Narrative:

We were flying into fsd and had briefed for the ILS approach to runway 3. The tower had closed for the night and the automated weather was reporting light winds and clear skies and there were no NOTAMS affecting the ILS 3 approach or runway 3. We advised center of our intentions to fly the ILS 3. As we got closer we saw what looked like cells on the radar over the airport and the FAF for the ILS 3. We listened to the AWOS again and it was now saying light winds but also light rain and thunderstorm over the field. We asked to have radar vectors to the RNAV 15 to avoid the cell over the FAF for ILS 3. Center was busy talking to other aircraft but then approved us for the RNAV and gave us vectors; descending us to 5000 feet. We broke out of the clouds and saw the airport and saw that the ILS 3 would keep us clear of the clouds and that there was no thunderstorm in the immediate area of the airport. We had gone beyond the localizer course by that point but asked for vectors to the ILS 3 again. Center gave us a vector to intercept the localizer and told us to report established. We quickly set up the FMS and proceeded.as we approached the course; the localizer was not becoming active. We intercepted on pink needles and reported established. Center cleared us for the approach. At this point I thought we should have the localizer and started troubleshooting to determine why we weren't seeing it. We had the correct frequency and it was loaded in the FMS. We were gear down and flaps 1 and 210 kts at 5000 feet. I pushed the approach button and got nothing; and didn't start the descent. We got closer to the airport and I saw that we were high crossing the FAF. I disconnected the autopilot and started a descent but immediately saw we were too high and fast to safely fly the approach. We asked center for vectors back to the FAF to try again. He told us to descend to 3500 feet and turn left back to the FAF for the procedure turn for the ILS 3. We did.we flew back to the FAF in visual conditions and continued to troubleshoot the localizer. We configured for the approach and turned back toward the runway. We could clearly see the airport and runway the whole time. Center told us that when we were turned back toward the airport to switch to the advisory frequency. We were established on the FMS course but the localizer was still not showing up or identified. By this point; our fuel was at 2900 pounds and I was concerned about fuel and the weather in the area. I elected to continue the approach visually but did not switch back to center and ask for the visual approach. We landed without incident. After landing I talked about the approach with my first officer and reviewed the NOTAMS to see if I had missed anything. I didn't see anything that would indicate the ILS was out of service. I didn't see that we had made a mistake on the frequency or the loading of the approach. The ILS was out of service and we didn't know it. We became focused on the ILS and failed to ask for and execute a visual approach. The weather in the area and my decision to try to fly the ILS after changing to the RNAV caused us to become task saturated and behind the airplane. The tower and approach control being closed took away some of the resources that could have helped us get a better picture of what was really happening at the airport and with the ILS; and the tower being closed required us to make more radio calls and took away some of the focus from flying.any time I fly an ILS I make sure I see the identifier and I did not do that this time. In the future; I will stick to the plan I have made if it still seems safe to do so; in this case it was to fly the RNAV approach. I will recognize the limitations and extra workload that occur when flying into a non-towered airport and not allow complacency to override my situational awareness. When we did not receive the localizer but had the airport in sight I should have asked for the visual approach but wasfixated on the instrumentation problems. Also; I should have gotten slower sooner and given us more time to maneuver and get into position to make a stabilized approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around from their approach to FSD when it became obvious the ILS was out of service. There was no NOTAM relating to the outage.

Narrative: We were flying into FSD and had briefed for the ILS approach to runway 3. The Tower had closed for the night and the automated weather was reporting light winds and clear skies and there were no NOTAMS affecting the ILS 3 approach or runway 3. We advised Center of our intentions to fly the ILS 3. As we got closer we saw what looked like cells on the radar over the airport and the FAF for the ILS 3. We listened to the AWOS again and it was now saying light winds but also light rain and thunderstorm over the field. We asked to have radar vectors to the RNAV 15 to avoid the cell over the FAF for ILS 3. Center was busy talking to other aircraft but then approved us for the RNAV and gave us vectors; descending us to 5000 feet. We broke out of the clouds and saw the airport and saw that the ILS 3 would keep us clear of the clouds and that there was no thunderstorm in the immediate area of the airport. We had gone beyond the localizer course by that point but asked for vectors to the ILS 3 again. Center gave us a vector to intercept the localizer and told us to report established. We quickly set up the FMS and proceeded.As we approached the course; the localizer was not becoming active. We intercepted on pink needles and reported established. Center cleared us for the approach. At this point I thought we should have the localizer and started troubleshooting to determine why we weren't seeing it. We had the correct frequency and it was loaded in the FMS. We were gear down and flaps 1 and 210 kts at 5000 feet. I pushed the approach button and got nothing; and didn't start the descent. We got closer to the airport and I saw that we were high crossing the FAF. I disconnected the autopilot and started a descent but immediately saw we were too high and fast to safely fly the approach. We asked Center for vectors back to the FAF to try again. He told us to descend to 3500 feet and turn left back to the FAF for the procedure turn for the ILS 3. We did.We flew back to the FAF in visual conditions and continued to troubleshoot the localizer. We configured for the approach and turned back toward the runway. We could clearly see the airport and runway the whole time. Center told us that when we were turned back toward the airport to switch to the advisory frequency. We were established on the FMS course but the localizer was still not showing up or identified. By this point; our fuel was at 2900 pounds and I was concerned about fuel and the weather in the area. I elected to continue the approach visually but did not switch back to Center and ask for the visual approach. We landed without incident. After landing I talked about the approach with my First Officer and reviewed the NOTAMS to see if I had missed anything. I didn't see anything that would indicate the ILS was out of service. I didn't see that we had made a mistake on the frequency or the loading of the approach. The ILS was out of service and we didn't know it. We became focused on the ILS and failed to ask for and execute a visual approach. The weather in the area and my decision to try to fly the ILS after changing to the RNAV caused us to become task saturated and behind the airplane. The Tower and Approach Control being closed took away some of the resources that could have helped us get a better picture of what was really happening at the airport and with the ILS; and the Tower being closed required us to make more radio calls and took away some of the focus from flying.Any time I fly an ILS I make sure I see the identifier and I did not do that this time. In the future; I will stick to the plan I have made if it still seems safe to do so; in this case it was to fly the RNAV approach. I will recognize the limitations and extra workload that occur when flying into a non-towered airport and not allow complacency to override my situational awareness. When we did not receive the localizer but had the airport in sight I should have asked for the visual approach but wasfixated on the instrumentation problems. Also; I should have gotten slower sooner and given us more time to maneuver and get into position to make a stabilized approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.