Narrative:

On a three day trip dealing with multiple mels on every leg including either a single pack operation or no APU operation while temperatures are in 90 degree range; making the cockpit at points in the 110 degree range. This is neither comfortable nor safe for either the passengers or crew. Final day of the trip and we receive a plane with; you guessed it; no APU. As I got into the cockpit it was obvious that the previous crew had not shut the plane down properly; because the fuel pumps were still on; the transponder was still on and I didn't notice it at the time; but the first officer (first officer) had placed his HSI in 'no needles'. Not white needles; not green needles; but no needles at all. 8 years and 6;000+ hours on this plane and I've never seen it left like that before and since it was not my side; and the FMS allowed me to auto tune; such a possibility never occurred to me. Anyways; in the swarming heat we boarded close to a full load of passengers and got ready for our external air start (which we were very familiar with at that point in the trip). We get one started; pushed then cross-bled the other engine. As soon as I taxi out; I get a hydraulic 3B caution. I park; get on the phone with maintenance (mx) and try an assortment of switch positions and circuit breaker resets. Unable to fix it or MEL it; we return to the gate mx telling us that 3A can be meled; but 3B can't; and swapping them will take about 2 hours. 8 hours later the issue is resolved with a combination of mels; while we have been sitting on an aircraft that; even though plugged into pc air is pretty darn warm. Tired and ready to get done; we board once again as quickly as we can attempting to beat a storm that is approaching. We do the external start; then the cross bleed and head out; but by the time we are at the end; the worst of the storm has hit and we decide to shut one down and wait for the heavy bit to pass. While we are waiting; with one engine running; we are burning a significant amount of fuel compared to if we had an APU. ATC gives us a re-route due to the storm and I check to make sure that we have enough fuel for that route; I feel comfortable that we do; provided that we get out soon as we are burning fuel for the engine. The heavy bit passes; ATC clears us for takeoff direct to a fix. As I am the pilot monitoring; I engage nav mode and it fails to engage. I try going direct once again in the FMS and still can't engage navigation; I look over and I see no green needles so I try it again and still nothing; so I instruct the first officer to fly in heading mode towards the fixes while I trouble shoot the problem. Right around that time; my radar ceases to work for a short time; and mind you we are dodging several cells. Shortly after; the controller informs us that our route will put us into the worst of the storms and he will need to send us far west and north of our current route (which I think we have just enough fuel for). At that point; we decide to go back to the departure airport as we know the weather is decent and we can make it in; rather than put ourselves in a fuel critical situation. I advise ATC; the passengers/flight attendants and dispatch. While getting vectored the aircraft receives a lightning strike stronger than I've ever encountered. Everything onboard seems fine; so we have no problem continuing back. Given the fact that we are worn out from three days of super hot planes; the issues currently face and the whole day sitting on one waiting for mx to be finished. We are happy to be on the ground safe; rather than put ourselves in a more precarious situation. I land; write up the lightning strike; auto pilot pitch trim caution encountered on final and intermittent stall fail caution. Then contact crew tracking to advise them of our situation and that we will not be flying anymore. In typical fashion; they make us wait almost two hours before dutying us off and letting us know that we'll have close to minimum rest to report in the morning to ferry theaircraft. I advise them that we [are] quite worn out after the last three days; and especially today; where we were close to a max duty day; and min rest is not a good idea; besides that we won't even know if the aircraft will be ready by that time in the morning. They say something to the effect of 'ok; but that's your schedule'. I check several times the next morning and it shows us showing at that scheduled time; even though the aircraft has been down for the night and morning and nobody has even looked at. Finally; just as we're about to leave for the airport; they bump the departure time up a couple hours; and then finally cancel the repo completely as the aircraft is not even worthy to fly a repo.the 'no needles' scenario is something I've never encountered; so perhaps we can make it an item to leave the plane in white needles.maintenance seems like an after thought here; MEL'ing seems like the first thought. I once had an APU that wouldn't start in a mx base and assumed that they might look at it; maybe at least just check the oil. Nope; mechanic shows up and straight mels it. That incident caused me plenty of trouble that day due to faulty ground equipment at outstations. The amount of mels that I have been flying with lately is sometimes exorbitant; that flight mentioned above dispatched with I believe 9. Each one adding to our work load. I have also received a plane that had an expired FMS database; that had sat on the ground overnight; no one took the time; then did a turn and sat for another 2 hours; once again; no one took the time. I went into the mx office and asked if someone could do it while we boarded; and he did which is a great help to have actual and proposed fuel numbers while flying in inclement weather. Because pilots are goal oriented people that want to get the job done; I was ready; willing and thought able. Looking back in all the legs of the trip; it was so damn hot in there that I always rushed to get one started so that I could have some airflow; which may have led to rushed procedures and poor decision making; and with a new first officer; I always tell them to let me know if I'm going too fast; but they may be too afraid or ashamed to ask me to slow down for the same reason mentioned above. Many airlines have a limit on the number of mels are allowed; perhaps that can be implemented here.perhaps crew tracking can look at the bigger picture of what is going on; rather than what is the legal minimum which is what is commonly assigned even; when in many cases clearly makes no sense. Example; my overnight to an outstation was cancelled; so they gave me minimum rest to deadhead to the outstation; sit there for 6 hours; then fly back. I called and asked for a hotel for the 6 hour wait and they changed it to me deadheading on the outbound plane that I was to bring back; genius.I'm not sure what can be done about ATC re-routes; but lately I have been given several that have actually put me in the worst of the weather. Just the other day; center had me go way west into weather that I could see then come back; adding about 25 minutes to the flight. I informed the controller that that routing will put me in the worst of the weather; and present position direct the field will keep me clear. His response was 'I've been hearing that a lot' a few minutes later; he cleared me direct a fix near the field and I was clear.after 10 years with this company I'm reaching my breaking point with maintenance issues; problem first officer's and flight attendants; since we seem to hire anybody. Crew tracking and dispatch issues which could be solved by hiring more competent staff and more training. One of my first officer's was scared when he was told by an instructor; that that instructor would never put his family on a flight operated by our air carrier. That says a lot because anything that happens is a bunch of links in a chain and lined up right together is a recipe for disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-900 Captain described a trip during hot weather in aircraft with either the APU or a pack MELed; multiple MELs; ATC reroutes in weather and a return to the departure airport following a lightning strike. The crew ultimately called in fatigued.

Narrative: On a three day trip dealing with multiple MELs on every leg including either a single pack operation or no APU operation while temperatures are in 90 degree range; making the cockpit at points in the 110 degree range. This is neither comfortable nor safe for either the passengers or crew. Final day of the trip and we receive a plane with; you guessed it; no APU. As I got into the cockpit it was obvious that the previous crew had not shut the plane down properly; because the fuel pumps were still on; the transponder was still on and I didn't notice it at the time; but the First Officer (FO) had placed his HSI in 'No Needles'. Not white needles; not green needles; but no needles at all. 8 years and 6;000+ hours on this plane and I've never seen it left like that before and since it was not my side; and the FMS allowed me to auto tune; such a possibility never occurred to me. Anyways; in the swarming heat we boarded close to a full load of passengers and got ready for our external air start (which we were very familiar with at that point in the trip). We get one started; pushed then cross-bled the other engine. As soon as I taxi out; I get a HYD 3B Caution. I park; get on the phone with Maintenance (MX) and try an assortment of switch positions and circuit breaker resets. Unable to fix it or MEL it; we return to the gate MX telling us that 3A can be MELed; but 3B can't; and swapping them will take about 2 hours. 8 hours later the issue is resolved with a combination of MELs; while we have been sitting on an aircraft that; even though plugged into PC air is pretty darn warm. Tired and ready to get done; we board once again as quickly as we can attempting to beat a storm that is approaching. We do the external start; then the cross bleed and head out; but by the time we are at the end; the worst of the storm has hit and we decide to shut one down and wait for the heavy bit to pass. While we are waiting; with one engine running; we are burning a significant amount of fuel compared to if we had an APU. ATC gives us a re-route due to the storm and I check to make sure that we have enough fuel for that route; I feel comfortable that we do; provided that we get out soon as we are burning fuel for the engine. The heavy bit passes; ATC clears us for takeoff direct to a fix. As I am the pilot monitoring; I engage nav mode and it fails to engage. I try going direct once again in the FMS and still can't engage NAV; I look over and I see no green needles so I try it again and still nothing; so I instruct the FO to fly in heading mode towards the fixes while I trouble shoot the problem. Right around that time; my radar ceases to work for a short time; and mind you we are dodging several cells. Shortly after; the controller informs us that our route will put us into the worst of the storms and he will need to send us far west and north of our current route (Which I think we have just enough fuel for). At that point; we decide to go back to the departure airport as we know the weather is decent and we can make it in; rather than put ourselves in a fuel critical situation. I advise ATC; the Passengers/Flight Attendants and Dispatch. While getting vectored the aircraft receives a lightning strike stronger than I've ever encountered. Everything onboard seems fine; so we have no problem continuing back. Given the fact that we are worn out from three days of super hot planes; the issues currently face and the whole day sitting on one waiting for MX to be finished. We are happy to be on the ground safe; rather than put ourselves in a more precarious situation. I land; write up the lightning strike; auto pilot pitch trim caution encountered on final and intermittent stall fail caution. Then contact crew tracking to advise them of our situation and that we will not be flying anymore. In typical fashion; they make us wait almost two hours before dutying us off and letting us know that we'll have close to minimum rest to report in the morning to ferry theaircraft. I advise them that we [are] quite worn out after the last three days; and especially today; where we were close to a max duty day; and min rest is not a good idea; besides that we won't even know if the aircraft will be ready by that time in the morning. They say something to the effect of 'ok; but that's your schedule'. I check several times the next morning and it shows us showing at that scheduled time; even though the aircraft has been down for the night and morning and nobody has even looked at. Finally; just as we're about to leave for the airport; they bump the departure time up a couple hours; and then finally cancel the repo completely as the aircraft is not even worthy to fly a repo.The 'No needles' scenario is something I've never encountered; so perhaps we can make it an item to leave the plane in white needles.Maintenance seems like an after thought here; MEL'ing seems like the first thought. I once had an APU that wouldn't start in a MX base and assumed that they might look at it; maybe at least just check the oil. Nope; mechanic shows up and straight MELs it. That incident caused me plenty of trouble that day due to faulty ground equipment at outstations. The amount of MELs that I have been flying with lately is sometimes exorbitant; that flight mentioned above dispatched with I believe 9. Each one adding to our work load. I have also received a plane that had an expired FMS database; that had sat on the ground overnight; no one took the time; then did a turn and sat for another 2 hours; once again; no one took the time. I went into the MX office and asked if someone could do it while we boarded; and he did which is a great help to have actual and proposed fuel numbers while flying in inclement weather. Because pilots are goal oriented people that want to get the job done; I was ready; willing and thought able. Looking back in all the legs of the trip; it was so damn hot in there that I always rushed to get one started so that I could have some airflow; which may have led to rushed procedures and poor decision making; and with a new FO; I always tell them to let me know if I'm going too fast; but they may be too afraid or ashamed to ask me to slow down for the same reason mentioned above. Many airlines have a limit on the number of MELs are allowed; perhaps that can be implemented here.Perhaps crew tracking can look at the bigger picture of what is going on; rather than what is the legal minimum which is what is commonly assigned even; when in many cases clearly makes no sense. Example; my overnight to an outstation was cancelled; so they gave me minimum rest to deadhead to the outstation; sit there for 6 hours; then fly back. I called and asked for a hotel for the 6 hour wait and they changed it to me deadheading on the outbound plane that I was to bring back; genius.I'm not sure what can be done about ATC re-routes; but lately I have been given several that have actually put me in the worst of the weather. Just the other day; Center had me go way west into weather that I could see then come back; adding about 25 minutes to the flight. I informed the controller that that routing will put me in the worst of the weather; and present position direct the field will keep me clear. His response was 'I've been hearing that a lot' a few minutes later; he cleared me direct a fix near the field and I was clear.After 10 years with this company I'm reaching my breaking point with maintenance issues; problem FO's and Flight attendants; since we seem to hire anybody. Crew tracking and dispatch issues which could be solved by hiring more competent staff and more training. One of my FO's was scared when he was told by an instructor; that that instructor would never put his family on a flight operated by our air carrier. That says a lot because anything that happens is a bunch of links in a chain and lined up right together is a recipe for disaster.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.