An air traffic controller and trainee reported two aircraft converging at the same altitude that req...

Narrative:

Aircraft X checked in with me level at 11;000 feet as expected and as per SOP (standard operating procedures). I instructed the pilot to climb to 12;000 feet. Another pilot then checked in; while I was witnessing a convergence of aircraft X and aircraft Y; slightly delaying my next control action. I instructed aircraft X to turn right to a 180 degree heading immediately and issued the traffic at his twelve o'clock; at the roughly the same altitude. I asked the pilot if he had visual contact and he said negative. I reiterated the 180 heading immediately; and issued a climb to 13;000 feet. The pilot then stated they finally had the traffic in sight. At that time aircraft X was at an appropriate altitude to be able to proceed direct to his departure fix; in which I instructed him to do; as well as maintain visual with the other aircraft. I was never in contact with aircraft Y during the event. That aircraft was still being worked by the previous controller and at 11;000 feet in the direct path of aircraft X whom he had previously switched to my frequency at the same altitude. Traffic volume; combined (busy) positions; frequency congestion; complexity; weather deviations; ojti; and an unexpected altitude by the other aircraft all contributed in some part to this safety event. I issued corrective action as soon as I saw the situation and to ensure the safety of the two aircraft involved. It is standard to have two very busy sectors combined in this sector. Additionally; if standard protocol and altitudes were issued or appropriate coordination was done; the two aircraft would have not been at the same altitude. Had I seen the situation developing even sooner than I did; I would have taken corrective action and notified the other controller to ensure the safety of the two aircraft involved. This position should have been split sooner than it was due to volume and complexity. The conflict alert (ca) alarm did not activate visually or aurally. I doubled checked my console volume and it was set within required facility limits. This is a major safety concern and has been verbally passed to the appropriate personnel.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Traffic Controller and Trainee reported two aircraft converging at the same altitude that required late action to avoid a loss of required separation.

Narrative: Aircraft X checked in with me level at 11;000 feet as expected and as per SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). I instructed the pilot to climb to 12;000 feet. Another pilot then checked in; while I was witnessing a convergence of Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; slightly delaying my next control action. I instructed Aircraft X to turn right to a 180 degree heading immediately and issued the traffic at his twelve o'clock; at the roughly the same altitude. I asked the pilot if he had visual contact and he said negative. I reiterated the 180 heading immediately; and issued a climb to 13;000 feet. The pilot then stated they finally had the traffic in sight. At that time Aircraft X was at an appropriate altitude to be able to proceed direct to his departure fix; in which I instructed him to do; as well as maintain visual with the other aircraft. I was never in contact with Aircraft Y during the event. That aircraft was still being worked by the previous controller and at 11;000 feet in the direct path of Aircraft X whom he had previously switched to my frequency at the same altitude. Traffic volume; combined (busy) positions; frequency congestion; complexity; weather deviations; OJTI; and an unexpected altitude by the other aircraft all contributed in some part to this safety event. I issued corrective action as soon as I saw the situation and to ensure the safety of the two aircraft involved. It is standard to have two very busy sectors combined in this sector. Additionally; if standard protocol and altitudes were issued or appropriate coordination was done; the two aircraft would have not been at the same altitude. Had I seen the situation developing even sooner than I did; I would have taken corrective action and notified the other controller to ensure the safety of the two aircraft involved. This position should have been split sooner than it was due to volume and complexity. The conflict alert (CA) alarm did not activate visually or aurally. I doubled checked my console volume and it was set within required facility limits. This is a major safety concern and has been verbally passed to the appropriate personnel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1368324
Time
Date	201607
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	N90.TRACON
State Reference	NY
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Small Transport
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	Climb
Route In Use	Vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Small Transport Low Wing 2 Turboprop Eng
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	Cruise
Route In Use	Vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Approach
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Developmental
Person 2
Function	Instructor Approach
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Experience	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An air traffic controller and trainee reported two aircraft converging at the same altitude that required late action to avoid a loss of required separation.