Narrative:

I arrived to the plane one hour prior to the departure time. Captain arrived shortly thereafter and the flight attendants just after that. He briefed the flight attendants and then we proceeded to prepare the aircraft for departure. I set up camp; loaded the box and did my flows. I then went outside to do a walk around. It was dark; but I had my flashlight and all the tires appeared normal. They all had plenty of tread and no cracks.captain then did the pre-flight briefing off his briefing card. It was all very standard; including rejecting for fire; engine failure; or unable/unsafe to fly. He did mention that if we were to reject at high speed to just have them roll the trucks anyway regardless of what was wrong. He thought that if you rejected at that high of a speed it was just better to be safe. I agreed. We did the preflight checklist and were planning a flaps 1 departure (based on the preliminary take off data). I did notice at some point that my release had a plan gate 6;000 pounds lower than what we had on board. He did not show that as they had put out release #2. I got release #2 and it showed a plan gate of 24;900. We had two fuel slips; the second of which showed no fuel added. The plane must have been pre-fueled for something else and then re-released to reflect the fuel on board. This made us heavier for takeoff than we otherwise would have been.we received final weights prior to push and asked for take off data from 15L at wv for 154;000 lbs. We then taxied on both engines as it was the first flight of the day (five minute warmup). There were absolutely no delays and we were the first plane at the runway. We were cleared for takeoff and told to turn left to heading of 340.captain began the takeoff roll and we had standard callouts of set thrust and thrust set X% (I can't remember the exact N1 number). I called '100 knots' and was monitoring the engines / runway track and waiting to call V1; rotate.around what I would have guessed is about 130 KIAS (I didn't precisely note it) the plane began shuddering and shaking violently. I really didn't know what had happened; but the engines were still operating. There were no caution lights at this point. Captain called 'reject' and began rejecting the takeoff. It was certainly above 100 KIAS and in the high speed regime. I remember thinking I would have done likewise as I was quite shocked by the violent shaking and really didn't know what had caused it. He pulled the thrust levers to idle and disconnected the auto throttles. The speed brakes extended and he opened the reversers. I remember the plane slowing down nicely but still wasn't sure what had caused the shaking.as soon as the plane was slowing I called the tower and informed them we were rejecting the takeoff on runway 15L and that they needed to roll the trucks as captain had briefed at the gate. As we were nearly stopped (around 10-20 knots) I got on the PA and said 'remain seated; remain seated'. I probably should have waited to completely stop as I forgot that is the indication the flight attendants (flight attendant) may unbuckle.after we were stopped I got out the rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) checklist and ran it as per captain instructions. He then spoke with the fas and they confirmed everyone was okay and things looked normal in the back. On recollection we did the whole thing but I may have skipped reading the last step. I honestly don't remember. I know we did look at both engines and found them to both be operating normally. I then checked the brake cooling time and came up with either 40 or 57 minutes depending on whether it was 120 or 130 knots. We were probably faster.I then noticed the plane leaning about 5 degrees to the left and knew we had blown both mains on the left side. I'm not really sure when the second blew; during the takeoff or during the rejected takeoff? We were barely right of centerline a foot or two.next; I noticed the system a had a low pressure light for both the engine driven pump and the electric pump. I figured we must have no fluid. I then looked at the system page and confirmed that. We hydraulic pump low pressure QRH checklist and shut down both pumps. We didn't run the loss of system a checklist as we thought it wasn't necessary as we were on the ground.captain started up the APU and put the busses online. We shut down the engines shortly after the airport rescue and fire fighting vehicles arrived. They didn't find fire but noted we had blown both left mains and had a lot of hydraulic fluid on the runway.he then spoke to the people and let them know what had happened and we began coordinating with operating to get the people off the plane. It took quite a lot of time (about an hour) to get them off. However; all were safe and in good spirits.after we noticed all the flashing lights around we did a somewhat abbreviated after landing flow leaving the flaps where they were due to potential damage.he ended up speaking with dispatch; the fas; ops; maintenance etc. Everyone was informed and before we left he filled out the logbook for an rejected takeoff. We ran the items by read and do of a parking check and we left with the last of the people and gave the plane to maintenance.upon talking to maintenance and looking at the plane it looked like the initial shaking was from the outboard left main letting go. This caused us to reject the takeoff due to the question of what was going on and the violent nature of the shaking. I'm not sure what order things happened; but I believe one of the tires severed the system a hydraulic line and we bled out the fluid. I think the inboard blew due to the rejected takeoff. Any investigation will clear the exact timeline up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 flight crew reported experiencing a severe vibration during takeoff roll and they initiated a high speed abort. The vibration was attributed to a failed main gear tire and was followed by another tire failure and subsequent loss of hydraulic fluid. Passengers were safely deplaned at a remote spot on the airport; and the airplane was given to maintenance for evaluation.

Narrative: I arrived to the plane one hour prior to the departure time. Captain arrived shortly thereafter and the flight attendants just after that. He briefed the flight attendants and then we proceeded to prepare the aircraft for departure. I set up camp; loaded the box and did my flows. I then went outside to do a walk around. It was dark; but I had my flashlight and all the tires appeared normal. They all had plenty of tread and no cracks.Captain then did the pre-flight briefing off his briefing card. It was all very standard; including rejecting for fire; engine failure; or unable/unsafe to fly. He did mention that if we were to reject at high speed to just have them roll the trucks anyway regardless of what was wrong. He thought that if you rejected at that high of a speed it was just better to be safe. I agreed. We did the preflight checklist and were planning a flaps 1 departure (based on the preliminary Take Off data). I did notice at some point that my release had a plan gate 6;000 LBS lower than what we had on board. He did not show that as they had put out release #2. I got release #2 and it showed a plan gate of 24;900. We had two fuel slips; the second of which showed no fuel added. The plane must have been pre-fueled for something else and then re-released to reflect the Fuel On Board. This made us heavier for takeoff than we otherwise would have been.We received final weights prior to push and asked for Take Off data from 15L at WV for 154;000 lbs. We then taxied on both engines as it was the first flight of the day (five minute warmup). There were absolutely no delays and we were the first plane at the runway. We were cleared for takeoff and told to turn left to heading of 340.Captain began the takeoff roll and we had standard callouts of Set Thrust and Thrust Set X% (I can't remember the exact N1 number). I called '100 knots' and was monitoring the engines / runway track and waiting to call V1; Rotate.Around what I would have guessed is about 130 KIAS (I didn't precisely note it) the plane began shuddering and shaking violently. I really didn't know what had happened; but the engines were still operating. There were no caution lights at this point. Captain called 'Reject' and began rejecting the takeoff. It was certainly above 100 KIAS and in the high speed regime. I remember thinking I would have done likewise as I was quite shocked by the violent shaking and really didn't know what had caused it. He pulled the thrust levers to idle and disconnected the auto throttles. The speed brakes extended and he opened the reversers. I remember the plane slowing down nicely but still wasn't sure what had caused the shaking.As soon as the plane was slowing I called the tower and informed them we were rejecting the takeoff on runway 15L and that they needed to roll the trucks as Captain had briefed at the gate. As we were nearly stopped (around 10-20 knots) I got on the PA and said 'remain seated; remain seated'. I probably should have waited to completely stop as I forgot that is the indication the Flight Attendants (FA) may unbuckle.After we were stopped I got out the Rejected Takeoff (RTO) checklist and ran it as per Captain instructions. He then spoke with the FAs and they confirmed everyone was okay and things looked normal in the back. On recollection we did the whole thing but I may have skipped reading the last step. I honestly don't remember. I know we did look at both engines and found them to both be operating normally. I then checked the brake cooling time and came up with either 40 or 57 minutes depending on whether it was 120 or 130 knots. We were probably faster.I then noticed the plane leaning about 5 degrees to the left and knew we had blown both mains on the left side. I'm not really sure when the second blew; during the takeoff or during the RTO? We were barely right of centerline a foot or two.Next; I noticed the system A had a low pressure light for both the engine driven pump and the electric pump. I figured we must have no fluid. I then looked at the system page and confirmed that. We hydraulic pump low pressure QRH checklist and shut down both pumps. We didn't run the Loss of system A checklist as we thought it wasn't necessary as we were on the ground.Captain started up the APU and put the busses online. We shut down the engines shortly after the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting vehicles arrived. They didn't find fire but noted we had blown both left mains and had a lot of hydraulic fluid on the runway.He then spoke to the people and let them know what had happened and we began coordinating with operating to get the people off the plane. It took quite a lot of time (about an hour) to get them off. However; all were safe and in good spirits.After we noticed all the flashing lights around we did a somewhat abbreviated after landing flow leaving the flaps where they were due to potential damage.He ended up speaking with dispatch; the FAs; Ops; Maintenance etc. Everyone was informed and before we left he filled out the logbook for an RTO. We ran the items by read and do of a parking check and we left with the last of the people and gave the plane to maintenance.Upon talking to maintenance and looking at the plane it looked like the initial shaking was from the outboard left main letting go. This caused us to reject the takeoff due to the question of what was going on and the violent nature of the shaking. I'm not sure what order things happened; but I believe one of the tires severed the system A hydraulic line and we bled out the fluid. I think the inboard blew due to the RTO. Any investigation will clear the exact timeline up.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.