Narrative:

Another day with thunderstorms and another day with low staffing. We had a controller come in for overtime and another controller in a staff position to come to the floor and work traffic. The day was filled with thunderstorms and reroutes from the moment I walked into the area. The sector was busy. Pik lo and cmh lo were combined with pkb lo. The controller was briefing me about the sectors. My primary focus was a military flight going into the buckeye MOA past the scheduled time. The supervisor was working on getting clearance to allow this to happen after the scheduled time. The radar assist was calling the approach controls to block for the buckeye MOA's altitudes. I know the radar controller discussed what else was going on in the sector. Unfortunately; I never heard that we had control of the uni shelf from hts approach. After this whole incident; I saw that the uni shelf information was on the esis (status area) in the extra information area. How did I miss seeing that?aircraft X was shooting an approach at eop. Other traffic was flying through the airspace. The thunderstorm line was about 70-80 miles west of my western edge of the airspace; moving southeast bound. Aircraft were not penetrating the line; so we had extra flights in our area to avoid the severe weather. I accepted the sector and cleared the military fighters into the buckeye MOA. I was busy working departures; arrivals; and enroute traffic through the airspace. Aircraft X called on saying that they were on the missed approach for eop and wanted clearance back to uni. I radar identified aircraft X; climbed them to 3000 feet; and cleared to uni. Aircraft Y called on at 5000 feet. His flight path was crossing southbound over aircraft X's flight path. I asked aircraft Y if he had the weather and NOTAMS for pmh. Aircraft Y corrected me and said that his destination was I43. He was requesting the RNAV runway 19 apch to I43. I looked up the approach and cleared him direct fedik direct I43. Fedik is the initial approach fix. Hts approach has very poor radar coverage. I43 is about 10 miles south of the ZID/hts approach northern boundary. The fighters were through with their time in the buckeye MOA. I cleared them out of the airspace to [their destination]. I worked several other aircraft in all 3 sectors. My assist also very busy taking calls; making point outs; and taking point outs. I remember thinking that I was going to give aircraft X to hts approach; I was going to let them work aircraft X non-radar to uni (I still did not realize that I had the uni shelf). So; I was flashing a handoff to hts for aircraft X at 3000 feet. I was also flashing aircraft Y to hts approach. Aircraft Y was at 40 direct fedik. Even though the flights paths crossed; the targets did not merge. I did not call traffic to aircraft X and aircraft Y concerning each other. Aircraft Y was 4 miles south of aircraft X and hts approach took his handoff. Aircraft X was still flashing to hts approach at 3000 feet. I switched aircraft Y to hts approach. I continued issuing clearances to all the other aircraft in the sectors. I then noticed that aircraft Y was descending out of 4000 feet in my airspace. I turned aircraft X to a 040 heading to get away from aircraft Y. I called hts and asked them why they descended aircraft Y with aircraft X also flashing at them at 3000 feet. They said that they were never going to work aircraft X because I had the uni shelf. It was then that I saw the note posted about the uni shelf. After the situation was reviewed; the area manager in charge said that separation was not lost. He said that the pilot of aircraft Y thought I had issued him a clearance for the RNAV 19 approach to I43 and descended after I switched him to hts approach. The event was classified as a pilot deviation. Today was a reminder of the holes in the swiss cheese lining up for a bad situation. I could have done a whole lot more to prevent any of this from occurring. First; I should have fully read the esis before I plugged in. I was too complacent at reading all the usual postings and didn't see the new posting about the uni shelf. This was my first mistake. Next; I fixated too much on the buckeye MOA after-scheduled-time situation during the briefing. I was thinking too much about all that and missed the uni shelf in the briefing. So; I made the mistake in not fully listening to all that was said. I should have called traffic to aircraft X and aircraft Y. With a student in the left seat in aircraft X; it made this even more imperative. I could have told aircraft Y that he could expect his clearance when he was 5 miles away from aircraft X. I should have called hts approach and explained that aircraft Y could not be issued a clearance until entering their airspace. At that time he would be clear of aircraft X. I should not have assumed that they would wait to issue aircraft Y's clearance. In our letter of agreement hts approach has control for descent on arrivals after hand off and frequency change from us. This was a huge mistake on my part. The hts approach controller never issued the clearance even though I gave them free reign to do so by switching aircraft Y to them. This was again my mistake. I should have asked for a tracker or for one of the sectors to be split out from my airspace. This would have lessened my attention from being diverted in so many directions. The area manager even suggested that I should have had the sector split. Our overtime people had come in and we had enough people to do it. It was my mistake in not splitting the sector.I am upset that I allowed so many mistakes to occur. Today was a huge punch to the gut. I did everything that I have told my trainees never to do. Shortcuts have no place in ATC. Every aircraft requires our full attention. If I don't have time to make all the necessary coordination; then I need a tracker. I should have called for a tracker to help.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID Controller issued a frequency change to an underlying TRACON. The aircraft was converging and began descending through the altitude of lower traffic the Center Controller was still working. The Center Controller turned their aircraft away from the converging traffic to maintain separation.

Narrative: Another day with thunderstorms and another day with low staffing. We had a controller come in for overtime and another controller in a staff position to come to the floor and work traffic. The day was filled with thunderstorms and reroutes from the moment I walked into the area. The sector was busy. PIK LO and CMH LO were combined with PKB LO. The controller was briefing me about the sectors. My primary focus was a military flight going into the BUCKEYE MOA past the scheduled time. The supervisor was working on getting clearance to allow this to happen after the scheduled time. The Radar Assist was calling the approach controls to block for the BUCKEYE MOA's altitudes. I know the radar controller discussed what else was going on in the sector. Unfortunately; I never heard that we had control of the UNI shelf from HTS APCH. After this whole incident; I saw that the UNI shelf information was on the ESIS (Status Area) in the extra information area. How did I miss seeing that?Aircraft X was shooting an approach at EOP. Other traffic was flying through the airspace. The thunderstorm line was about 70-80 miles west of my western edge of the airspace; moving southeast bound. Aircraft were not penetrating the line; so we had extra flights in our area to avoid the severe weather. I accepted the sector and cleared the military fighters into the BUCKEYE MOA. I was busy working departures; arrivals; and enroute traffic through the airspace. Aircraft X called on saying that they were on the missed approach for EOP and wanted clearance back to UNI. I radar identified Aircraft X; climbed them to 3000 feet; and cleared to UNI. Aircraft Y called on at 5000 feet. His flight path was crossing southbound over Aircraft X's flight path. I asked Aircraft Y if he had the weather and NOTAMS for PMH. Aircraft Y corrected me and said that his destination was I43. He was requesting the RNAV RWY 19 apch to I43. I looked up the approach and cleared him direct FEDIK direct I43. FEDIK is the initial approach fix. HTS APCH has very poor radar coverage. I43 is about 10 miles south of the ZID/HTS APCH northern boundary. The fighters were through with their time in the BUCKEYE MOA. I cleared them out of the airspace to [their destination]. I worked several other aircraft in all 3 sectors. My Assist also very busy taking calls; making point outs; and taking point outs. I remember thinking that I was going to give Aircraft X to HTS APCH; I was going to let them work Aircraft X non-radar to UNI (I still did not realize that I had the UNI shelf). So; I was flashing a handoff to HTS for Aircraft X at 3000 feet. I was also flashing Aircraft Y to HTS APCH. Aircraft Y was at 40 direct FEDIK. Even though the flights paths crossed; the targets did not merge. I did not call traffic to Aircraft X and Aircraft Y concerning each other. Aircraft Y was 4 miles south of Aircraft X and HTS APCH took his handoff. Aircraft X was still flashing to HTS APCH at 3000 feet. I switched Aircraft Y to HTS APCH. I continued issuing clearances to all the other aircraft in the sectors. I then noticed that Aircraft Y was descending out of 4000 feet in my airspace. I turned Aircraft X to a 040 heading to get away from Aircraft Y. I called HTS and asked them why they descended Aircraft Y with Aircraft X also flashing at them at 3000 feet. They said that they were never going to work Aircraft X because I had the UNI shelf. It was then that I saw the note posted about the UNI shelf. After the situation was reviewed; the area manager in charge said that separation was not lost. He said that the pilot of Aircraft Y thought I had issued him a clearance for the RNAV 19 approach to I43 and descended after I switched him to HTS APCH. The event was classified as a pilot deviation. Today was a reminder of the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up for a bad situation. I could have done a whole lot more to prevent any of this from occurring. First; I should have fully read the ESIS before I plugged in. I was too complacent at reading all the usual postings and didn't see the new posting about the UNI Shelf. This was my first mistake. Next; I fixated too much on the BUCKEYE MOA after-scheduled-time situation during the briefing. I was thinking too much about all that and missed the UNI Shelf in the briefing. So; I made the mistake in not fully listening to all that was said. I should have called traffic to Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. With a student in the left seat in Aircraft X; it made this even more imperative. I could have told Aircraft Y that he could expect his clearance when he was 5 miles away from Aircraft X. I should have called HTS APCH and explained that Aircraft Y could not be issued a clearance until entering their airspace. At that time he would be clear of Aircraft X. I should not have assumed that they would wait to issue Aircraft Y's clearance. In our Letter of Agreement HTS APCH has control for descent on arrivals after hand off and frequency change from us. This was a huge mistake on my part. The HTS Approach controller never issued the clearance even though I gave them free reign to do so by switching Aircraft Y to them. This was again my mistake. I should have asked for a tracker or for one of the sectors to be split out from my airspace. This would have lessened my attention from being diverted in so many directions. The area manager even suggested that I should have had the sector split. Our overtime people had come in and we had enough people to do it. It was my mistake in not splitting the sector.I am upset that I allowed so many mistakes to occur. Today was a huge punch to the gut. I did everything that I have told my trainees never to do. Shortcuts have no place in ATC. Every aircraft requires our full attention. If I don't have time to make all the necessary coordination; then I need a tracker. I should have called for a tracker to help.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.