Narrative:

*Several flts occurred prior to the aircraft being taken to vny for maintenance, and fuel data from those flts formed the basis of the reporter's fuel planning once the aircraft was delivered from fuel system maintenance at vny. On the day of the incident, nacelle tanks were checked visually, while gauges were used for determining wing tank fuel quantity. Total fuel on board was believed to be 294 gals. Flight was planned from vny to toa, toa to L08, and L08 to toa, a straight line distance of 210 NM for the all VFR flight. Shortly after departing toa, the wing 'no fuel transfer' light illuminated, indicating probable low fuel levels in the wing tanks, and the fuel transfer pump switches were turned off. A minimum of 100 gals remaining was assumed. Approaching sna on the last leg (L08 to toa), the left engine fuel low pressure light illuminated, fuel flow and fuel pressure indicators oscillated, then fell to zero. The engine xfeed light illuminated indicating automatic right nacelle tank to left engine fuel flow. An emergency call was made to coast approach, the transponder switched to 7700, and a turn toward sna was initiated. The pilot now believed a low fuel quantity emergency existed. Shortly following the first engine fuel flow low pressure light, the right engine fuel low pressure light illuminated, followed closely by flameout of both engines. A successful forced approach was conducted to sna. No damage occurred. Both nacelle tanks were filled to 62 gals each, thus both had indeed run dry. Inspection revealed no static or pressure fuel leaks. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: the reporter was contacted to provide information on fuel system design and indications. The reporter claims that all tanks other than the right nacelle tank read full prior to departure. The right nacelle tank indicated 3/8 full, and in that the reporter had inspected the tank visually and found it to be full, assumed fuel indication problems for that tank. Fuel is supplied to the engines from the nacelle tanks only, each nacelle tank having a maximum capacity of about 62 gals. Wing tanks feed the nacelle tanks through fuel transfer pumps. The pumps are controled through on/off switches, the on position providing for automatic fuel transfer when nacelle tank level falls to approximately 54 gals, and automatically turning off when the nacelle tank is replentished. There is no hard evidence to support fuel bladder collapse prior to or after takeoff, however that possibility cannot be entirely dismissed. The possibility of bladder collapse could be given more weight, except that the fuel low pressure light came on separated by only a few minutes. This would seem to require collapse of fuel bladders on both sides, and to about the same degree. The FAA is investigating the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TURBOPROP SMT EXPERIENCES DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. CONDUCTS SUCCESSFUL FORCED APCH TO SNA.

Narrative: *SEVERAL FLTS OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE ACFT BEING TAKEN TO VNY FOR MAINT, AND FUEL DATA FROM THOSE FLTS FORMED THE BASIS OF THE REPORTER'S FUEL PLANNING ONCE THE ACFT WAS DELIVERED FROM FUEL SYSTEM MAINT AT VNY. ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, NACELLE TANKS WERE CHECKED VISUALLY, WHILE GAUGES WERE USED FOR DETERMINING WING TANK FUEL QUANTITY. TOTAL FUEL ON BOARD WAS BELIEVED TO BE 294 GALS. FLT WAS PLANNED FROM VNY TO TOA, TOA TO L08, AND L08 TO TOA, A STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE OF 210 NM FOR THE ALL VFR FLT. SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTING TOA, THE WING 'NO FUEL TRANSFER' LIGHT ILLUMINATED, INDICATING PROBABLE LOW FUEL LEVELS IN THE WING TANKS, AND THE FUEL TRANSFER PUMP SWITCHES WERE TURNED OFF. A MINIMUM OF 100 GALS REMAINING WAS ASSUMED. APCHING SNA ON THE LAST LEG (L08 TO TOA), THE LEFT ENGINE FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED, FUEL FLOW AND FUEL PRESSURE INDICATORS OSCILLATED, THEN FELL TO ZERO. THE ENGINE XFEED LIGHT ILLUMINATED INDICATING AUTOMATIC RIGHT NACELLE TANK TO LEFT ENGINE FUEL FLOW. AN EMER CALL WAS MADE TO COAST APCH, THE XPONDER SWITCHED TO 7700, AND A TURN TOWARD SNA WAS INITIATED. THE PLT NOW BELIEVED A LOW FUEL QUANTITY EMER EXISTED. SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE FIRST ENGINE FUEL FLOW LOW PRESSURE LIGHT, THE RIGHT ENGINE FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY FLAMEOUT OF BOTH ENGINES. A SUCCESSFUL FORCED APCH WAS CONDUCTED TO SNA. NO DAMAGE OCCURRED. BOTH NACELLE TANKS WERE FILLED TO 62 GALS EACH, THUS BOTH HAD INDEED RUN DRY. INSPECTION REVEALED NO STATIC OR PRESSURE FUEL LEAKS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THE REPORTER WAS CONTACTED TO PROVIDE INFO ON FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN AND INDICATIONS. THE REPORTER CLAIMS THAT ALL TANKS OTHER THAN THE RIGHT NACELLE TANK READ FULL PRIOR TO DEP. THE RIGHT NACELLE TANK INDICATED 3/8 FULL, AND IN THAT THE REPORTER HAD INSPECTED THE TANK VISUALLY AND FOUND IT TO BE FULL, ASSUMED FUEL INDICATION PROBLEMS FOR THAT TANK. FUEL IS SUPPLIED TO THE ENGINES FROM THE NACELLE TANKS ONLY, EACH NACELLE TANK HAVING A MAX CAPACITY OF ABOUT 62 GALS. WING TANKS FEED THE NACELLE TANKS THROUGH FUEL TRANSFER PUMPS. THE PUMPS ARE CTLED THROUGH ON/OFF SWITCHES, THE ON POSITION PROVIDING FOR AUTOMATIC FUEL TRANSFER WHEN NACELLE TANK LEVEL FALLS TO APPROX 54 GALS, AND AUTOMATICALLY TURNING OFF WHEN THE NACELLE TANK IS REPLENTISHED. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FUEL BLADDER COLLAPSE PRIOR TO OR AFTER TKOF, HOWEVER THAT POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISMISSED. THE POSSIBILITY OF BLADDER COLLAPSE COULD BE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT, EXCEPT THAT THE FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT CAME ON SEPARATED BY ONLY A FEW MINUTES. THIS WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE COLLAPSE OF FUEL BLADDERS ON BOTH SIDES, AND TO ABOUT THE SAME DEGREE. THE FAA IS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.