Narrative:

I had filed an IFR flight plan out of akron; colorado (ako) with flight service. I called clearance delivery on my cellphone to get my clearance; and was told they couldn't give me a 10 minute 'time before off' - but to call back when I was ready to leave. I finished my last preparations; started up; and taxied to runway 29. During taxi; an experimental aircraft called on CTAF inquiring about fuel at ako; to which query I responded. I taxied to the hold short line of runway 29; ending with a question as to where the akron experimental traffic was presently located. There was no response; so I radioed again; and they said they were 12 miles out; and that the winds were calm. I then contacted clearance delivery on my cellphone (which required me to remove my headset) and told them I was ready to leave immediately. They put me on hold for about 5 minutes (seemed like an eternity in the hot weather); they finally came back on and gave me 90 seconds to be airborne. I hung up the phone and turned it off; got my headphones back on; and announced on CTAF that I was taxiing onto rnwy 29 and taking off. There was no response on the radio. I lifted off; and at about 300 ft. AGL began a slight turn to the north to get established on V-132. About one minute later; I noticed off my left wing the other plane rolling away from me slightly; it appeared to be on final for runway 11. We were separated far enough that by the time I saw him it was clear that we were not in imminent danger (he was at my 8:00); but I also recognized that it was a close call. A minute or two after this; I switched to denver center frequency and established communication with them. Prior to switching; I heard no radio communication from the other plane; although I expected to. Also of note is that my TCAS system did not register nor alert me to the presence of that aircraft.although I suspect both I and the other pilot made mistakes leading to this incident; had I been more careful and conscientious; this would not have happened. Any of the following would have precluded the event:1. Knowing that there was another aircraft approaching the airport; I should not have accepted a 90-second 'time off by' limitation on the clearance. That was insufficient time for me to establish the location of the other aircraft once I put my headset back on. In hindsight; it would not have really made that much a difference had I waited even another 10 - 20 minutes for another clearance. It certainly was not worth risking lives to save a few minutes.2. As a new instrument pilot (less than a year); I only know of one way to reach clearance delivery - by cellphone. I need to know how to reach them while in the air. The thought occurred to me to take off and get my clearance in the air; once clear of the airport - but I do not yet know how to do that. This deficiency is mine; and will be rectified. Had I been able to get my clearance in the air; five minutes' flying would have certainly put me outside the airport environment; likewise mitigating the situation.3. Although my earlier communication had established runway 29 as the active; nevertheless the other pilot had communicated his intent of landing on runway 11. I was shortsighted and selfish in assuming (without verification) that he would enter a left downwind for rnwy 29 after our communication. I need to be more mindful of other pilots; and less concerned with my own desires.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: M20 pilot reported receiving an IFR clearance via cell phone from AKO then told to hold for release. While holding an experimental aircraft reported inbound for landing on the opposite runway. When the M20 pilot was released he was given 90 seconds to be airborne and departed immediately. Once airborne a conflict developed with the inbound aircraft.

Narrative: I had filed an IFR flight plan out of Akron; Colorado (AKO) with Flight Service. I called Clearance Delivery on my cellphone to get my clearance; and was told they couldn't give me a 10 minute 'time before off' - but to call back when I was ready to leave. I finished my last preparations; started up; and taxied to RWY 29. During taxi; an experimental aircraft called on CTAF inquiring about fuel at AKO; to which query I responded. I taxied to the hold short line of RWY 29; ending with a question as to where the Akron experimental traffic was presently located. There was no response; so I radioed again; and they said they were 12 miles out; and that the winds were calm. I then contacted Clearance Delivery on my cellphone (which required me to remove my headset) and told them I was ready to leave immediately. They put me on hold for about 5 minutes (seemed like an eternity in the hot weather); they finally came back on and gave me 90 seconds to be airborne. I hung up the phone and turned it off; got my headphones back on; and announced on CTAF that I was taxiing onto RNWY 29 and taking off. There was no response on the radio. I lifted off; and at about 300 ft. AGL began a slight turn to the north to get established on V-132. About one minute later; I noticed off my left wing the other plane rolling away from me slightly; it appeared to be on final for RWY 11. We were separated far enough that by the time I saw him it was clear that we were not in imminent danger (he was at my 8:00); but I also recognized that it was a close call. A minute or two after this; I switched to Denver Center frequency and established communication with them. Prior to switching; I heard no radio communication from the other plane; although I expected to. Also of note is that my TCAS system did not register nor alert me to the presence of that aircraft.Although I suspect both I and the other pilot made mistakes leading to this incident; had I been more careful and conscientious; this would not have happened. Any of the following would have precluded the event:1. Knowing that there was another aircraft approaching the airport; I should not have accepted a 90-second 'time off by' limitation on the clearance. That was insufficient time for me to establish the location of the other aircraft once I put my headset back on. In hindsight; it would not have really made that much a difference had I waited even another 10 - 20 minutes for another clearance. It certainly was not worth risking lives to save a few minutes.2. As a new instrument pilot (less than a year); I only know of one way to reach Clearance Delivery - by cellphone. I need to know how to reach them while in the air. The thought occurred to me to take off and get my clearance in the air; once clear of the airport - but I do not yet know how to do that. This deficiency is mine; and will be rectified. Had I been able to get my clearance in the air; five minutes' flying would have certainly put me outside the airport environment; likewise mitigating the situation.3. Although my earlier communication had established RWY 29 as the active; nevertheless the other pilot had communicated his intent of landing on RWY 11. I was shortsighted and selfish in assuming (without verification) that he would enter a left downwind for RNWY 29 after our communication. I need to be more mindful of other pilots; and less concerned with my own desires.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.