6 for weather. I said yes and TRACON controller in charge responded by saying I'll call you back when I get all the information to switch the runway. In the meantime the south controller calls and asks if we are going to runway 6. I respond 'I believe so I'm waiting for the controller in charge to call me back.' he asked if he should start vectoring aircraft for runway 6 due to weather. I said affirmative. I never received a call back from the TRACON controller in charge leading me to believe we were still on runway 24. The ground controller was holding an aircraft waiting for the call back. Upon observing 2 aircraft being vectored to a 7 mile final for runway 6. I called downstairs to the TRACON controller in charge to inquire as to the runway status. No one had every told me we were on runway 6 officially; never coordinated a last departure for runway 24 or a first arrival to runway 6. This was an unsafe situation in which I could have launched a departure off of runway 24 had I not been aware of the situation. Upon calling the TRACON controller in charge the simple response was 'yes we are on rwy 6' still with no coordination as to whom is the first arrival. The wst controller called me to give me the first arrival for runway 6 when the aircraft was on a 5 mile final.we have a checklist in place to prevent this exact situation. The TRACON controller in charge failed to use this checklist. I heard from everyone on position in the radar room except for the 1 person I should have heard from. The point of a checklist and single point of communication is to prevent confusion and a potentially hazardous situation. Had the person upstairs been busier or potentially less experienced this situation could have had hazardous consequences. The only recommendation I have is for people to follow the checklist as designed and required to do. Maybe the whole facility could use another briefing on the checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RSW Tower Controller in Charge (CIC) reported the TRACON CIC did not follow published procedures concerning changing active runways.

Narrative: I was upstairs working Local Control/Controller in Charge (CIC) when the TRACON CIC called. TRACON CIC asked whether we would be willing to change runways to runway 6 for weather. I said yes and TRACON CIC responded by saying I'll call you back when I get all the information to switch the runway. In the meantime the South Controller calls and asks if we are going to runway 6. I respond 'I believe so I'm waiting for the CIC to call me back.' He asked if he should start vectoring aircraft for runway 6 due to weather. I said affirmative. I never received a call back from the TRACON CIC leading me to believe we were still on runway 24. The ground controller was holding an aircraft waiting for the call back. Upon observing 2 aircraft being vectored to a 7 mile final for runway 6. I called downstairs to the TRACON CIC to inquire as to the runway status. No one had every told me we were on runway 6 officially; never coordinated a last departure for runway 24 or a first arrival to runway 6. This was an unsafe situation in which I could have launched a departure off of runway 24 had I not been aware of the situation. Upon calling the TRACON CIC the simple response was 'yes we are on rwy 6' still with no coordination as to whom is the first arrival. The WST controller called me to give me the first arrival for runway 6 when the aircraft was on a 5 mile final.We have a checklist in place to prevent this exact situation. The TRACON CIC failed to use this checklist. I heard from everyone on position in the radar room except for the 1 person I should have heard from. The point of a checklist and single point of communication is to prevent confusion and a potentially hazardous situation. Had the person upstairs been busier or potentially less experienced this situation could have had hazardous consequences. The only recommendation I have is for people to follow the checklist as designed and required to do. Maybe the whole facility could use another briefing on the checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.